INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: MIGRANT INCLUSION ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE

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This dissertation is dedicated to my family, its immigrants and descendants, both past and present.

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Abstract

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INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: MIGRANT INCLUSION ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE

This project explores why similar organizations located in similar countries in the European Union (EU) working on behalf of similar interests will undertake very different strategies to achieve their policy goals. I focus on organizations working toward a migrant inclusion policy agenda across twenty EU countries, and compare their political activities across levels of governance. I develop an interconnectivity model based on group ties to explain activity. In particular, I examine how an organization's ties with a range of other actors shape activity levels and activity choice, as compared to more traditional social movement explanations. A broad range of activities are examined, including lobbying, protest, judicial action, media use, and collaborative efforts with others.

The findings support the proposition that the nature and strength of an organization's connections strongly influences its political activity across each level of governance. At the national level, increasingly strong connections to other like-minded actors serve to increase and moderate activity. Moreover, groups that maintain strong connections with actors beyond the state are more likely to expand their activities across levels of governance, including the EU level. In addition, I find evidence of a "solidarity effect" among networks of NGOs across levels of governance that increases the likelihood of collaborative activity. Interesting findings also emerge with respect to the other predictors. For example, I find evidence that the more radical groups, while not excluded from EU political processes, tend to resort to "back door" strategies whereby they target less visible institutions. Moreover, these groups tend to be excluded from collaborations at the national level, forcing them to look beyond their nation-states for partners. Overall, the findings lend strong support to the interconnectivity model developed in this

dissertation, suggesting that the nature of group ties helps to not only explain the choice of activity but also the target. This study is based on original data collected through the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations. In general, the sample of groups included is broadly representative of the population, lending confidence to the conclusions drawn from this study.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations in Europe

"Migration scholars are increasingly realising the importance of immigrant organisations," Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005.

"Since the 1990s and the uprising of the extreme right parties, it's gotten more difficult to defend the rights of asylum-seekers and immigrants in general," Representative from the Flemish Refugee Council in Brussels.

The newspaper headlines presented in Table 1.1 are just a small sample from a single European country over a ten year period, yet they illustrate the growing salience of immigrant-related issues and suggest the presence of a very active and contentious movement on behalf of migrants and refugees. In a sense, this should not come as a surprise, because since the 1970s and 1980s issues of immigration, asylum, and migrant integration have increased in importance throughout Europe (Joppke 1999; Koslowski 2000). At the same time that intolerance appears to be on the rise in Europe and beyond (Rohrschneider and Peffley 2003), public interest in many of the broad issues that the migrant inclusion movement is concerned with, such as anti-racism, anti-discrimination, and human rights, has also reached new heights over the past decade (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ireland 1994). As a result, these issues are increasingly recognized as part of the political debate in most European Union (EU) democracies. However, in order to affect the political process, groups must successfully coordinate and mobilize their support base. To that end, the migrant inclusion movement has, over the past decades, developed organized groups that direct the actions of the movement. Social movement research emphasizes that once a movement reaches this stage of formal organization, it becomes important to study the behavior of its groups (Dalton 1994).

In examining organized migrant inclusion interests, one puzzle that emerges is why similar groups based in similar countries working toward similar goals choose to engage in different activity patterns and target different levels of governance. The basic theoretical

argument I develop in this dissertation is that the European migrant inclusion movement is linked to and influences the political process through connections of interest groups and other relevant stakeholders in the anti-discrimination lobby, broadly defined. Consequently, who groups know, and how well they know them, is a factor that can be expected to shape political action and its effectiveness, as well as where that action is directed. In addition to group ties, social movement research has shown that other factors, such as organizational resources, group identity, and the political opportunity structure that groups face also shape political activity. Thus, these will also be examined.

A focus on pro-migrant and refugee organizations is important because they provide an organized base for the movement's actions. Because policy influence in advanced industrial democracies necessitates the formal representation of interests, groups must work at the local, national, transnational, and EU levels to monitor legislation, maintain close contact with bureaucratic allies, network, maintain a lobbying presence to present the views of pro-migrant organizations, and educate and mobilize supporters. As pro-migrant forces pursue these activities, they define the agenda and political direction of the movement. These groups also send signals to the public regarding which policies are important nationally and supranationally, and which strategies should be utilized to achieve the movement's goals.

THE POLICY CONTEXT OF THE MIGRATION ISSUE IN EUROPE

Issues of immigration have risen in importance across Europe in recent decades (Guiraudon 2000a). As Chapter 2 explains in detail, this development can be traced back to the post World War II period when many European governments began importing "guestworkers" to rebuild their societies. These guestworker programs benefited both Europe in allowing it to rebuild quickly after the devastation of the war, as well as individuals from the sending countries, where employment was likely scarce or sporadic. At the same time, however, European governments regarded this imported workforce as temporary. The prevailing view was that upon completion of their work, migrant laborers would return to their countries of origin (Wallace and Wallace 2000).

By the 1970s it was becoming clear that the idea of guestworkers as temporary residents was far from reality, although many governments had yet to acknowledge this fact.

As European societies were becoming more heterogeneous, native populations often reacted negatively against migrants, whom they viewed as competitors for jobs and as general "outsiders" who did not belong and could not acclimate to the predominant norms, values, and ways of life (Ireland 1994). In short, as migrants became more numerous and thus more visible to native populations, they began to represent a threat to the predominant societal norms and values. Thus, because of this perceived threat, European citizens began to advance claims that migrants were not only taking their jobs, but also eroding their culture. This viewpoint is expressed in the rhetoric of far-right political parties, whose anti-immigration platforms began to garner wide support in the 1980s and 1990s. At this time, immigration and asylum became highly politicized issues (Koslowski 2000). Table 1.2 illustrates the more recent activity and success of the far-right in various countries of the EU.

These developments culminated in issues such as xenophobia, racism, intolerance, and discrimination adopting a prominent place in the public debate of many European societies by the 1990s. At this point, the notion that the relationship between migrants and native citizens was at the root of many social problems associated with the phenomenon of immigration began to solidify. The conflict over migrant assimilation into the values of the host society versus cultural integration in which the norms and values of native and non-native residents co-exist side by side found an outlet as debates about how migrants should be incorporated into their host societies took hold (Koslowski 2000). Migration continued to be blamed for a wide variety of social problems, such as crime, violence, theft, unemployment, drug use and, more recently, terrorism.

In light of this brief background, Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and Table 1.3 establish the policy context of migration and asylum in the EU today. First, Figure 1.1 provides a picture of migration to the EU as a whole over time from 1960 through 2005. It shows that particularly since the early 1980s, net migration has generally increased, with certain ebbs and flows in the overall trend.

Although net migration decreased slightly into 2005, the trend has shown a steep and marked increase since approximately 2000. In examining the crude net migration rates in 2005 by country, shown in the first half of Figure 1.2, it is evident that migrants constitute a significant proportion of the overall population across many Western and Eastern European member states, as well as across the Eurozone countries, the EU-15 and the EU-25 as a whole.[1] Moreover, the second half of Figure 1.2 shows that although crude net migration increased in specific countries from 2004 to 2005, including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the European Free Trade Area as a whole, the change in percentage points was negative across the Eurozone, EU-15, and EU-25.

As in many other advanced democracies, asylum is a particularly contentious aspect of migration in the member states of the EU. Figure 1.3 displays the number of asylum applications lodged in the EU as a whole in 2005 by country of origin. The overwhelming majority of asylum applications to the EU come from Russia and Serbia/Montenegro, which are relatively close in geographic terms. Following this, a considerable number originate from Turkey and Iraq, likely reflecting the result of ethnic conflict in those countries. Moreover, between 1,000 and 2,000 asylum applications in 2005 came from Iran, China, Pakistan, Somalia, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. In each of these countries, respect for human rights is relatively low and/or significant conflicts are taking place, no doubt prompting waves of asylum-seekers into Europe.

Table 1.3 paints a more detailed picture of the asylum situation by providing a breakdown of asylum applications to each European country in 2005 by country of origin. The numbers reflect that, by far, asylum-seekers are targeting Western Europe in particular. More specifically, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK receive significantly large numbers of asylum applications from many countries. Moreover, Cyprus receives a relatively large number of overall applications for its size, Poland receives a large

[1] The Eurozone refers to those EU countries taking part in European monetary union (the common currency), the EU-15 refers to the 15 member states of the EU before the latest round of enlargement in 2004, and the EU-25 refers to the EU as a whole including the old and new member states.

number from Russia, and Ireland receives a significant proportion from Nigeria. Taken together, these tables and figures reflect the migrant and refugee policy context across the EU as a whole, as well as within specific member states. Overall, they illustrate the growing significance of these issues and their implications for tolerance, incorporation, and integration.

This policy context is associated with a host of public opinion issues and practical problems that migrants and refugees face, such as discrimination, social exclusion, and a strained relationship between migrants and native citizens. In general, organizations that work on behalf of migrants and refugees were largely established to address these issues and work for improvement (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). Although a few such groups originated in the 1970s (a time when family reunification was prevalent and help with basic services for migrants was needed), many more were established in the 1980s and, especially, 1990s and 2000s when net migration to the EU surged upward (see Figure 1.1). These organizations work on a wide variety of practical issues that promote migrant integration and inclusion, such as language acquisition, employment issues, housing, health care, psychological care, legal rights, voting and political participation, fighting discrimination and intolerance, and providing education. Moreover, although the groups concerned with these issues typically target any type of migrant that needs assistance, many groups focus on assisting migrants of a particular ethnicity or nationality, women, and youth. Much more will be said about these organizations and their work in the forthcoming chapters. For now, it is important to emphasize that the developments in and changes to European societies that have occurred over the past decades underscore the importance of pro-migrant and refugee organizations that work for remedies to many of the problems that migrants face, as well as the relationship between migrants and their host societies.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Given the assumption that a variety of factors influences the political behavior of an organization, the main research questions guiding this study attempt to paint a picture of how a movement for migrant inclusion, based on the activities of pro-migrant and refugee organizations, is developing

not in a specific country or handful of countries, but throughout the EU as a whole across various levels of governance. The broad research questions are as follows:

- What political activities do migrant inclusion groups choose to engage in at each level of governance?
- What factors influence participation in these activities?
- Why do groups choose certain political activities or levels of governance over others?

In order to explore the domestic, supranational, and transnational activities of pro-migrant and refugee groups and the determinants of those activities, I adopt a focus on an organization's "interconnectivity" as an important determinant of group behavior. In this research, interconnectivity or group ties are defined as connections to specific actors including other social organizations (encompassing both pro-migrant groups and other types of non-governmental organizations), and "members of the polity" (Tilly 1978) such as business associations and labor unions both at home and abroad. I focus on interconnectivity as part of an integrative approach to political behavior that incorporates other aspects of the most important social movement theories: political opportunity structures, ideology, and organizational resources. Each of these theoretical perspectives will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

In addressing the guiding research questions stated above, this project makes several important contributions to the fields of comparative politics and international relations. First and foremost, it will add to the social movement literature by examining how organizations embedded in a movement that promotes electorally unpopular issues (Geddes 1998) act to achieve their policy goals. Because the migrant inclusion movement lacks a wide popular base of support, there is reason to expect that groups may either behave differently or have different determinants of action compared to more popular movements, such as environmentalism.

This study will also add to the literature on the political behavior of movement organizations by going beyond the traditional focus on protest politics. Although migrant

inclusion is often presented by the media as a contentious movement as illustrated in Table 1.1, social movement scholars emphasize that the vast majority of movement politics likely reflects less spectacular tactics (McAdam et al. 2001). In disaggregating political behavior into various types of conventional and unconventional political action, this study presents a more nuanced investigation of social movement activity. Furthermore, in examining activities that span levels of governance, this project will bridge the literatures on supranational governance and the activities of the EU with the social movement literature. It also adds to the field of comparative politics by comparing activity not across countries as is common practice, but rather across levels of governance. In addition, this research not only focuses on activities, but also the effectiveness of those activities. While previous research tends to infer that those factors that influence SMO activities also lead to effectiveness, this study explicitly addresses this question. Finally, this study will contribute to the literature on immigration and migrant inclusion interest groups by investigating the political activities of a wide array of pro-migrant and refugee organizations active across Europe.

Thus, this study moves beyond existing research by focusing in-depth on migrant inclusion actors across 20 of the 25 current EU member countries. To date, no study has comprehensively and systematically analyzed the activities of a large number of such groups across many countries. In collecting data from 114 groups throughout the EU with the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations, this study is uniquely positioned to systematically address many research questions about the activities of the migrant inclusion movement. Accordingly, this study moves beyond yet compliments case study research by applying statistical techniques to analyze the determinants of group activity across levels of governance. Thus, it will ultimately enable us to make generalizations about patterns of action within the migrant inclusion movement and situate them in the broader theoretical context of social movement politics.

Based on the guiding research questions posited above, this project will examine the various factors that influence groups to engage in a range of activity types. Moreover, it will investigate how and under what conditions groups take their issues beyond their national borders and target the EU. In addition, it will assess the conditions under which groups engage in cooperative activity with a range of actors domestically, supranationally, and transnationally. These concerns suggest an inter-related set of more specific research questions which the empirical chapters of this dissertation will address. First, what activities do pro-migrant and refugee groups engage in at the national level? What drives participation in different modes of conventional versus challenging activity and their effectiveness in the domestic arena? Second, what activities do groups rely on at the supranational level? What factors prompt groups to go beyond their nation-states and target the EU? Finally, to what extent do groups engage in less visible "behind the scenes" collaborative activities with different types of actors? What factors lead groups to collaborate with others at the domestic, transnational, and EU levels to achieve their policy goals?

Finally, this research pursues two larger theoretical goals. First, the broad scope of this dataset provides a basis on which to test theories about the various factors that affect groups' choice of activities and their effectiveness. To this end, this study aims to contribute to social movement theory by being the first to engage in a systematic treatment of actor connectivity. Both the social movement and migrant inclusion literatures recognize the importance of group ties to social movement behavior and success (Guiraudon 1998, 2000a, 2001: Imig and Tarrow 2001; Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2000), yet to date no study has formally incorporated these ties as predictors of activity or effectiveness. To this end, this study analyzes the effects of interconnectedness on participation in a wide array of activities across levels of governance. In addition, this research will assess the predictive power of resource mobilization theory, group identity explanations, and political opportunity structures. By

including variables from each approach in a single model, it is possible to isolate the influence of each set of factors on political behavior while controlling the others.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS

The chapters that follow will address several topics. Chapter 2 provides a contextual background by discussing the literature to date on pro-migrant actors and migrant inclusion, and how this study builds on and contributes to this body of work. Chapter 3 discusses group ties in more depth and develops a connectivity model of political behavior applicable across levels of governance. It also offers a theoretical overview of the other social movement theories that guide the empirical analyses, and places the migrant inclusion movement in the context of these theories. Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations, the main data source on which this study is based. It details the process of data collection and provides basic descriptions of the data. The empirical analyses begin in Chapter 5. This chapter examines the patterns of activities used by pro-migrant and refugee groups in the national arena. It also assesses the determinants and effectiveness of different activity types. Chapter 6 investigates the activity patterns of groups in the supranational arena, and analyzes the factors that cause groups to shift their focus from the national to the EU arena. Chapter 7 focuses on collaborative activity among pro-migrant groups and different types of actors both within and beyond the nation-state. In addition to examining the extent and nature of collaborative activity, it analyzes the factors that shape cooperation at the domestic, transnational, and supranational levels. Finally, Chapter 8 provides the conclusions of this study. It summarizes its key themes and findings, develops the broader implications, and suggests avenues for future research.

The following chapters set out on an exploration of the European migrant inclusion movement and its political activities. Throughout this study, the primary focus will be on the factors that impact political behavior and policy effectiveness. I examine these issues with an original data source that spans organizations in 20 countries. This research project will add to our knowledge of social movement politics by focusing on a broad set of actors in the migrant

inclusion movement, investigating a range of political activities, and drawing comparisons across several levels of governance.

Chapter One: Tables and Figures



Figure 1.1 Net Migration, EU-25, 1960-2005. From Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Population and Social Conditions, 1/2006.



Figure 1.2 2005 Crude Net Migration Rates, and Changes in Percentage Points of Crude Net Migration Rates from 2004-2005. From Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Population and Social Conditions, 1/2006.



Figure 1.3 Asylum applications lodged in the European Union* by origin, first quarter of 2005 to third quarter 2005 (*All current EU members, except Italy for which no data are available). Source: UNHCR Statistics 2005.

Table 1.1 Selection of Newspaper Headlines in France, 1991-2001

"Marchers protest against tyranny, neocolonialism" (Panafrican News Agency Wire, 2/24/01)
"Illegal immigrants seek regular status" (Panafrican News Agency Wire, 11/26/00)
"Protestors defend rights of immigrants in France" (Panafrican News Agency Wire, 12/15/00)
"Appel national pour le regularization des sans papiers (National call for the regularization of illegal immigrants)" (Collectif St. Denis, 4/25/00)
"Illegal immigrants march in Paris to call for residency papers" (Associated Press, 4/4/99)
"Banlieue Babylon" (The Observer, 7/25/99)
"Attitudes to hunger strikes start to thaw" (Le Monde, 11/15/98)
"Protesters clash with police over expulsion of Turk" (Agence France Presse, 10/19/98)
"Art world comes to aid of immigrants" (Le Monde, 7/5/98)
"Bikers, immigrants in Paris day of protest" (Agence France Presse, 5/16/98)
"Controversial French immigration bill passes Parliament" (Agence France Presse, 4/8/98)
"Air France upset about immigrant expulsions" (Agence France Presse, 4/8/98)
"French film makers denounce gov't policy on immigration" (Agence France Presse, 4/7/98)
"Protests against expulsions of immigrants mount in France" (Agence France Presse, 4/6/98)
"Thousands protest French draft immigration law" (Agence France Presse, 11/22/97)
"Forty facing deportation go on hunger strike" (Agence France Presse, 8/26/97)
"Thousands march in Paris demanding papers" (Associated Press, 7/5/97)
"Paris protesters put pressure on Jospin" (Daily Telegraph, 6/11/97)
"Protest over immigration crackdown" (Manchester Guardian Weekly, 3/9/97)
"French arts leaders join in protest of immigration bill" (Los Angeles Times, 2/17/97)
"Paris march demands change to immigration laws" (Agence France Presse, 9/29/96)
"Immigrant protest ended by police" (Facts on File World News, 9/5/96)
"Illegal immigrants in France step up their protest" (The Independent, 8/14/96)
"30,000 protest over Moroccan's death" (The Independent, 5/4/95)
"Intolerance of immigrants growing in France" (Inter Press Service, 3/21/95)
"Hundreds of students protest ban on Muslim scarves at school" (Associated Press, 9/30/94)
"Thousands protest against new immigration laws in Paris" (Xinhua News Service, 2/5/94)
"Thousands protest against anti-immigration bill" (Agence France Presse, 6/19/93)
"Riots test new French government" (The Independent, 5/12/93)
"Riots in Reims after verdict" (Irish Times, 11/19/92)
"Killing of French youth raises debate on discrimination" (Associated Press, 5/28/91)

Table 1.2
Success and Activity of the Far-Right in Europe

Country	Party	Time Period	Activity
Austria	Freedom Party	Jun-99	Won 23.2% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		Oct-99	Won 27.3% of the vote in Austrian general elections
		Oct-99	Is second biggest party in Vienna and second in Austria
		Feb-00	Became partner in coalition with Austrian People's Party
		2002	Won 10.2% of the vote in national elections
		Feb-03	Invited to take part in new right-wing coalition with Austrian People's Party
		2003	Sat in 8 of 9 regional parliaments in Austria
		2004	Won 6.33% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	1 candidate elected to European Parliament
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	Jun-99	Won 9.2% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		May-03	Won 11.6% of the vote in the Belgian general elections
		May-03	Took 18 seats in Belgian federal parliament
		May-03	Front National Party won 1.92% of the national vote
		2004	Won 23.16% of all Flemish votes in European parliamentary elections
		2004	3 candidates elected to European Parliament
		2005	Commanded support from 17.9% of the electorate in Flanders region
		2005	Commanded support from 30% of the electorate in Antwerp
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Jun-99	Won 5.8% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2001	Won 12% of the vote in Danish national elections
		2004	Won 6.8% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	1 candidate elected to European Parliament
		2005	Controls 22 national parliamentary seats and is 3rd largest party in Denmark
Finland	True Finns	1995	Formation of True Finns
		2003	Party member and former wrestler Tony Halme won 40% of party's entire vote in general election
		2005	Occupies 3 seats in Finnish parliament, representing 1.7% of national vote
France	Front National	Apr-02	Won 17.9% of the vote in national presidential elections
		Jun/02	Won 11.1% of the vote in the general election
		2004	Won 9.81% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	7 candidates elected to European Parliament

Table 1.2 (continued)

Germany	National Democratic Party, German People's Union, Republicans	Mar-96	Republican Party won 9% of the votes in in Baden-Wurttemburg regional election
		Apr-98	German People's Union won 13.6% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt regional election
		2001	Federal government appealed to Constitutional Court for National Democratic Party to be outlawed
		2003	Court rejected this request
		2004	National Democratic Party won 0.9% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	Republican Party won 1.9% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
Greece	Golden Dawn Movement, Hellenic Front	1999	Front Line party formed, led by Holocaust denier Kostas Plevris
		Oct-02	Hellenic Front won 1.5% of the vote in municipal and prefecture elections, the highest for a nationalist party in 20 years
		2004	Golden Dawn alliance won 0.17% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
Italy	National Alliance, Northern League	Mar-Dec 1994	National Alliance is part of Berlusconi's first coalition government
		Apr-95	National Alliance won 14.1% of the vote in regional elections
		Jun-99	Fascist candidates received 16.9% of the vote in European elections
		2001	National Alliance won 12% of the vote in general elections, forming part of Berlusconi's coalition government
		2004	National Alliance won 11.5% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	9 candidates elected to European Parliament
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn	2001-2002	Rise of Fortuyn's anti-Islamic, anti-refugee movement
			After Fortuyn's assassination, List Pim Fortuyn entered parliament at its first attempt
			List Pim Fortuyn became part of coalition government
		Jan-03	List Pim Fortuyn lost all but 8 of its 26 seats in regional election
		2004	Won 2.6% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
Portugal	Popular Party	Mar-02	Won 8.75% of the vote in general election
		2005	Occupied 14 seats in 230-seat parliament and was a junior party in Portuguese coalition government
Spain	Independent Liberal Group, Frente Espanol	Jan-03	Frente Espanol founded, a new fascist party
		2004	Frente Espanol won 0.09% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections

Table 1.2 (continued)

Sweden	Sweden Democrats, National Democrats	Sep-02	Sweden Democrats won 1.4% of the vote in general election
			They also won 50 seats on local councils
			National Democrats polled 4,000 votes in ballot for national parliament
			They also polled 7,000 local council votes across Sweden
		2004	Sweden Democrats won 1.13% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	National Democrats won 0.29% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
UK	British National Party	2004	Won 4.9% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
Hungary	Life and Justice Party	2004	Won 2.35% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom	2004	Won 29.82% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	4 candidates elected to European Parliament
Malta	Imperium Europa	2004	Won .59% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
Poland	League of Polish Families	2004	Won 15.92% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	1 candidate elected to European Parliament
Slovak Republic	Slovak National Party	2004	Won 2.01% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
Slovenia	Slovene Democratic Party, New Slovenia	2004	New Slovenia won 23% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	1 candidate elected to European Parliament
		2004	Slovene Democratic Party won 17% of the vote in European Parliamentary elections
		2004	1 candidate elected to European Parliament

Sources: www.united.non-profit.nl, www.cre.gov.uk, www.bbcnews.co.uk, www.stopthebnp.org.uk, www.osce.org, various government websites.

Table 1.3
Asylum Applications to Europe by Country of Origin, 2005

	Russia 2005	Serbia & Mont. 2005	Iraq 2005	Turkey 2005	China 2005	Iran 2005	Nigeria 2005	Afghanistan 2005	Pakistan 2005	Haiti 2005
Austria	3,004	2,917	392	762	391	230	680	682	343	0
Belgium	1,000	972	1034	310	165	366	83	187	173	0
Bulgaria	7	0	44	5	0	5	0	305	31	0
Croatia	10	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
Cyprus	313	0	594	176	184	497	5	51	425	0
Czech Rep.	203	15	28	21	259	0	64	0	0	0
Denmark	109	234	282	33	50	90	44	110	38	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	168	343	252	70	19	69	51	170	0	0
France	2,236	3,047	169	3427	2,224	73	831	100	422	4,359
Germany	1,268	3,671	2005	2178	453	673	403	511	397	0
Greece	311	0	822	98	214	130	301	324	880	0
Hungary	26	189	26	50	117	12	64	10	38	0
Ireland	37	13	137	0	67	93	1038	116	49	0
Latvia	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lichtenstein	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	61	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	0	0
Luxembourg	45	164	35	0	0	35	31	0	0	0
Malta	0	8	17	5	0	0	43	0	8	0
Netherlands	182	191	1312	207	255	343	98	592	49	0
Norway	411	369	619	84	28	196	49	366	17	0
Poland	3,448	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	33	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	98	40	33	23	6	0	16	0
Slovakia	721	25	23	20	179	0	5	81	127	0
Slovenia	0	423	5	181	0	0	194	0	9	0
Spain	91	39	45	14	5	18	397	0	0	0
Sweden	752	2,140	1810	309	111	345	338	332	48	0
United Kingdom	135	145	3955	740	1,280	2560	570	1210	1770	0
Total	**14,543**	**14,920**	**13710**	**8737**	**6,034**	**5758**	**5323**	**5147**	**4878**	**4,359**

Source: UNHCR Statistics 2005.

CHAPTER TWO

A Focus on Migrant Inclusion

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS MIGRANT INCLUSION?

Traditionally, states conceptualize policies that deal with migration in one of two areas: immigration control or immigrant integration. Whereas the former addresses admission into the country, including who and how many are granted the right of entrance, the latter deals with incorporating the migrants already living in the country and thus addresses citizenship and naturalization issues (see Money 1999). I use migrant inclusion as a concept that incorporates both of these policy areas, among others.

Migrant inclusion is broad enough to deal not only with issues of how many and who may enter the country, and the requirements for attaining citizenship, but also with the practical, day-to-day issues that affect migrants' level of rights or quality of life, such as access to housing, health care issues, language acquisition, employment, education, and fighting intolerance and discrimination. Thus, the concept applies to organizations whose work involves legal issues (e.g., facilitating immigration procedures, naturalization requirements, work permits, voting issues, etc.) as well as quality of life or cultural adjustment issues (e.g., learning the national customs and language, psychological adjustment, health care, fighting discrimination, etc.). At the same time, the concept of migrant inclusion is narrow enough to exclude those organizations whose main interests do not touch upon migrant- or migration-related issues. This serves the function of incorporating a broad and diverse sample of organizations that address a variety of policy issues.

In addition, this dissertation conceptualizes migrant inclusion organizations as social movement actors, complementing the body of literature that uses the social movement framework for analyzing the politics of migration and ethnic relations (Guiraudon 2001; Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Statham 1999).

Social movement organizations are distinct from traditional interest groups in that they espouse quality of life issues (Inglehart 1997), such as improving the environment and women's rights, as opposed to traditional economic issues that concern business associations and labor unions. As migrant inclusion groups address policy issues that deal with rights acquisition, solidarity, and life quality concerns (as discussed above), they fall under the rubric of social movement organizations. Moreover, some social movement research argues that social movement organizations are distinct in that they tend to employ disruptive political tactics as opposed to more conventional lobbying strategies, as the media headlines in Chapter 1 illustrate with respect to migrant inclusion actors. However, others have challenged this proposition and have found that social movement organizations behave much like traditional interest groups in terms of the political tactics they employ (Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003).

In sum, migrant inclusion is a broad concept used throughout this dissertation to describe the types of issues that most concern the groups included in this study. It includes immigration control and integration issues, as well as rights acquisition and cultural adjustment issues. Further, migrant inclusion organizations are social movement actors mainly because of the nature of the issues they espouse. Rather than focusing on economic or business concerns, these groups devote their attention to solidarity and quality of life among other issues. The tactics they use to address these concerns are an empirical issue that this dissertation will address.

ESTABLISHING THE TOPIC

This study is concerned with the patterns and determinants of political behavior of the migrant inclusion movement not in a specific country or region of Europe, but across the EU as a whole. At least three major developments provide the foundation for a focus on migrant inclusion. First, changing patterns of international migration over time have created pressures for closer cooperation among EU member states in the area of immigration and asylum, prompting the rise of movement groups with political claims (for migrant inclusion *and* exclusion) in this policy domain. For example, the migration flows from southern to northern Europe that characterized

the 1950s and early 1960s eventually gave way to increasing flows from beyond Europe's borders in the late 1960s and 1970s; at the same time, slower economic growth and rising unemployment within the EU sharpened resistance to immigrant labor (Wallace and Wallace 2000). Secondly, in the 1980s, tightened controls on immigration coincided with a global rise in the number of refugees, which resulted in a surge in the number of asylum-seekers arriving in Western Europe (Wallace and Wallace 2000); this increased the public visibility of the migration issue across the European Union. Finally, the success of the 1992 internal market program in facilitating the free movement of goods across internal borders focused increasing attention on the remaining controls on people at the internal frontiers of the EU (Wallace and Wallace 2000).

Taken together, these developments have prompted some pro-migrant and refugee NGOs to contend that the underlying purpose of policy development in the area of immigration is to fashion a "Fortress Europe," virtually excluding certain outsiders from beyond the external borders of the EU. As will be explained in subsequent sections, some scholars argue that these restrictive tendencies tend to occur at the level of the nation-state in an attempt to maintain control over borders. When they do occur at the EU level, they tend to be expressed through actors that represent nation-states. Some scholars argue that this provides an incentive for pro-migrant actors to target EU institutions or take cooperative action with others in the transnational sphere as an alternative to national action. This situation, which is related to developments both within individual nation-states and the European Union, has created an agenda for pro-migrant and refugee groups to become involved in the political process across levels of governance.

More recently, from the 2005 suburban riots in France to the church occupations, sit-ins and hunger strikes of the early 1990s, immigrant-related issues have received increasing media attention as problems of migrant integration come to the fore. Consequently, over the past few decades the migrant inclusion movement has developed and expanded throughout virtually every EU country. Pro-migrant and refugee organizations undertake a broad range of work on issues that affect third country nationals in Europe. Groups attempt to influence policymakers to enact

policy reforms to reduce barriers to migrant integration and promote active involvement with the host society.

Despite their proliferation across Europe and lobbying presence in Brussels, however, no social movement study has systematically analyzed a broad range of activities and effectiveness of pro-migrant and refugee organizations across the EU as a whole. Moreover, previous migrant inclusion research has not focused explicitly on both action and effectiveness at various levels of governance (Guiraudon 1998; 2003), has tended to emphasize the contentious aspects of migrant inclusion or has not fully examined a range of both conventional and challenging political strategies (Geddes 1995; 1998; Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 2000b), and has not systematically explored the full range of theoretical causal factors that could possibly structure the action patterns of organized interests in different arenas (Kriesi et al. 1995; Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 2000b). In analyzing the political behavior of pro-migrant and refugee organizations, the social movement literature achieves an important step toward greater coherence and comparability in understanding a range of social movements. Moreover, we gain a broader and more nuanced understanding of the relationships between the factors that mobilize political activity, different methods of influence at the domestic and supranational levels, and policy effectiveness. Thus, through filling in some of these gaps we may use the migrant inclusion movement to expand our theoretical knowledge of social movements. Taken together, the ensuing chapters will help to build a more complete, more robust, and more finely tailored understanding of social movement behavior.

WHAT WE KNOW FROM PRIOR RESEARCH

Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe. In postwar Europe, new immigrants were imported in the framework of “guestworker programs” to fill employment demands. The intention of the guestworker programs was to bring in new labor, rebuild and expand economically, and then return the immigrant laborers to their home countries. However, as Massey et al. (1998) has shown, once a migration flow is created it is virtually impossible to stop,

as inevitably some migrants will choose to remain in the host country and, under international human rights law, can send for their families to join them. Ultimately, this results in a phenomenon whereby settled and prospective migrants forge connections between the host and sending countries, which facilitates future migration and perpetuates a "migration network." In Europe, these networks were created when migrant guestworkers were reunited with their families in their new societies but retained extended family and other ties to the home country. Ultimately, once a migration network is created, one can expect to observe continued flows from sending to receiving societies. Thus, although European governments for a long time refused to view their societies as "immigration countries," these were precisely what were developing over time.

The first waves of immigrant labor around 1945 came mainly from southern Europe toward the industrialized Center-North (Martiniello 1995). From the 1960s onward, Europe also experienced colonial, post-colonial, and other migration from beyond Europe. Migration policies during this period were largely a part of employment policy and thus failed to anticipate large-scale settlements of ethnic minorities (Martiniello 1995). Later, in the early- to mid-1970s, the zero-immigration doctrine was put into place in many European countries as they officially halted the recruitment of new migrant workers from abroad (Martiniello 1995). From the mid-1970s until the end of the 1980s, labor migration continued but on a smaller scale, family reunification became much more common, Southern Europe began to experience increasing migration, and refugee flows into Europe became much more pronounced (Martiniello 1995). During this period, immigration policies were fashioned to promote return migration, border controls were strengthened, and attention began to shift somewhat toward migrant integration (Wallace and Wallace 2000). From 1989 through roughly 2004, Europe witnessed the explosion of the so-called "asylum crisis," a sharp rise in illegal immigration, and the association of migration with internal security (Martiniello 2005). Policies at this time incorporated de facto restrictions to asylum, an emphasis on security and border control to fight illegal immigration, an increase in

deportations and expulsions, an increased focus on integration and citizenship policies, and a linkage of migration and development policies (Martiniello 2005). At present, although the nation-state continues to be the primary actor in migration politics, some scholars have argued that Europe's approach to migration is becoming increasingly supranational with an emphasis on the creation of more balanced policies (Martiniello 2005).

Besides knowing that migration networks perpetuate continued migration flows, we know that migration into most European countries has been increasing over time. This is occurring for several reasons and has numerous implications. First, globalization creates pressures to migrate. At the most basic level, the media highlight the gap between the world's rich and poor and implant a desire to better one's standard of living. At the same time, labor market structures in both Europe and beyond are such that they create a demand for low-skilled labor to fill many types of jobs that native populations refuse to perform; this is particularly acute in certain industries such as construction, automobiles, and hospitality (Favell and Hansen 2002). Because of this need for labor, many businesses in Europe actively lobby their governments for less restrictive immigration control policies (Favell and Hansen 2002). Thus, most migrations occur for economic reasons (Martiniello 1995).

Research has shown that once pressures associated with supply and demand create a migration market, government action that aims to place restrictions on the number of immigrants it will allow into its borders, or conditions on the types of migrants it will allow, tends to be ineffective (Favell and Hansen 2002). Government attempts to control migration and close off avenues for entry prompt prospective migrants to select alternative means of entry which are often illegal. Thus, in periods of economic growth or in the face of labor market demand, illegal migration tends to persist even when governments enact restrictive migration control policies (Hansen et al. 2001). Alternatively, family reunification is another means by which prospective migrants can gain entry.

In addition to economics, however, demographic factors play a role in structuring increasing migration to Europe. For example, Franco Frattini, the European commissioner for justice, security, and freedom, recently drafted a proposal identifying migration as a tool for addressing Europe's labor needs in light of the fact that the populations of many EU countries are projected to either fall or grow at a low rate over the next few decades (European Voice 2005). The birth rate for many EU countries is currently below the replacement level, meaning that parents are not producing enough children to replace them after they die. For example, France has one of the highest fertility rates in Western Europe at 1.9 children per woman, yet approximately 2.1 children per woman is necessary to attain or maintain economic growth (Population Reference Bureau 2005). Such low birth rates will likely cause Europe's workforce, and therefore its economies, to shrink (Journal of Employee Assistance 2005). In order to sustain their labor force and economies into the future, European countries will likely have no choice but to depend on migration to some extent to fill labor market demand.

Moreover, geographic factors play a role in encouraging migration to Europe. Europe's southern countries, such as Spain and Italy, are situated in close proximity to North Africa, where countries such as Algeria and Morocco channel many poor and unskilled migrants into Europe. It is not uncommon for prospective migrants to travel from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa, where they are transported relatively easily (and often illegally) to Europe (EU Observer 2005). Moreover, the new member states of Eastern Europe serve as a prospective access point for many migrants seeking to make their way to Western Europe where they can earn higher wages.

In sum, Europe's guestworker programs, combined with human rights law allowing family reunification, started a wide-scale phenomenon of migration in the post-war period. Once the first waves of migrants decided to settle permanently in their host countries, migration networks served to facilitate more migration, ensuring a virtually continuous flow from the sending to receiving societies. Government policies that seek to restrict migration are often futile, as migrants tend to find other (often illegal) means of entry. Migration into Europe has thus

increased, and is expected to continue increasing over time. Although the nation-state retains a stronghold on migration politics, the policy approach to migration in Europe is arguably becoming increasingly supranational combined with the search for more balanced policies. Globalization and the structure of Europe's labor markets ensure a steady flow of unskilled workers. Moreover, Europe's low birth rate combined with its geographic proximity to many of the major sending countries makes continued migration a virtual certainty.

Toward a Comparative, Politics-Oriented Paradigm

The following paragraphs outline a brief synopsis of the main academic traditions of migrant and ethnic minority politics spanning the apolitical analyses to the important developments that have moved research toward a more comparative, politics-oriented paradigm in the 1990s to the MERCI project of the late 1990s-early 2000s. The discussion informs this dissertation's use of an integrative theoretical framework that draws on several social movement approaches.

Much of the pre-1990s literature on migration and ethnic relations can be grouped into one of three research camps: migration studies and immigration/integration policy approaches, migrant associations and collective action, and extreme right politics and intolerance. Whereas intolerance is discussed in the following section on the national context, the former two approaches are elaborated below. It is surprising that, given their obvious areas of common focus, these research traditions have remained largely separate.

The focus of research in the migration studies tradition tends to adopt an apolitical perspective on the structural, socio-economic, and demographic aspects of migration flows. This research often employs statistics from official sources and is frequently used to collect information for government bodies. Migrants tend to be viewed as the passive subjects of policies for incorporation into the host society. Moreover, it holds that migration patterns are strongly determined by economic and demographic trends and cycles such as those of the labor market, housing, or education (see Koopmans and Statham 2000b). The social and economic aspects of migrant integration in a welfare state perspective tends to constitute the main research focus. In

this context, there is little consideration given to non-elite actors or the general political processes in which migrants are embedded.

Research on migrant political participation and migrant associations attempts to address some of these shortcomings by adopting a focus on the relationship between migrants, collective action, and the host society. The two main camps in this tradition are the class paradigm, and the race/ethnicity paradigm (see Ireland 1994). The class paradigm views ethnicity and race as mainly class identities; thus the political participation of migrants is taken as evidence of an emergent class consciousness of migrant workers (e.g., Castles and Kosack 1974, 1985; Miles 1982; Miles and Phizacklea 1977, 1984). This approach moves beyond previous research by focusing on the migrants themselves and positing a relational theory that connects them to the host society. Yet besides being overly-deterministic, there is little theory on the relationship between migrants and the political institutions that affect them. Moreover, any focus on political processes is limited to largely descriptive case studies that adopt class as the primary explanation for collective action.

Although the race/ethnicity paradigm is similar to that of class (see e.g., Rex and Tomlinson 1979; Miller 1981, 1982), it takes the ethnic and racial identities of minorities, rather than class, as the basis of collective action. In other words, shared experiences of racism and discrimination in the host society are presumed to promote and strengthen ethnic and racial identities which mobilize collective action independently from class. An important element in this perspective is its view of ethnic differences as one basis for societal cleavages. At the same time, however, "such approaches have a tendency to replace the socio-economic determinism of class by the cultural characteristics of the group itself…as the determinant of behavior," (Koopmans and Statham 2000b). Importantly, this approach also ignores the relationship between migrants and the political-institutional framework of the state. In general, both class and race/ethnicity approaches fail to systematically relate migrant collective action to the political process.

In contrast to theories of class and ethnicity/race which focus importantly on migrants and their collective action, another research tradition forges a more direct link between social structure and collective action by emphasizing relative deprivation. This theoretical perspective relies on models of socio-economic change and ethnic competition between migrants and the host society population to draw conclusions about how occurrences such as urban riots and xenophobic violence signal social disintegration (Koopmans and Statham 2000b). According to this perspective, migration impacts the economy in such a way as to generate certain pressures which create psychological frustrations among the "losers" of globalization processes (Heitmeyer et al. 1992). Violent mobilization becomes the response to increasing social inequalities. Perceptions of relative deprivation among different ethnic groups are used to explain violence over ethnic differences, which is often presented as evidence for a break down of the "social order" (Koopmans and Statham 2000b).

This type of explanation is often seen in the media and in public debates over riots perpetuated by minorities or violent reactions against them. In addition, this approach is quite salient in academic and policy responses to race riots and periods of ethnic urban violence (Koopmans and Statham 2000b). In addition, it has been widely used in research on extremism, influencing much of the literature on xenophobic mobilization and support for extreme right political parties. In the work addressing extreme right voting, supporters of the far-right are seen as reacting to losses generated by processes of modernization and globalization (see Betz 1994). Moreover, some scholars have explained Islamic extremism in Germany, for example, by the estrangement of Turkish youth caused by a lack of social integration (Heitmeyer, Schroder, and Muller 1997). The same logic serves as the foundation of the "ethnic competition" approach which uses perceptions of relative deprivation among white lower classes that must compete with migrant labor to explain urban ethnic conflict (Husbands 1994; Olzak 1992; and see Koopmans and Statham 2000b).

In short, prior to the 1990s, research on migration and ethnic relations was dominated by research focusing on class, race/ethnicity, relative deprivation, and far-right politics. Overall, it failed to systematically account for the political process in its explanatory approaches. Moreover, class and race/ethnicity theories of collective action are strongly influenced by country-specific national integration models, a characteristic which promotes insulation and prevents cross-national or cross-level comparative learning.

By the early 1990s, the migration literature faced several weaknesses. For example, research tended to be overly-descriptive with an inward focus on specific nation-states. There was a true lack of systematic, cross-national research. As trans-European academic exchanges became increasingly popular, the 1990s saw an increase in cross-national research. The first wave of scholarship that this produced was largely descriptive edited volumes focusing on the extreme right and migration and ethnic relations; it was common for experts from different countries to author single-country case studies (on ethnic relations see: Rex and Drury 1994; Wrench and Solomos 1993; Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994; Thränhardt and Miles 1995 in relation to Europe; on extreme right see Husbands 1994). Cross-national reflection remained quite limited, although general theoretical observations did emerge from some of these case studies (e.g., Rex 1994; Cornelius, Hollified, and Martin 1994) which informed the subsequent group of researchers who concerned themselves with fashioning a more systematic comparative research agenda. Three main perspectives characterize this emergent agenda: studies of citizenship and conceptions of nationhood, political opportunity perspectives, and studies that focus on post-national and European developments that transcend the nation-state. Whereas the first of these is related only tangentially to this dissertation, the latter two perspectives inform its theoretical approach and empirical focus. Thus, the political opportunity structure will be discussed further in the following two sections, while the post-national and European literature will be discussed in the section on the European context.

Before turning to that discussion, however, it is important to detail the recent evolution of the migrant inclusion literature to systematic, cross-national comparative research. The Mobilisation over Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration (MERCI) project was established in 1994 as a collaborative effort between the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), the University of Leeds, the University of Geneva and the University of Amsterdam. The MERCI project uses newspaper events data to compare the contentious politics of migration and ethnic relations in five European countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) over a seven-year (1992-1998) time period. As such, it has produced the first systematic, empirical, and comparative body of research on migration politics in Europe. Moreover, it is among the first to place migrant inclusion in a social movement and collective action theoretical framework.

Many important findings have emerged from this research which will be discussed in the following sections. For example, pro-migrant actors use many methods to press their claims (Koopmans and Statham 1999b). Further, connections among pro-migrant actors are a strong characteristic of the movement that facilitates political action in many arenas (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2001). Moreover, the POS of the nation-state plays a strong role in shaping claims-making (Koopmans and Statham 2000b). Finally, identity is an important factor in claims-making that must be accounted for (Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 2001).

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

That migration is increasing, that the majority of Europe's migrants are unskilled workers, and that government policies to restrict migration often result in more illegal immigration produce many tensions at the national level associated with the phenomenon of migration. A persistent issue, for example, is that of intolerance. Sniderman et al. (2000), Kitschelt (1997), Gibson and Gouws (2000), Maddens et al. (2000), Fetzer (2000), Weldon (2003), Lahav (1997a and 2004), Citrin et al. (1997), and Quillian (1995) have all examined intolerance of immigrants by national citizens. Taken together, these studies confirm that both economic and cultural factors lead to

intolerance. In general, the more economically marginalized the individual, the more susceptible they are to intolerance. Thus stems the perception of immigrants as "stealing" the jobs of native citizens. Moreover, individuals with a strong national or cultural identity are more prone to intolerance. Thus, immigrants also tend to be blamed for rising crime and the loss of cultural identity.

The implications of public intolerance, whether warranted or not, is that it is reinforced through the media since it attracts public attention and "sells," and constrains national policymakers in that they are less able to enact open or liberal policies to accommodate market demand. Moreover, it leads to increasing support for far-right extremist political parties that espouse anti-immigrant platforms. This has been a problem throughout Europe, particularly in Austria, Denmark, France, and the Flanders region of Belgium. Overall, tendencies toward intolerance are so strong that policymakers cannot ignore them, despite the need to do something to counterbalance declining population levels across Europe. If they do, they risk losing power to the far-right in many cases. Because of these issues, most pro-migrant and refugee groups that I surveyed have an active public relations campaign to target the media and to educate citizens about the benefits of migration and living in a diverse society.

Related to intolerance is the persistence of slow economic growth and high overall unemployment across many European countries. For example, one forecast for 2003 predicted that European economies would grow by only 0.5 percent on average, and unemployment would remain around 8 percent or 9 percent (The International Herald Tribune 10/31/03). More recent data paint a slightly more optimistic picture: the forecast for economic growth in 2006 is 2.1% although it decelerated in the first half of 2005, and the unemployment rate remains relatively high at over 8.5% due to persistent labor market rigidities (European Commission 2005). Unemployment also makes individuals more susceptible to the claims of far-right parties that

blame immigrants for national economic problems (Kitschelt 1997). This is evidenced by Jean-Marie Le Pen's[2] famous phrase: "two million immigrants, two million unemployed."

In addition to intolerance, there is a perception among elites that increasing immigration signals an erosion of control on the part of the nation-state (see Sassen 1999; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). At a time when goods, services, technology, etc. cross borders freely, national elites are more apt to focus attention on maintaining a stronghold on who may enter their borders. International human rights norms and the freedom of movement required by a global economy and regional markets are two characteristics of a liberal regime that undermine the sovereignty of nation-states. Moreover, since 9/11 immigration has increasingly been viewed as an internal security issue. From this perspective, it is a matter of national security for elites to maintain control over who enters their borders. Thus, states fight hard in order to control matters of immigration within their borders. This control is also important to national policymakers who seek to counterbalance developments toward the "Europeanization" of migrant integration policies.

That the nation-state remains a strong actor in migration politics, together with the increased awareness of the political dimensions of migration, helped to produce a body of scholarship emphasizing the political opportunity structure (POS) of the national institutional environment. The goal here was to produce systematic research connecting migrants to their political-institutional setting. This research tends to use the POS to explain differences in national migration policies (e.g., Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Freeman 1992, 1995; Ireland 1994; Joppke 1997, 1998), the success of extreme right political parties (Kitschelt 1997; Koopmans and Statham 1999), and the political participation of migrants at the individual level (Ireland 1994). These studies tend to focus on the broad aspects of the POS elaborated by Tarrow (1994), and neglect the "issue-specific" (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) aspects of the POS most

[2] Le Pen is the long-time leader of the extreme right *Front National* in France, and is also a member of the European Parliament.

relevant to migrant inclusion. Moreover, research has tended to neglect other important social movement theories, such as resource mobilization and organizational identity, in studies of group action.

The preceding issues suggest, and research confirms, that most politics plays out in the national context (see Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Koopmans and Statham 1999b). In working to influence policy, groups develop connections with political elites, other policy stakeholders, and NGOs both within their country and beyond. Nevertheless, migrant inclusion research has tended to focus on transnational and supranational ties at the expense of those at the domestic level. For example, Virginie Guiraudon (2001) discusses the activities of a network of ethnically specific migrant organizations and how their differences hampered their efforts at the EU level. Moreover, pro-migrant lobbies have established an NGO network on European refugee, asylum, and immigration policy (Geddes 2000b). Thus, we also know that ties among pro-migrant groups exist and function at a minimum in the transnational and EU arenas, and possibly in the national context as well. In this study, such connections will be used as the basis for comparative research not across countries, but across levels of governance.

In sum, at the national level certain phenomena associated with migration produce public intolerance toward immigrants. Citizens tend to blame immigrants for a range of national problems, including unemployment, crime, and the loss of cultural identity. Widespread intolerance is reinforced through the media, ties the hands of governments in fashioning more inclusive migration policies, and leads to increasing support for extremist parties. Moreover, globalization, international norms, and European integration produce a sense of a loss of national control over immigration that is made more acute by the national security dimension of immigration that has increased since 9/11. These represent formidable obstacles for pro-migrant and refugee organizations that seek a more inclusive and less restrictive policy regime. Pro-migrant interconnectivity exists at various levels and is important in addressing these issues. Over time, the POS has emerged as a dominant approach to studying migration politics, but has rarely

been applied to a large cross-section of migrant organizations throughout the EU, has neglected to examine issue specific opportunities, and has been used at the exclusion of other important social movement theories.

THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

The preceding discussion illustrates an extremely unfavorable national environment for pro-migrant and refugee NGOs that work for migrant inclusion. Such an environment has led one scholar to describe the goals of such groups as "electorally unpopular" (Geddes 1998), and has spawned a literature on migrant inclusion organizations that is heavily biased toward the EU and transnational levels,[3] where opportunities for influence are hypothesized to be more forthcoming.

A prominent theme in the literature on migrant inclusion and the EU is the political opportunity structure (POS) of the EU. Scholars such as Andrew Geddes (1995, 1998, 2000b) and Virginie Guiraudon (1998, 2001, 2003) argue that the POS of the EU affords pro-migrant lobbies certain avenues of influence for pressing their claims that do not exist at the national level. For example, Guiraudon (2000a) finds that the democratic deficit, or the closed venue of debate at the EU level, can lead to more inclusive policies since public opinion is absent from the policymaking equation. Geddes (2000b) finds that the structure of EU policymaking provides political allies for groups in the Commission and European Parliament in particular. What these studies have in common is the assumption that groups will turn to the EU level in the absence of opportunities at home, although this is often implicit and never explicitly tested across levels of governance.

In general, the literature argues that the EU POS may be more open to pro-migrant lobbies because of the mission of EU institutions to expand their competencies, or what Cram (1997) calls "purposeful opportunism." This implies that the Commission, Parliament, and

[3] Note the contrast with the national-level literature which tends to use the POS to explain differences in national immigration policies, support for far-right political parties, and the political participation of migrants at the individual level. At the level of the EU, in contrast, literature uses the EU POS to explain the activities of specific migrant inclusion organizations or campaigns that operate at the supranational level, and neglects to incorporate the national POS as an explanatory factor.

European Court of Justice (ECJ), for example, champion migrant inclusion issues not because they necessarily favor the issues at hand, but rather because it provides a plausible means of expanding their policy jurisdiction relative to the national level. When the ECJ rules on a matter of immigration or asylum, for example, it sets a precedent to hear further cases of a similar nature and thus expands its competencies in this area. Overall, it is relatively well-established that the EU affords migrant inclusion actors opportunities for influence and represents an alternative arena for political action.

In addition to the many national organizations, pro-migrant lobbies have been particularly active at the EU level since the 1990s (Geddes 2000b). Groups such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, and the Migration Policy Group operate at the level of the EU and receive financial support from the EU. This implies that there are likely important resource differentials between these "Eurogroups" and those at the national level. However, because the existing research is heavily biased toward POS explanations, it has failed to account for how resource differentials may affect political action and effectiveness. At the same time, European pro-migrant lobbies are small compared to other types of interest groups, such as women's, consumers, and environmentalists. Geddes (2000b) points out that the "one door, four doorbells" problem highlights this predicament. Behind one door in a Brussels office building one can easily find four pro-migrant organizations. It is common for staff to perform activities across organizations (Geddes 2000b), which again highlights the important function that connections among pro-migrant interest groups likely play.

In sum, at the EU level the focus of research has been on the POS, and the avenues for influence it affords pro-migrant actors, to the exclusion of other relevant theoretical explanations. Both the democratic deficit and the logic of "purposeful opportunism" can structure an environment for more favorable policies. Moreover, there are many pro-migrant lobbies organized at the EU level. These bodies are funded by the EU, thereby creating resource differentials between local and national groups on the one hand, and EU groups on the other.

However, staff is in short supply, creating a disadvantage compared to more established interest groups and underscoring the importance of interconnectedness.

WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW FROM PRIOR RESEARCH

Although cross-national studies are now more common, the literature on migration and migrant inclusion is replete with assumptions and hypotheses that have yet to be empirically tested. This is particularly the case with respect to the literature on migrant inclusion interest groups, as very little empirical research exists on this topic. The research that does exist tends to be case studies of EU-level or ethnically specific organizations which, while important, cannot be used to generalize across a range of organizations, countries, or levels of governance. Thus, we are left with many unknown factors about organizations that comprise the migrant inclusion movement and their political activities across the EU as a whole.

Although we do know from the more qualitative studies that migrant inclusion groups work on a range of issues and policy concerns (Geddes 1998, 2000b), we do not know precisely which political activities the movement as a whole utilizes, and in what combinations, to address its concerns. In addition, although the more recent literature that has come out of the MERCI project has gone a long way toward documenting the political activities of migrants, the dataset explicitly does not document lobbying, an important tactic of organized pro-migrant interests, and only includes data from five countries, all of which are in Western Europe. When we include a broader sample of groups from across the entire EU, can they be expected to rely mainly on protest, as some social movement theorists and media reports suggest should be the case?

Moreover, we know from qualitative research that these organizations act in different arenas, including not only the national level but also across countries in transnational arrangements (Danese 1998) and at the level of the EU (Geddes 1995; Guiraudon 2001, 2003), but we do not know if their methods of influence differ at various levels of governance. For example, does the structure of national versus EU policymaking encourage the use of certain activities over others? In addition, the MERCI project, among other research, has shown that

migrant inclusion groups are strongly connected to other actors. However, it remains unknown what these group ties look like, how strong they are, whether they differ at the national versus the transnational or EU levels, and what effects they have on the choice of political activity or the arena in which activity is undertaken. Moreover, among pro-migrant and refugee groups, we do not know what proportion of overall activity networking activities account for. Although the literature treats these ties as important, it fails to fully investigate their characteristics, scope, and effects.

By nature of its design, this study can answer these questions by employing a survey instrument. The survey is useful in that it can be used to systematically obtain information directly from the groups involved, and can be administered to a large number of groups. Moreover, it allows for groups in different countries and of varying types to provide information on the same structured questions. It can thus correct for the some of the shortcomings of event data analysis by asking groups about their lobbying activities (which the MERCI data excludes) and a range of other types of behavior. Newspaper data is not useful in examining a wide range of both conventional and contentious activity because reports are biased toward claims-making that occurs in the public sphere. For this reason, prior research has been unable to examine lobbying activity as well as less public activity that occurs at the local level, for example. The survey corrects for this by asking groups about their actual use of a wide range of political activities, both conventional and challenging. It also asks them to report on a variety of activities and their effectiveness at various levels of governance, spanning the local, national, transnational, and EU levels. Furthermore, an entire section of the questionnaire is devoted to asking groups about their actor connectivity (whom do they consistently ally with and how strong are these alliances) and their networking activities (what cooperative actions do they take with others) at each level of governance. This study uses statistical techniques to assess patterns of overall activity and effectiveness across levels of governance.

Besides these descriptive traits, there is an extreme dearth of knowledge when it comes to causal relationships among various factors, as no statistical studies exist on the activities of organized migrant inclusion interests as an EU-wide movement. Those cross-national studies that do exist tend to examine migrant political actors in a handful of Western European countries, are biased toward more contentious forms of activity, are biased toward POS approaches, and do not focus predominantly on organized interests (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2000c, 2001b; Kriesi et al. 1995). Thus, although studies have shown that these groups act at various levels of governance including the EU to press their claims, we do not know what factors besides the POS influence different political methods at different levels of governance. It is one thing to state that migrant inclusion interests lobby the EU, but it is another to provide empirical evidence about the range of factors that increase or decrease lobbying the European Parliament, Commission, Council of Ministers, contacts with the Economic and Social Committee, etc. Moreover, although existing research emphasizes that groups have a choice when it comes to the arena in which they act, and that the EU represents an alternative arena for influence, it has not shown under what conditions migrant inclusion groups will shift the focus of their efforts from the national level and act at the level of the EU or the transnational level.

This study can address these shortcomings. Again, the survey instrument allows data collection on numerous types of political activities in both the national and EU arenas. The relationships among these variables are then analyzed using statistical techniques, making causal inference possible. For example, the survey data allow the construction of a variable that measures activity targeted at the national versus the EU level. Binary logistic regression techniques can then be used to assess the factors that cause groups to shift their attention from the national to the EU level. This clearly goes beyond the existing research that simply focuses on activity in one arena or the other.

Despite the heavy bias toward POS-oriented research, some studies on migrant inclusion organizations implicitly assume that resources enable political activity. Geddes (2000b), for

example, discusses resources that EU-level groups enjoy being funded by the EU. In addition, the MERCI project confirms the importance of a multi-dimensional approach to studying social movements that includes resource mobilization. However, this has never been empirically tested while controlling for the effects of other factors, such as the identity of the group. Moreover, although resource mobilization theory claims that the source of an organization's resources is important in shaping its activity, it remains unknown whether EU funding encourages certain methods of political influence while discouraging others, or if it increases policy effectiveness. If EU-funded groups are no more active or effective than other organizations, we can question the value added of EU administered grants. By using the survey to directly ask groups about their sources of funding and other resources, this study can deliver an answer to the question of whether and how much resources matter, and whether EU funding shapes certain political strategies, particularly when other factors such as the political-institutional environment are controlled.

In addition, as mentioned earlier, virtually every recent study of migrant inclusion interest groups discusses interconnectivity among actors, and assumes that these ties are important in facilitating political action and effectiveness. For example, a platform of EU-level groups was successful in influencing the Commission on numerous occasions (Guiraudon 2001; Geddes 1998, 2000b). Other types of connections have been successful with the European Court of Justice (Guiraudon 1998). Yet few, if any, studies examine connectivity among actors within the nation-state, where most political activity takes place. Beyond lacking basic descriptive data on organizational ties, their effects are never empirically tested due to the small-N nature of this body of research. Thus, we do not know how ties among migrant inclusion work, if EU and transnational ties are the most important, or if national ties also impact activity and effectiveness and how they might do so. This study can address these issues by using a survey instrument to directly ask groups about their connections with a range of actors. Moreover, statistical

techniques are applied in order to assess the causal effects of interconnectedness on various methods of influence across multiple levels of governance.

Finally, existing research is heavily biased toward examining ethnically specific, Western European, or EU-level migrant organizations. This causes numerous problems when it comes to making inferences and generalizations, as one cannot be sure if the findings of such studies are applicable beyond those types of organizations. By adopting a broad focus on migrant inclusion actors across the EU as a whole, this study is able to include a wide variety of organizations that function at the national, international, and EU levels and address multiple policy concerns. Because the sample is relatively large and diverse, I can analyze different dimensions of migrant inclusion identity and use statistical techniques to assess the causal effects of identity on action and effectiveness.

In sum, the existing body of research on migrant inclusion organizations has numerous shortcomings when it comes to making causal inferences or generalizations about the movement as a whole. These include: a small N or case study approach, implicit assumptions, untested propositions, a biased sample and a single theoretical approach. This study is well-positioned to address each of these shortcomings by: using a survey instrument to directly ask groups many questions about their political activities and policy effectiveness, asking about (and thus collecting data on) multiple methods of influence including both conventional and challenging tactics, including a wide range of groups in the sample from all regions of Europe that vary on numerous characteristics, and employing a range of descriptive and, more importantly, inferential statistical techniques to assess patterns and address issues of causal inference. Thus, this study will add to existing research by answering many of the questions that have heretofore remained implicit or unknown. The following chapter expands upon this discussion of migrant inclusion groups as social movement organizations by explaining the theoretical arguments and propositions that the empirical chapters will test with the survey data.

CHAPTER THREE

Actor Connectivity and Social Movement Theory

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the European migrant inclusion movement's political behavior and political effectiveness. As such, it is situated in the tradition of more recent new social movement literature in that it relies on an integrative theoretical model to explain cross-national and cross-level activity and effectiveness of pro-migrant actors across Europe. For example, it asks: What do the broad patterns of migrant inclusion political action look like across Europe as a whole at different levels of governance? More relevantly, which factors best predict participation in and effectiveness of each political tactic at each level? What factors prompt migrant inclusion actors to shift the arena of activity from one level to another? In addressing these research questions, this study integrates and builds on aspects of various theoretical approaches to studying social movements.

Early studies of social movement behavior often relied on a single theoretical paradigm. For example, throughout the 1970s and 80s, much research was driven by New Social Movement (NSM) theory (Dalton 1994: 5-6). This view argues that the new social movements that emerged in the 1960s, such as the women's, environmental, and peace movements, are unique in that their participants are not defined by class boundaries but by a common concern over social issues (Pichardo 1997). These concerns typify a set of values and ideologies that have been linked to other new social movements. NSMs are characterized by their ideological opposition to the established political order, presumably leading them to employ disruptive tactics over other, more conventional, means of influence. Thus, the NSM approach suggests that the challenging identity of social movements is the driving force behind their contentious political behavior.

In the 1990s, however, scholarship began to reflect the view that the NSM approach alone is analytically incomplete. With its narrow focus on contentious behavior, it ignores the possibility that social movement organizations (SMOs) employ a range of political tactics. For example, many studies that examine a wide scope of action including not only confrontational behavior but more conventional methods as well have shown that social movements tend to behave similar to other organized interest groups in that, for the most part, their tactics reflect efforts to work inside established political channels and employ conventional strategies to effect change (e.g., Dalton 1994; Dalton et. al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). Protest, in contrast, is generally a relatively minor part of a movement's overall political strategy. This tendency broadly holds for the migrant inclusion movement in certain Western European countries as well, in that actors have been shown to use the media extensively in addition to more contentious forms of action (Koopmans and Statham 1999b).

Even if the identity of an SMO leads it to rely on contentious tactics, this fact alone may not indicate the absence of more conventional methods of influence because the underlying sources of action may be varied. In this view, an organization's tactics may not depend solely on its NSM identity, but also on other group characteristics and exogenous factors. For example, a host of factors beyond those emphasized by NSM theory have been shown to influence the likelihood of conventional versus challenging tactics, such as group resources and the structure of political opportunities that movements face (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994).

Thus, over the past decade NSM scholarship has increasingly relied on an integrative approach that incorporates various theoretical explanations of movement activity and success (McAdam et al. 1996, and see Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1994; for the migrant inclusion movement see Koopmans and Statham 2001). At a minimum, such an integrative approach incorporates dimensions of the group identity, resource mobilization, and political opportunity structure paradigms. Studies have found that an integrative approach performs quite well in explaining variation in the types of political tactics used by social

movement groups (Dalton 1994; Dalton et. al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Koopmans and Statham 2001), although relatively few, if any, studies have used it to explain political effectiveness of SMO actors.

In developing an integrative approach, a unique contribution of this study is its treatment of "actor connectivity" as an explanation of movement behavior and effectiveness. Interconnectedness among actors in the movement can be thought of as a more enduring form of alliance patterns conceptualized as sustained relationships or ties with other policy actors, including other NSM organizations, business associations, labor unions, and EU-level groups that I argue facilitate political action as opposed to more isolated pro-migrant organizations. For a given group, ties can exist at the domestic, international, and/or European levels. Actor connectivity is measured by the strength or intensity of ties with specific actors. Although a good portion of both the social movement and migrant inclusion literatures underscore the importance of alliances and group ties to SMO behavior, research has yet to systematically assess how connections among organized migrant inclusion actors are structured and how they affect political activity and effectiveness. This study is the first to use data from pro-migrant and refugee organizations to systematically address these questions.

In addition to group ties, the integrative approach incorporates and builds on more traditional social movement theories, such as the political opportunity structure (POS). Its basic premise is that a country's political-institutional context enhances or inhibits the prospects for mobilization, and thus influences the type of action employed (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; McAdam et al. 1996; Rucht 1996; Guiraudon 2001). In migrant inclusion studies, POS has been the dominant approach (e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2000b, 1999b; Geddes 2000b; Guiraudon 2001; Danese 1998). Yet besides not giving other theoretical factors due attention, these studies tend to focus strictly on the broad aspects of the POS elaborated by Tarrow (1994), and ignore the "issue-specific" opportunities most relevant to a given movement (see Meyer and Minkoff 2004). An innovative aspect of this study is its attempt to refine the POS

concept by examining not only the traditional broad aspects, but also the issue-specific "policy context" specific to the migrant inclusion movement. Incorporating both of these elements constitutes a more robust test of how the POS structures political behavior.

Another theoretical approach focuses on group identity. In contrast to the institutional focus of the POS, social movement researchers such as Zald (2000) and Dalton (1994) have employed the framework of ideologically structured action, an argument which centers on an organization's political values to explain behavior. The few studies of migrant inclusion actors that control for identity at all tend to focus on the individual ethnic identity of the migrant, rather than organizational identity (e.g., Statham 1999). This raises several problems which I discuss in greater detail below. This study addresses gaps in group identity research by being the first to systematically explore the ideological dimensions of pro-migrant and refugee organizations, conceptualizing and providing evidence for three distinct types: political/legal, services/care-giving, and asylum.

Resource Mobilization (RM) represents the final social movement theory. RM theory not only argues that an organization's resources structure its behavior patterns (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1987), but also that the sources of those resources play a role in structuring action (Lowe and Goyder 1983; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Despite their significance and the importance ascribed to integrative models, no study of the migrant inclusion movement has systematically tested the effects of an organization's resources, or the source of those resources, on action and effectiveness. For example, although many pro-migrant groups receive EU funding, its effect on movement behavior has never been assessed. To test RM theory in the context of the migrant inclusion movement, this analysis examines how the resources that any group controls, as well as the supranational source of those resources, relate to patterns of action and political effectiveness.

Beyond integrating actor connectivity and building on the more traditional theoretical arguments, a novel aspect of this study is its focus on political behavior across levels of governance. While the MERCI project has collected newspaper events data on pro-migrant

activities at different levels, it focuses on a handful of Western European countries and virtually ignores the local level (Koopmans and Statham 1999b). Moreover, subsequent research has not employed statistical techniques to assess the factors that drive groups to bypass one level for another. This study corrects for this by adopting a large and broad sample, and asking: How is group action structured at the local, national, transnational, and supranational levels? Which factors prompt groups to move beyond their nation-states to target other levels? Although many social movement analyses focus on a single level, this research attempts to expand this analytical focus by examining movement behavior from the local to the supranational domains.

Finally, a major contribution of this study is its focus on a broad range of migrant inclusion organizations across all regions of the EU. As discussed in the previous chapter, migrant inclusion research has become more systematic and explicitly comparative over the past decade. However, research is still biased toward actors in Western Europe rather than across the EU as a whole, and does not focus on a broad range of organizational actors. In studying the behavior of pro-migrant organizations and considering the evidence of this study with that of other social movement research, we can begin to assess which aspects of social movement theory can be applicable across different contexts. These steps will allow us to build fuller, more robust, and more finely tailored explanations of movement behavior.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT BEHAVIOR

In integrating the possible explanations for social movement behavior into a single model, I begin by discussing actor connectivity, which, although theoretically important, has received scant empirical attention in social movement research. Following this, I elaborate on the more traditional approaches (e.g., the POS, identity and resources), discussing their contributions and unresolved shortcomings, and how this study will address them.

Actor Connectivity: What Is It and Why Is It Important?

Actor connectivity, or group ties, is a concept that reflects specific actors with whom an organization is connected through regular interactions, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (more on

Figure 3.1 follows), and thus serves as a measure of "interconnectedness" to other actors in the movement. Similarly, Klandermans (1990) refers to interconnectivity as ties and consistent interactions that link organizations to other social and political actors. These other social and political actors are tied to the migrant inclusion movement through their relationships with pro-migrant and refugee NGOs.

Charles Tilly (1978) argues that such ties can be valuable in developing and maintaining a movement. For example, business associations, labor unions, and other social groups can contribute finances, personnel, expertise, and the basis for collaboration. Further, ties with strategic actors can create a platform for the exercise of political influence by connecting organizations to potential affiliates and allies within the political establishment. Thus, actor connectivity can exist at the domestic, international, and/or European levels, and potentially impact participation in different political activities and their effectiveness.

Organizations may opt to form ties in order to more effectively challenge the political establishment. Charles Tilly (1978), for instance, argues that citizens' groups which may have little in common have a tendency to band together to confront the political status quo. Thus, pro-migrant and refugee organizations may establish links with environmental, women's, or human rights groups, since each of these movements shares a common critique of the established political order. Other pro-migrant and refugee organizations are also important potential partners since the movement's expansion over the last few decades has increased the potential resource base for action (see Chapter 4). Thus, the potential for the formation of group ties exists; there are good reasons for SMOs to target a variety of actors.

What We Know about Interconnectedness

The literatures on new social movements and migrant inclusion emphasize the importance of interconnectedness and alliances to SMO behavior (e.g., Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Dalton et al. 2003; Ward and Williams 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999; Risse-Kappen 1995; Diani 1995; Guiraudon 1998). Theory, therefore, tells us much about the ways that specific

ties may encourage political behavior. At the individual level, for example, social movement participants maintain ties to labor unions, churches, political parties, other groups, etc. These multiple attachments establish a connection between the social movement and these other actors. Research has shown that personal affiliations are important when it comes to mobilizing new participants and influencing the behavior of individual members (Klandermans et al. 1988). Other scholars have shown that adherents of a given movement tend to overlap considerably with supporters of other movements (Kaase 1990; Kriesi 1988; Kitschelt 1989). Although the multiple connections that have been shown to influence behavior were originally applied to the individual level, the same logic can be applied to the group level as well.

At the group level, actor connectivity performs several functions that may serve to mobilize political action and increase the efficacy of that action. First, by definition, it connects groups to one another and, secondly, by doing so increases exposure to different perspectives on a given issue, deepening understanding of a given policy problem. Thus, group ties can facilitate dialogue, discussion, and ultimately common action (Danese 1998; Karim 1999). This is likely to occur if a group's connections are not only extensive, but also diverse in that they include a range of different policy actors.[4] Thus, extensive patterns of connectivity that include a diversity of actors may not only increase the overall political activity of groups simply by providing more opportunities for action, but the fact that groups are exposed to a range of viewpoints on an issue may also serve to diversify their tactics (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001; Beja Horta 2002). For instance, expanding one's ties to include business and labor may result in the group not only engaging in protest or media campaigns, as many SMOs do, but also lobbying specific actors in the national government. In general, then, we can expect that the more allies an SMO has, the more likely it becomes that it will be called upon by others to act, or will itself call upon others to act.

[4] In contrast, narrow connection patterns with a single type of actor are not likely to expose groups to varying perspectives and may instead promote "groupthink."

In general, then, an SMO's level of activity and effectiveness should be related to its degree of connectedness to a range of other movement actors. In contrast, groups with few or no connections may be afforded fewer opportunities to act in different venues, and may find it harder to mobilize. Isolation raises the costs of collecting information, and makes resource constraints more acute. The absence of ties may thus increase the costs of action.

Relatedly, groups may strategically develop their ties in order to pool resources to better influence political action. In this sense, "alliances within the movement may create a support network that single groups can draw upon," (Dalton 1994: 168). Thus, interconnectedness can facilitate organization and mobilization by providing a venue that links actors to one another (versus single groups that need to find one another to mobilize), and can increase action of many types by expanding the opportunities to act and by expanding groups' perspectives on a given issue. Finally, group ties can also impact movement success. One scholar writes "the importance of alliance patterns is illustrated by research indicating that the number of organizational allies supporting an SMO is a significant predictor of success," (Dalton 1994: 151 in reference to Gamson 1975; Steedly and Foley 1979; Turk and Zucker 1984).

In addition, interconnectedness can prompt groups to expand their political tactics beyond the national level. If allies for pro-migrant forces are scarce at the national level, an alternative strategy is to build alliances with actors in other countries or levels of governance. Keck and Sikkink (1998), for example, find the emergence of transnational policy networks as a response to closed national environments. In addition, much migrant inclusion research has examined transnational (Kastoryano 1998, Beja Horta 2000; Danese 1998; Guiraudon 2001; Karim 1999) and supranational (Geddes 1998, 2000b) networks. Of these connections, one scholar writes that they "assist the activists in working out strategies that reach beyond state systems," (Kastoryano 1998: 8). Thus, as migrant inclusion actors expand their range of connectivity to include actors from beyond the home country, one might expect their political activity to shift from the national to other levels as well.

In sum, scholarship has shown that interconnectedness is important to movement behavior and effectiveness in many ways. The diverse ties that individuals maintain forge a connection with the social movement and serve as a mobilizing influence. At the group level, ties connect groups to one another and other policy actors, expose groups to different perspectives, engender discussion, and ultimately facilitate common action. In connecting groups to others, organizational ties increase the opportunities for action and mobilize activity by creating a common basis of support. Links with actors outside of the group's home country can serve to mobilize activity at the transnational and EU levels.

What We Do Not Know about Interconnectedness

Although a rich theoretical literature exists on alliances and connections among groups, very little empirical research has been done on how this affects SMOs. As discussed above, much of the research that analyzes group ties in the migrant inclusion movement either tends to be case studies or is biased toward analyses of transnational or EU networks at the expense of those at the domestic level. Thus, we know very little about groups' connections at the national level. Moreover, the small-N nature of the case study research makes it impossible to assess the effects of group ties on movement activity and effectiveness while systematically controlling for other factors.

Other SMO research tends to treat the activities of networks as the *dependent* variable to be explained (Guiraudon 1998, 2000a, 2001; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). Thus, although these studies tell us a great deal about the factors that shape networking activity, we do not know how connections with other actors impact overall political activity. In addition, we do not know how this might vary at different levels of governance. In short, no study has systematically evaluated how connections with a range of other policy stakeholders structure an SMO's choice of tactics or its political effectiveness.

Figure 3.1 outlines the theoretical argument relating connections with specific actors to certain types of activity and effectiveness.[5] It begins with an organization, which can create links with other SMOs, business associations, labor unions, and EU groups. First, in the national arena, links with other SMOs are expected to mobilize contentious forms of activity, such as protest and court action. This is because these groups are said to embody goals and political values that challenge the established order of advanced democracies. Although research has shown that contentious action comprises a minor part of SMOs' political repertoires, strong ties with like-minded civil society groups may nonetheless encourage the confrontational tactics for which social movements are so well-known (Tilly 1978). Regardless of their tactics, SMOs by definition are part of a movement to challenge socio-political norms. For example, women's, environmental, peace, and migrant inclusion groups all seek to effect some degree of social or political change. Thus, when they band together, the common NSM ideology may dominate, which would then be reflected in their political tactics.

In contrast, as groups expand their national-level ties to include business and labor interests, they may be likely to experience a moderation of tactics. This is because in Europe's corporatist system, business and labor share a privileged position with policymakers. These actors routinely lobby governments and are formally consulted for the purposes of policy input. Thus, business and labor can create a de facto link between pro-migrant groups and policymakers by increasing groups' political connections or at least by channeling their demands to national policymakers. With facilitated access to members of the polity, pro-migrant groups have little reason to protest. Additionally, as SMOs interact more with business and labor, they may simply

[5] I posit in this model that interconnectedness influence activity rather than activity influencing interconnectedness. Although the latter relationship is not impossible, I argue that it is improbable and the more likely scenario is that connections shape activity patterns among groups. If social movement research as a whole (including POS, identity, and resource mobilization research) has shown us anything, it is that groups do not act in a vacuum. Rather, groups select activities based on various factors. I argue that group ties are one of those factors. In other words, a group is unlikely to choose to lobby the European Commission, for example, if it has no contacts with actors at the EU level. Once certain contacts are in place, certain activities then become more likely to occur.

choose to adopt similar methods of influence. Thus, lobbying and other conventional activities should become more common.

The last set of relationships in Figure 3.1 illustrates that as ties develop beyond the domestic sphere, groups likely shift the target of their activities beyond the nation-state. For example, connections with an EU-level organization may lead a group to lobby certain EU institutions in addition to, or instead of, its national government. Because many EU-level pro-migrant groups are tied to the Commission, for instance, including them in networks may increase the likelihood that organizations will engage in contacts with the Commission. Moreover, business and labor are routinely and formally consulted in matters of EU policymaking. Connections with business and labor interests across many countries may thus make groups more likely to capitalize off of their influence and target the EU.

In sum, this study is the first to use data from a survey of pro-migrant and refugee organizations to systematically address these questions. The above arguments suggest that organizations' political behavior is closely related to the types of connections they maintain; these arguments are empirically tested in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In this study, group ties are measured by the strength or intensity of interactions with other SMOs, business associations, labor unions, and EU groups at the domestic, transnational, and EU levels. By analyzing information on these connections, the following chapters will build theory about how being connected to specific policy actors can be expected to shape political behavior.

Political Opportunity Structures

The political opportunity structure (POS) approach focuses on factors exogenous to the SMO to explain its behavior. Tarrow defines the POS as "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to take collective action by affecting their expectation of success or failure," (1994: 85). Thus, the structure of political opportunities in the environment in which the SMO operates affects the

strategies and methods it chooses to employ, as well as its political effectiveness (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; McAdam et al. 1996).

There are certain shortcomings with the existing POS research. First, social movement studies are biased toward analyzing the broad aspects of the POS, such as elite alliances, political openness, degree of state repression, etc, while ignoring what Meyer and Minkoff (2004) call "issue-specific opportunities." Moreover, migrant inclusion research is heavily biased toward the POS of the EU, while very few studies examine how the national POS shapes action. Virtually all studies that do analyze issue-specific factors at the national level focus on citizenship to the exclusion of other relevant factors. This study is positioned to address these shortcomings by examining a range of issue-specific opportunities in addition to the broad POS and theorizing how they are likely to affect SMO behavior. Moreover, the analyses focus primarily on the national environment as opposed to the EU POS. Each of these is discussed in turn below.

Issue-Specific Opportunities. Issue-specific opportunities are important given the fact that recent research has attempted to refine the POS concept in response to the criticism that "the concept of political opportunity structure is…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment," (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275). To this end, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) separate the conceptualization of the POS into broader aspects of the political system versus "issue-specific" factors relevant to a particular social movement. Those general aspects of the political system are what much of the existing social movement literature emphasizes (e.g., Oberschall 1978; Rucht 1996; Tarrow 1989), and typically include such factors as the relative openness of the political system to the goals of a social movement, and the presence or absence of political allies. In contrast, issue-specific aspects represent those elements of the political-institutional environment most likely to affect the movement in question, such as federal government action against discrimination against women (Costain 1992) in the case of the American women's movement. This study refers to these "issue-specific" factors as the "policy context."

The heart of Meyer and Minkoff's (2004) argument is that institutional openness can vary across social movement issues and constituencies. For example, some movements may mobilize in response to certain aspects of system openness or closure, while these same aspects may be completely irrelevant for other movements. The activities of the migrant inclusion movement, for instance, are unlikely to be affected by environmental regulations, yet would almost certainly be influenced by family reunification policy. Analytically, then, it is important to separate the broader aspects of system openness from those specific to the migrant inclusion movement.

The migrant inclusion literature recognizes this to the extent that institutional studies of immigrant mobilization and the POS tend to focus either on access to national citizenship (Ireland 1994; Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 1999c, 2001, 2005), or how the POS of the EU shapes opportunities for migrant inclusion actors (Geddes 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2001). However, that it is easier and more common for groups to mobilize within their nation-states (see Imig and Tarrow 2001) combined with the purported significance of issue-specific opportunities highlights a theoretical void in existing research. This gap can be filled by examining how a broad range of issue-specific aspects of the domestic environment, in addition to the broad aspects of the POS, shape activity, including that which transcends the nation-state.

To this end, this study uses new data from the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index to examine five policy areas that comprise the issue-specific POS most relevant to migrants and refugees: labor market inclusion, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination. Where this "policy context" is relatively open to migrant inclusion interests, one would expect groups to use conventional participation strategies, such as formal meetings and lobbying. Such a policy setting affords groups with opportunities to express their political interests through traditional national channels, making protest unnecessary. Moreover, it suggests that groups have little need to bypass their nation-states in search of a more open POS at the EU level.

In contrast, societies with more stringent regulations enact *de jure* and *de facto* barriers to migrant integration. Thus, the POS remains relatively closed where the national policy context is more stringent. In such cases groups may resort to challenging tactics or activity that bypasses the nation-state as the available options for influence become constrained. EU countries vary widely in their policy stringency toward migrant inclusion. The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index can thus provide a thorough and robust test of how the issue-specific institutional context affects political action.

Broad Aspects of the POS. Prior research has shown that those broad aspects of the POS elaborated by Tarrow (1994) are also important in shaping movement activity. Thus, they must be included if only as controls. Many migrant inclusion studies commonly adopt the POS approach in explaining political behavior (e.g., Danese 1998; Geddes 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2001; Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000b). This body of research has left little doubt that states influence political activity. Overall, the POS has been shown to facilitate or constrain certain strategies according to the extent to which available access points for influence exist. Two broad elements of the POS may be important in explaining the action repertoires of pro-migrant and refugee groups: the relative openness of the political system and the presence or absence of political allies. Each is discussed in turn below.

First, social movement research finds that the degree of openness of a political system to the tactics and goals of a movement influences the tactics the SMO chooses (Eisenger 1973; Tarrow 1989, 1994; Kitschelt 1986). Relatively open systems create more opportunities for SMOs to focus their political action through conventional participation channels, whereas closed systems tend to encourage more challenging tactics. Alternatively, closed systems may encourage groups to turn away from the national setting and toward the EU. Many studies find that in the context of an open political system, groups tend to employ conventional tactics, such as lobbying and participating in formal and informal meetings with government officials, but in closed systems, when conventional channels of influence are less available, disruptive tactics such as

civil disobedience and protest become more frequent (Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982; Imig and Tarrow 2001). In the following chapters, the relative openness of the political system is operationalized in terms of the country's competitiveness of participation (i.e., the extent to which non-elites can access institutional channels of political expression), and whether or not the country has a federal political system.

In addition to the degree of political system openness, social movement theory emphasizes the presence or absence of elite political allies in explaining social movement behavior (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994). When an SMO has allies within the political process, it is more likely to rely on conventional activities since the structure of political opportunities is relatively favorable. However, when such connections do not exist and avenues to influence become more constrained, groups tend to resort to unconventional and mobilizing tactics or they may act at the level of the EU. Previous research suggests that Left-leaning governments tend to be more receptive to social movement issues (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995). Moreover, multiparty systems increase the odds that an SMO will find political allies in government (Lijphart 1999; Dalton et al. 2003). Thus, the ensuing analyses operationalize political allies as whether the country has a Left-leaning chief executive or government legislature, and the number of political parties in the country.

In sum, this discussion suggests that the POS influences the tactics that groups are likely to select, and thus structures their political behavior. In the ensuing chapters, issue-specific opportunities are measured using the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and a battery of four questions from the survey that tap groups' perceptions of the migrant/refugee policy context. The broader aspects of the POS are measured by competitiveness of participation, a federal versus centralized system, a Left-leaning chief executive, a Left-leaning government, and the number of political parties in the country. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 evaluate how the POS shapes the political tactics and effectiveness of pro-migrant and refugee organizations in the national, EU and transnational arenas, respectively.

Ideology

Whereas POS theory focuses on the exogenous environment, RM and identity theories focus on aspects of group characteristics to explain social movement behavior. The ideological structured action framework emphasizes group identity as the key factor in explaining movement behavior (Dalton 1994; Zald 2000). An organization's ideology "provides a framework for organizing and interpreting the political world; it defines the core values and peripheral concerns," (Dalton 1994: 12). Thus, group identity is expected to structure how SMOs perceive migrant inclusion issues, and influences the types of political strategies they utilize to confront problems that conflict with their core values. An organization's identity influences the forms of action it considers appropriate in view of its perceptions of the current social and political order, independent of which method will most likely achieve the desired result.

The main shortcoming of identity research in the migrant inclusion literature is that when studies control for identity at all, it is conceptualized as either the individual ethnic identity of the migrant or the group category to which the migrant belongs, such as Asian, Muslim, black, Turk, etc. (e.g., Statham 1999; Armstrong 1998; Favell and Martiniello 1999; Parkin 1999). While useful for studies of immigrant ethnic mobilization, this conceptualization presents problems with respect to interest group studies. For one, it fails to get at a conception of identity at the organizational level that transcends simple ethnic, racial, or religious categorizations. Secondly and relatedly, it fails to relate identity to the issue priorities of the organization. As Dalton (1994) shows, the issue priorities of groups shape their unique political ideology, and thus their tactics. Therefore, what is needed is a conception of group identity related to migrant inclusion groups' issue priorities and theory regarding how group identities structure political behavior.

Because this study encompasses a broad sample of organizations from 20 EU countries that work on a wide range of issues, it provides a basis for creating categories of organizational identity in the migrant inclusion movement. To this end, a factor analysis of group identity is conducted in Chapter 4. Following Dalton (1994), it generates group identity measures based on

the nature of the issues SMOs espouse. Three distinct dimensions of group identity emerge: services/care-giving, political/legal, and asylum. I argue that in SMO research it is more appropriate to conceive of identity along a continuum from less to more challenging, as opposed to a dichotomous view of non-challenging versus challenging, since all pro-migrant organizations are part of a social movement which by definition seeks some level of political change. The following paragraphs thus categorize each type of group along a continuum, and explain how the identity of each is expected to structure its political activity.

Organizations that focus on services/care-giving have concerns that center on providing a needed social service to immigrant communities as opposed to calling for changes in the existing system. Thus, these groups often pursue their goals with little challenge to the dominant political, social, or legal paradigms. Their issues of focus include: creating programs to improve societal tolerance of foreigners, creating educational programs to or about migrants (these are often implemented in schools and aimed at the young), job training services, helping migrants learn the national language and customs, providing housing services for immigrants, providing health care services to migrants, and implementing psychological adjustment programs for migrants and refugees that may have been victims of torture or that otherwise need treatment.

Because services-care organizations have issue priorities that tend not to pose a large threat to the established order, their values should be less challenging. These groups generally accept the dominant socio-political order and attempt to integrate migrants into it. In turn, their identity should shape the political options open to them. Thus, because they are more likely than more challenging groups to receive support and build alliances with members of the social and political establishment, services-care groups are more likely to act conventionally, and may be more apt to adopt a range of tactics, perhaps spanning multiple levels of governance.

In contrast, groups with a political/legal identity adopt concerns that may require changes in existing legal, social, or political relations. For example, they espouse changes in existing political-legal structures throughout the EU and generally seek to improve the legal rights of

resident third country nationals to reflect a more inclusive system. Thus, political/legal groups tend to focus on the types of migrant inclusion issues that call for an alternative paradigm, or vision of society, such as: facilitating free movement for migrants and refugees within the EU for work, allowing migrants and refugees to vote in local, national, and European elections, extending the benefits and responsibilities of European citizenship to resident migrants and refugees, and generally improving migrants' legal rights.

Finally, groups with an asylum identity hold similar political-legal concerns, but are distinct in that they focus on issues of particular importance to refugees – a specific classification of migrant. For example, asylum-seekers often encounter stringent legal criteria for gaining classification as a refugee and thus face serious legal obstacles to remaining in the country of asylum. Moreover, asylum-seekers are often held in detention centers pending a judge's decision whether or not they may remain in the host country, which can take years; this type of holding system ignites issues of a political nature to refugee groups. Overall, asylum groups are concerned with such issues as facilitating national procedures for obtaining asylum, facilitating procedures for legal refugees to obtain visas and work permits, and facilitating access to national citizenship.

Because the issue priorities of political/legal and asylum groups tend to pose a greater threat to existing social and political-legal relations, their values should reflect a more challenging identity. Both group types reject the dominant order of relations between migrants and refugees on the one hand, and state and society on the other. They attempt to bring about social, political, and legal change. It may thus be harder for such groups to find elite allies and they may have to look instead to other movement groups. Because their identity may limit their options for action, these groups may be likely to resort to protest and other confrontational tactics. Moreover, they may be blocked from accessing EU institutions, which exhibit a preference for conventional lobbying (Imig and Tarrow 2001).

In sum, the ideological approach generates a set of expectations that relates pro-migrant and refugee organizations' political behavior to their identity. Here, organizational identity is related to the nature of the issues that groups prioritize. This reflects a set of values among the group which contribute to its unique political identity and shape its tactics. In the following analyses, group identity is measured by the three classifications discussed above: services/care-giving; political/legal; and asylum. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 evaluate how group identity structures political behavior and effectiveness in a range of settings.

Resource Mobilization Theory

American sociologists are largely responsible for the development of RM theory throughout the 1970s and 80s (Oberschall 1973; Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983; Zald and McCarthy 1987). RM theory views the formation and subsequent behavior of a social movement to depend mainly on formal organizations and movement entrepreneurs that mobilize resources in pursuit of the movement's goals; thus the relative level of organizational resources determines the activities and success of the movement. According to this perspective, organizational needs and opportunities – rather than the individual beliefs and political values of the movement members – are the driving force behind SMO formation and action. Thus, RM theory places the analytical focus on the organizational features of a movement rather than its mass base. In general, the resource needs of any SMO influence its structure, goals, activities, and alliance patterns (Zald and McCarthy 1987; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam et al. 1988).

There are two main shortcomings with existing research as it pertains to RM theory. First, RM theory stresses that not only group resources, but also the sources of those resources, shape activity. However, the social movement literature tends to focus on the level of resources and generally ignores their sources, even though they are theorized to impact activity. An important exception is Dalton (1994), but in focusing on the national-level sources he fails to account for the influence of EU-level funding on groups' activities. This is a serious weakness of existing research, since the EU actively funds interest groups and thus likely shapes their behavior to some

extent. Moreover, although research on migrant inclusion actors has recognized the importance of accounting for resources (Statham 1999), data limitations and/or research design have prevented it from doing so.

This study can correct for these weaknesses by including information directly from a relatively large number of organizations on funding from the EU. EU funding is theorized to shape group action in several ways. First, "transnationality" is a criterion for receiving a grant from the European Commission, meaning that group projects must be transnationally collaborative in nature. Thus, groups with EU funding likely engage in more cooperative activities with others abroad than non-EU funded groups. Moreover, EU funding may serve to connect groups with European actors in the major institutions, including the Commission, Parliament and Council. Thus, these organizations are likely to act at the EU level. In general, EU funded groups may be less likely to limit their tactics to the national arena, making them more likely to engage in transnational and EU-level activities.

In addition to the source of funding, the amount of resources that groups possess must also be included in the study, at least as controls. Resources can work in two different ways to structure activity. First, in general, groups with more resources are better-positioned to engage in a broad range of political actions and to participate at higher levels in those activities. Thus, groups with more resources are likely more politically active and effective, regardless of the activity type or level. Underlying this logic is the assumption that group participation in both conventional and challenging modes of action requires planned efforts that are organized and financed by the group. Organizations need resources when they meet with government officials to provide research, technical knowledge, and expertise. Alternatively, groups can utilize their resources to organize a demonstration or protest. Studies of other SMOs document that organizational resources influence groups' overall levels of political activity across a range of activity types (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Dalton et al. 2003).

Alternatively, resources could differentially affect a group's choice of activities. For example, a large professional staff may lead to a preference for activities that reflect organizational maintenance rather than more confrontational actions. A paid staff may also be more likely to cultivate and sustain relationships with other social groups, political elites, and other actors, thereby providing the group with long-term stability and effectiveness. Consequently, groups with more resources and a professional staff are more likely to engage in conventional modes of action, including lobbying and mobilizing the public (Oberschall 1993; Milofsky 1988). In contrast, SMOs with few or limited resources often take advantage of their pool of volunteer activists; such groups may be more prone to confrontational strategies such as protest (Piven and Cloward 1977). Their inability to appeal to a broad-based membership, combined with the need to mobilize potential members and draw attention to their causes, may make organizations with few resources and a small staff more prone to challenging activities.

The organization's age may also indicate its level of resources and political orientation. As an SMO develops over time, it increases its legitimacy as well as its links to established social and political institutions. Institutional access and influence may also serve to increase a movement's allure among the public. Younger organizations, in contrast, may lack experience and the networking base to exert political influence through more conventional means, making them more prone to actions that challenge the political status quo or to limit their activities to the national arena. Consistent with this logic, Dalton (1994: 204) demonstrated that older groups engage more often in conventional modes of action whereas younger organizations are more apt to engage in protest-based tactics.

In sum, the tenets of RM theory lead one to expect that pro-migrant and refugee organizations' patterns of political action are closely related to the resources they possess as well as the source of those resources. In the following chapters, resources are measured by several variables: group age; number of full-time staff; part-time staff; volunteers; annual budget; an

increasing annual budget; whether or not the group has received funding from the European Commission; and its membership size.

To summarize thus far, this study integrates several theoretical models of social movement behavior in the context of the migrant inclusion movement. The traditional approaches emphasize how organizational resources, ideology, and the structure of political opportunities impact SMO behavior. I add several elements to this picture. First, I explicitly incorporate group ties into assessments of SMO behavior. In the following chapters, group ties are used as independent variables to predict activity and effectiveness. Secondly, I refine the concept of political opportunity by examining not only its usual broad aspects, but also by incorporating the issue-specific "policy context" most relevant to migrants and refugees. Third, I create categories of organizational identity based on groups' primary issue concerns, rather than ethnic or racial characteristics. Fourth, I not only systematically account for groups' resources, but also for the supranational source of those resources. The following section foreshadows the topics of the upcoming empirical chapters by moving from a discussion of the various factors that influence SMO behavior to a discussion of the different activity types and locales where political behavior occurs.

PREVIEW OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TYPES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

This study focuses on a broad range of activities in order to correct for the shortcomings of prior research. Although the studies that have come out of the MERCI project are the most systematic research to date on pro-migrant mobilization, they nonetheless leave gaps that this study can fill. First, by admission, in relying on content analyses of newspapers the MERCI data is biased toward more controversial forms of claims-making or forms that occur in the public sphere. Thus, it does not include lobbying activity or informal meetings, for example, even though part of its focus includes organized interests. Moreover, although the data purports to cover a variety of both conventional and challenging tactics, upon closer scrutiny the only non-challenging activities it covers are "public statements" and other uses of the media.

Because groups can use a variety of tactics to influence politics, any framework for analyzing group activity patterns should include a broad range of relevant activities that pro-migrant interests engage in. In this project, they span the conventional to the more confrontational, the more visible to the more "behind the scenes," from the local to the supranational level, and include: contacts with local government; formal and informal meetings with civil servants or ministers; contacts with political parties; contacts with Parliament; participation in government commissions and advisory committees; contacts with the media; demonstrations, protests and other direct actions that target the national government; legal recourse to the national courts or other judicial bodies; contacts with the European Commission; European Parliament; Council of Ministers; the Economic and Social Committee; and COREPER; demonstrations, protests and other direct actions that target the EU; legal recourse to the European Court of Justice (ECJ); and sharing information, expertise, resources, and collaborating in projects at the national, transnational, and EU levels.

The concept of political effectiveness is also captured across levels. For each activity mode mentioned above, a corresponding question in the survey asked respondents to rate that activity's effectiveness in achieving the organization's policy goals.

Because groups can undertake activity alone or with other movement actors, chapter 7 explores the factors that lead groups to engage in domestic and non-domestic cooperation, such as sharing information and collaborating on common projects. In addition, activity can occur in multiple arenas, including the national and EU levels. Therefore, chapter 6 examines the conditions under which groups will expand their activities from the realm of the nation-state upward to the EU. Rather than examining each level in isolation, it focuses on how changes in the independent variables influence the propensity to act in one arena versus the other. Thus, it looks at activity in one setting relative to another. Chapter 5 leads off the empirical investigation by assessing the factors that prompt groups to use conventional versus challenging tactics in the

national sphere. Before turning to the empirical investigations, however, the following chapter discusses the main data source in greater detail.

Chapter Three: Tables and Figures

Figure 3.1
Interconnectedness and Political Activity



CHAPTER FOUR

Overview of the Data: The Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the data collection process and a descriptive account of the basic organizational characteristics of pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) groups throughout the EU. This type of factual information is important, in part, because it sheds light on the nature of the organizations that serve as the basis for analyses in the subsequent chapters. For example, comparing the age of the sample to that of the known population of PMR groups provides information about how representative the sample is. Moreover, in examining other group characteristics, such as membership, finances, and personnel, it becomes possible to assess the amount of variation within the sample itself. Thus, the information presented here describes the process of data collection, introduces the groups I surveyed, describes many important characteristics of the sample, and, where possible, attempts to compare certain elements of the sample to the known universe of PMR groups across the EU.

The main data for this study primarily come from an original survey of organized PMR interests, as these groups deal with issues that affect migrants and refugees in Europe on a regular basis. As with any data collection method, surveys have advantages and disadvantages. One limit of surveys is that they rely on self-reporting, which may be problematic insofar as the respondent must make judgments in recalling past events or predicting future events. In this survey, groups are asked to make judgments about the relative degree of time they spend on given activities (often, sometimes, rarely, or never). A related limitation here is that there is no precise definition of what constitutes “often” as opposed to “sometimes,” etc. Therefore, one group may consider lobbying ten times a year as “often,” while another group may assess this as “rarely.” The survey

also asks respondents to assess the effectiveness of their political tactics. A similar issue arises in that there are no precise meanings of "very effective," "somewhat effective," etc. Instead, each group must make a judgment which can potentially vary considerably between groups for a given response category. Finally, survey data is not suited to drawing inferences about trends over time; rather, it is best used to capture a "snapshot" of activity at a given point in time.

At the same time, however, surveys have great advantages that are particularly well-suited to address the research questions in this study. First, they are a systematic means of collecting first-hand data directly from the source. This survey asks group representatives what political methods they use at various levels of governance, allowing an explicitly comparative analysis across levels. Moreover, this survey served the important goal of generating a relatively large sample. In this study, I conducted in-depth interviews in many cases *before* administering the survey, which allowed me to begin this project with detailed information. Using this information, I was able to design the questionnaire in a manner that focused on obtaining the most relevant information from the largest possible number of groups. The Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations is thus the first systematic effort to collect data directly from migrant inclusion groups throughout all regions of the EU on a variety of topics. In part, the questionnaire asked representatives to provide factual information on a variety of group characteristics. This chapter will show among other things that the sample is broadly representative.

The first step in constructing the dataset was to identify the known universe of non-governmental actors that work on behalf of migrants and refugees throughout the EU. After identifying this population and constructing a master list of groups, I administered several rounds of the survey questionnaire. In addition, I conducted interviews with a variety of different actors in Brussels and London in order to gain supplemental information not readily available through the survey. The outcome of these efforts is an original dataset of pro-migrant actor attitudes and activities in 20 EU countries. This chapter discusses each step of the data collection process.

THE UNIVERSE OF PRO-MIGRANT AND REFUGEE INTERESTS

In researching PMR groups throughout the EU, this study aims to represent the diversity of actors and group characteristics that comprise the migrant inclusion movement. Accordingly, the universe consists of a wide range of actors. Although this study is mainly concerned with the political activities of mass-membership organizations, the migrant inclusion movement (like other social movements) likely behaves much like an industry that interconnects mass-membership groups, research institutes, foundations, religious institutions, political lobbies, and small associations of elites. Thus, any comprehensive study of the movement should aim to include as many of these elements as possible.

The Universe

Before administering the questionnaire, the first step was to identify the population of relevant pro-migrant actors throughout the EU and create a master list.[6] Because there is no official directory of such organizations, it was necessary to begin with a short list of organizations in each of 15 EU countries and expand it from there. Accordingly, I began by compiling an inventory of relevant organizations from the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) website. ENAR is a platform of about 600 national NGOs organized at the European level that work to combat various forms of racism and discrimination in all EU member states. A portion of their website is dedicated to National Data Sheets, which list the relevant anti-racist organizations in each member country.

From the ENAR website, I obtained an initial listing of NGOs in 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. After eliminating those organizations whose work does not involve migrants or refugees from beyond the EU (such as strictly pro-Jewish

[6] I adopted a broad definition of a pro-migrant organization so that it would be possible to compare behavior across different elements of the movement. The complete listing of known pro-migrant and refugee groups in Europe can be accessed at www.united.non-profit.nl and looking through the European Address Book Against Racism.

organizations or narrowly-defined anti-fascist groups), the remaining list comprised about 15-30 relevant groups per country. In order to be considered relevant, the group had to satisfy the following minimum criteria: it must work to some extent on behalf of migrants and/or refugees from beyond the EU, it must be an active organization in the EU country where it is headquartered, and it must be independent from government. For most such organizations, the address and a website or e-mail address was provided along with the group's name. However, about 20-25% of groups on the ENAR listing represent smaller, grass-roots efforts which do not have a website or e-mail, leaving only a street address.

From this initial list, I examined the websites of each group (where available) in every country in order to increase the catalog. In nearly all cases, these sites contained links to, or addresses of, other PMR organizations active in that particular country. After collecting preliminary information on such groups and researching their missions to ensure that they conformed to the parameters of the study, I added them to the list. By supplementing the list in this manner I was able to increase representation of smaller, grass-roots, and unconventional groups, as well as larger, more prominent organizations. Using this "snowballing" method of identifying additional groups from the websites of previously-identified NGOs, I compiled an initial master directory across 15 countries with a median of 29.5 groups per country,[7] and a total of 390 groups.

In May 2005, I came across the closest approximation to a formal directory of PMR organizations in the EU. The European Address Book Against Racism is a directory of many different types of organizations in the 25 EU countries and beyond, including those that work in support of migrants and refugees. The data in the Address Book is collected and compiled by United for Intercultural Action,[8] a non-profit organization headquartered in the Netherlands that works for the rights of refugees and migrants. In total, the directory contains data on over 3,000

[7] Some of the smaller countries, such as Greece and Luxembourg, had fewer groups. Nonetheless, the target for each country was about 30 groups.
[8] www.united.non-profit.nl

different organizations throughout the world. Incorporating this into the universe I already identified using the method above, I was able to compile an additional listing of 1,347 organizations whose work (either broadly or narrowly) involves migrant or refugee issues and add 10 more countries to the analysis: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, and Malta. This more comprehensive universe encompasses both smaller grass-roots and larger more resource-rich groups, conventional and unconventional groups, and includes groups from all 25 current EU member states.

To summarize the procedures for generating the master list, I compiled a catalog of as many such organizations as possible in each EU country based on prior Internet research and several extensive published and online directories of NGOs.[9] In order to be included, each group had to meet specific criteria including: status as an established pro-migrant and/or refugee group, an active agenda on behalf of migrant and refugee issues, and be headquartered in a member state of the EU. Groups were excluded whose human rights or anti-discrimination work touched only negligibly on migrant inclusion, as well as groups with a purely anti-fascist or anti-nationalist agenda. Groups from the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe and other new EU member states are included.

DATA COLLECTION

In describing the stages of data collection, the following sections discuss the process of administering each of three rounds of the survey and conducting interviews with organizations and EU actors. The resulting data lay the foundation for this study by providing the basis for the empirical analyses.

Survey Round I

[9] I relied on various sources of information to identify relevant groups: pro-migrant and refugee organization websites, online links to other such organizations, the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) membership list, and the European Address Book Against Racism.

The first round of the survey was conducted from September 2004-February 2005. During these months, I mailed a questionnaire to a total of 390 organizations in 15 countries and asked each to return it by mail upon completion. Among these, a total of approximately 60 questionnaires were returned to sender as undeliverable because the organization had either moved or shut down. In total, this first round of mailings yielded an initial sample of 64 groups representing each of the 15 countries. Thus, taking into account the undeliverable questionnaires, the response rate for the first round is slightly above 19%.

Survey Round II

After discovering the European Address Book Against Racism in May 2005, I added additional groups to the master list for a second round of data collection. The second round was conducted online from May-September 2005. I chose to administer this round in the form of an online questionnaire for several reasons. First, during the initial mailing, several groups contacted me by email to request an electronic copy of the questionnaire, while others explicitly stated a preference for completing questionnaires online. Second, the European Address Book Against Racism contains email contacts for almost all of the targeted groups, making another round of time-consuming mailings unnecessary. Finally, after incurring excessive financial costs to administer the first round of the questionnaire by mail, I faced serious resource constraints and needed a less expensive alternative. Thus, although the pencil-and-paper survey allowed me to target a greater number of small, grass-roots organizations whose only available contact information is a street address, overall the online format allowed me to greatly facilitate the response process while keeping costs down.

Before requesting participation in the second round of the survey, I examined in closer depth each of the 1,347 groups across the 25 EU countries that I identified from the European Address Book Against Racism. By selecting groups whose work most directly involves migrant and refugee issues and eliminating groups whose focus was too broad, I narrowed down the target sample to approximately 545 groups across each of the 25 EU countries. At this point, I sent each

group an email message describing the research project and containing the link to the online questionnaire; they were asked to complete it as soon as possible. This yielded an additional 40 responses. Taking account of the email messages that were returned as undeliverable because the organization had either shut down or its mailbox was full, the response rate from the second round is approximately 19%. At the end of round II, a comprehensive total of 104 groups comprised the full dataset.

Survey Round III

Initial planning for a third, more targeted, round of the survey began with a year of field research in Brussels, Belgium starting in September 2005. Thus, the third and final round of data collection was administered from late September 2005-February 2006. The purpose of this round was to increase the overall sample size as much as possible by targeting specific groups that still had not participated as of the end of the second round. In countries where response rates were particularly low, I selected the most relevant groups from the European Address Book Against Racism and contacted them by email and phone to request participation. For each group outside of Belgium that agreed, I sent a copy of the questionnaire and a description of the research project to the director or other contact person. I then arranged a date to administer the questionnaire by phone. For each group within Belgium, I administered the questionnaire in person. This round was particularly successful in increasing representation from Eastern Europe and the other new EU member states, as I was able to double, and in certain cases triple, the number of participating groups in those countries. At the end of this round, the overall response rate stands at about 20% and the full dataset comprises 114 organizations.

Interviews

In addition to the survey questionnaire, the other aspect of the data collection process involves in-person interviews. I conducted interviews with group representatives, civil servants of the European Commission, and members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from October-December 2004. Whereas the overwhelming majority of the interviews took place in Brussels, a

few were conducted in London and a small number were carried out by phone from Brussels to another country. In line with procedures used in other interest group studies (Berry 1977; Lowe and Goyder 1983; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Dalton 1994), the interviews were conducted with a single informed representative from each organization, including the organization's director, deputy director, or public information officer. The goal of the interview data is to supplement the survey with more in-depth information.

To this end, the interview questions[10] cross-cut several important themes, including: the rationale for the group's chosen strategies; the reasons for and the importance of collaborations, including those that that cross policy sectors; the rationale for employing methods of influence that cross levels of governance; and assessments of EU versus national-level actors on matters of immigration and asylum. The group interviews lasted an average of one hour. In total, I conducted 18 group interviews: 3 in-person interviews in London, 12 in-person interviews in Brussels, 1 phone interview from Brussels with a group in Germany, 1 phone interview with a group in the Netherlands, and 1 phone interview with a group in Sweden.

I also conducted interviews with EU actors in order to obtain their views on the political behavior of PMR organizations, and to provide evaluations of the current and future state of the migrant inclusion policy sector. The questions focused mainly on the nature of the Commission's interactions with civil society groups that work on behalf of migrant inclusion, the importance of such interactions to migrant inclusion policy, and why these relationships are important to the Commission. These meetings lasted an average of approximately one hour. In total, I conducted 9 Commission interviews with representatives from DG Justice and Home Affairs and DG Employment and Social Affairs, unit D/3 Anti-Discrimination and Civil Society and unit E/3 Free Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes.

Finally, the MEP interviews were conducted in Brussels and were prompted by comments received in several of the Commission interviews. Specifically, several civil servants

[10] See Appendix A for a list of questions that structured the group and EU actor interviews.

commented that strategic relationships between civil society groups and MEPs have the potential to be extremely effective in terms of obtaining concrete policy outcomes. These comments led me to interview MEPs about several themes, including: their interactions with pro-migrant and refugee NGOs, the impact these NGOs have on the policy process, and the European Parliament as an avenue for influence for civil society groups. On average, these meetings lasted approximately 20-30 minutes. I interviewed a total of 10 MEPs.

THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Accounting for all waves, I administered the survey to group representatives from September 2004-February 2006.[11] The English-language questionnaire is divided into five sections: I. Background Information; II. Cooperation and Collaboration; III. Activities; IV. Effectiveness; and V. Personal Information. The questions cover a variety of topics including: the organizational characteristics of the group, their interactions with various national and EU political institutions on matters concerning migrants and refugees, their use of a range of political activity types, their policy interests, and the extent of the group's collaborative activities with a range of other actors.

The survey allowed me to generate a sample of migrant inclusion actors from throughout the EU.[12] The groups that comprise the sample vary on a number of organizational characteristics, as illustrated in Table 4.1. In terms of a broad overview, the mean group is approximately 16 years old and has over 4,000 members. In addition, it has about 6 full time employees and 18 volunteers in an average week. In terms of ideology, each of the three dimensions is well represented. Two additional variables are *group focus* and *group target*, which respectively describe the type of disadvantaged group (1=mainly migrants/refugees, 2=equally migrants/refugees and other disadvantaged groups, 3=mainly other disadvantaged groups) and the type of migrant/refugee the organization's work is primarily concerned with (1=all migrants/refugees, 2=a particular ethnicity, 3=a particular gender 4=a particular age). The *group*

[11] The survey questionnaire is included in Appendix A.
[12] See Table A.4.1 in Appendix B for a complete listing of groups included in the study.

focus variable indicates that the average group is mainly concerned with issues that affect migrants and refugees, or migrants/refugees and at least one other disadvantaged group. Finally, the *group target* variable indicates that the mean group targets all migrants and refugees without any particular distinction. The following sections draw on this and other information to discuss the descriptive characteristics of the sample in relation to the different sections of the questionnaire and, where possible, compare aspects of the sample with the known population.

Section I: Background Information

The section on background information consists of 11 questions about the organization itself. Overall, its primary goal is to measure different facets of group resources, ideology, and "issue-specific" political opportunities in perceptual terms. To begin with, six questions ask about the organization's resources, including: group age, the number of full- and part-time employees and volunteers, the annual budget, the group's income trend over the past year, its membership, and grants received from the EU. Each of these is discussed in turn.

Group Age. The pattern in Figure 4.1 reflects the group origins of the sample. It indicates a large mobilization wave beginning after the 1975-84 time period and steadily increasing over time to the present. Of course, many PMR groups established during this time have subsequently dissolved or merged with others, but a total of 27% (N=31) of the organizations in this study had their origins in the period 1985-1994, and 50% (N=57) in the period 1995-present. That is, over 7 dozen groups in this study were established since 1985.

In order to ascertain how representative the sample is, Figure 4.2 charts the origins of a subset of the known population of migrant inclusion organizations.[13] Like the sample, the main mobilization waves of the population occurred in the periods 1985-1994 and 1995-present. From

[13] Unfortunately, the amount of publicly available data on many of the group characteristics is limited, and the quality of data that specific groups provide greatly varies. Therefore, based on the consistency of information provided on groups' websites, it is feasible to compare three dimensions of the sample and known population: group origins (i.e., age), ideology, and size. That said, these are three important dimensions that represent different aspects of group characteristics.

1985-1994, 33% (N=63) of the groups were established; 37% (N=70) have been established since 1995. In contrast, only 2% (N=4) of the groups were established before 1945. A comparison of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrates that the sample characteristics roughly approximate those of the estimated population.

Unlike the European environmental movement whose organization-building efforts peaked between 1965 and 1975 (Lowe and Goyder 1983; Dalton 1994), the migrant inclusion movement's efforts began to peak much later (i.e., in the 1980s), when issues of immigration began to adopt a prominent place in the public debate. In fact, the largest portion of the contemporary movement originated during this period. Today, new PMR organizations are still being formed. Activists created nearly six dozen important national groups after 1995.

Staff Support. Another important resource is the staff support needed to carry out the everyday functioning of the organization. As with other types of resources, the level of staff support can vary greatly among groups. On average, most PMR groups operate with a small professional staff. The mean number of full-time employees is about six. As Figure 4.3 shows, even if one adds part-time staff the employee base of most groups remains fairly small. At the low end of the scale, 11% of all organizations operate without any paid employees at all, relying entirely on volunteers to sustain the organization. At the other end, about 10% of groups maintain a professional staff of more than twenty. Among the groups surveyed, Forum Réfugiés in France has the largest professional staff, comprising 90 full-time employees. Most groups also rely on volunteers, as shown in Figure 4.4. From time to time, volunteer workers are vital to policymaking and operation, but more often they carry out maintenance tasks such as staffing the office, processing correspondence, and generally serving the membership.

Financial Resources. One of the most important resources for any group is money. Unlike economic interest groups that can count on a steady stream of financial support from either

business or labor, public interest groups must often struggle to raise financial resources and meet financial needs. This is partly due to the fact that PMR groups lack a solid base of financial support, combined with the fact that influencing the political process can be very costly. Moreover, as other studies have pointed out (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Dalton 1994), the special value of money is that it can be processed to meet other needed goods such as staff, advertising, consultants, public relations programs, and more.

Because financial data for the population as a whole is difficult to come by, I use a proxy measure of whether the organization is national or international in order to assess the representativeness of the sample when it comes to the size of the group. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the proportion of national versus international organizations in the sample (Figure 4.5) and overall population (Figure 4.6). The data illustrate the sample is fairly representative when it comes to group size. About 21% of the groups in the sample are international compared to about 18% of those in the overall population. Although these figures are comparable, international organizations are very slightly overrepresented in the sample. This suggests that there is a slight possibility that the analyses in this study may be more likely to find that groups act across countries and/or levels of governance rather than limit their action to within the nation-state. However, because there is only 3 percentage points difference between the sample and population, the degree of overrepresentation is not large and thus is not expected to pose a major problem for drawing inferences.

Figure 4.7 illustrates the annual operating budgets of the groups in the sample, excluding most government contracts, grants, and other nonrecurring sources of income. Their financial resources vary a great deal. About 27% of all groups operate with an annual budget of less than 50,000 Euros. Often, these are smaller organizations working on behalf of a very specific target group, such as RAJFIR in France and AKELIN in Denmark. Such groups depend heavily on volunteer support. At the other end of the scale, about 19% of groups have annual budgets over 500,000 Euros and represent diverse elements of the migrant inclusion movement: refugee advice

or help groups (Forum Réfugiés in France, North of England Refugee Service Limited in the UK), broader human rights groups (REMDH in Denmark, Bruno Kreisky Foundation for Human Rights in Austria), service groups for migrants (LBR in the Netherlands, JCWI in the UK, Immigrantinstitutet in Sweden), housing services organizations for migrants (PAIH in the UK), groups that provide education for or about migrants (MPG in Belgium, Intercultural Centre in Austria, Palet in the Netherlands), and more unconventional groups that work with undocumented migrants (OCIV and PICUM in Belgium). The diverse array of well-funded groups illustrates that different sectors of the movement are able to successfully mobilize support for their activities.

Combining these budgetary figures, the estimated financial resources that PMR groups control is well over 80 million Euros a year. Further, Figure 4.8 illustrates that over two-thirds of the groups report that even after adjusting for inflation, their incomes have either remained steady or increased over the past two or three years. Thus, although the membership base remains fairly small, finances are an important indicator of the expansion of the movement across Europe.

Virtually all organizations included in this study rely on individual support, which underscores the populist base of the movement. Rather than ask groups to recall what percentage of their income stems from individuals, which may be difficult for many to do, I instead asked representatives to report whether they have or will receive a grant from the European Commission. These figures are reported in Table 4.2. The sample is composed of a relatively comparable number of groups that do and do not rely on the Commission as a source of financial support. For example, roughly 54% of the groups have received or will receive such a grant. At the same time, about 46% of the groups claim to receive no such support, perhaps illustrating the reservations some groups have about the possible co-optation that can accompany government grants, or the difficult and time consuming process of obtaining a grant.

Membership. For a good number of groups, their primary resource is their membership base. Members are important, in part, because they provide a significant potential source of revenue.

Many groups also mobilize volunteer work by members to support the group's activities. Although some membership activities are politically neutral, such as making a financial donation, members can also serve a latent pool of political activists. For instance, more confrontational groups may count on their members as a source for mobilizing a protest or petition. Conventional groups also rely on their members when organizing such activities as volunteer community projects and letter-writing campaigns to the government and/or media. Public interest organizations value their memberships for an additional reason as well, in that a large membership base adds legitimacy to the organization that claims to speak for the public interest. The more members a group can claim to represent, the better its chances are of gaining entry to various government offices.

As Figure 4.9 shows, there are many sizes of mass-membership organizations (see Table A.4.1 in Appendix B for the membership of specific groups). From the period 1985-1994, the average group was composed of about 3,116[14] members, but there is a great deal of dispersion around this figure. Among the sample, roughly 50% have fewer than 50 total members. At the higher end of the spectrum, only five organizations have a membership of 4,000 or more: Union of Students in Ireland, Stichting Vluchtelingen in de Knel of the Netherlands, Liga de Amizade Internacional of Portugal, Medicos del Mundos of Spain, and Student Action for Refugees (STAR) of the UK. Each of these groups pursues fairly moderate goals and helps other disadvantaged groups in addition to migrants and refugees. The mean membership of all PMR groups is about 4,302, but if one excludes the three biggest outliers,[15] the mean falls dramatically to about 318, a number that reflects the small, grass-roots nature of the overall movement.

The small single-interest and local organizations that comprise the movement are also reflected when we examine group membership in individual nation-states. Although the overall

[14] This figure is quite small compared to membership in environmental organizations in the mid-1980s, which averaged about 10,000 members (Dalton 1994: 86).
[15] These membership numbers are 130,000 (Dutch Refugee Foundation), 250,000 (Union of Students in Ireland), and 75,125 (Medicos del Mundos in Spain).

number of groups has increased over time (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2), not all EU countries are sharing equally in the development of the movement. In fact, there is substantial cross-national variation in the membership base of the groups included in this study, as well as between East and West regions.

Table 4.3 illustrates the overall pattern of these national differences by comparing general membership levels in each country included in the study. The combined total membership of these organizations reaches substantial levels in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. When population size and the presence of large outliers[16] are taken into account, the movements in Ireland and the Netherlands have an exceptionally large ratio of members.[17] The Irish movement has experienced a high degree of success developing its membership base. Excluding the large outlier,[18] its mean membership is very comparable to the movements in Finland and France, although the population of Finland is over one-and-a-half times as large, and that of France is almost 15 times larger. Similarly, the total membership of the Dutch groups represents almost 1% of its total population. Its mean membership is comparable to that of Spain, even though the Spanish population is over two-and-a-half times larger.[19] Finally, there is a great difference in membership means across the old and new member states. Whereas the mean in the former reaches 4,873, in the new member states it reaches only 536.

In examining the average membership level of the entire sample, it becomes possible to analyze country differences in membership compared to the total sample average. The average membership level for the sample is about 4,302. However, as discussed above, the presence of

[16] Note that the statistics of the Spanish groups are driven by a large outlier. This is why Spain is not considered to have an exceptionally large ratio of members represented here.
[17] According to Eurostat data, the population (in thousands) of Ireland is about 4025, and the Netherlands is about 16,258. (www.eurunion.org/legislat/agd2000/agd2000.html). Ireland has only the 14th largest populations among the 15 pre-Eastern enlargement EU countries.
[18] The outlier in Ireland is The Union of Students in Ireland, whose membership level reaches 250,000.
[19] According to Eurostat data, the population of Spain (in thousands) is 40,978. (www.eurunion.org/legislat/agd2000/agd2000.html).

three large outliers drives this figure.[20] If those three are excluded, the sample mean membership falls to about 318. Table 4.4 illustrates how membership in each country compares to this adjusted sample average. Five countries have levels below the sample mean; these are roughly evenly distributed between the old and new member states: Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Hungary, and Cyprus. The rest of the countries have membership levels above the average, with Ireland representing the highest and Luxembourg representing the lowest average membership of all countries.

Organizational Identity. Beyond resources, a set of three questions in the survey tap different features of the organization's identity. From a given list presented to the respondent, they ask the group representative to name the types of issues that most concern the organization, to describe the type of migrant (if any) towards whom the group's work is mainly directed, and to indicate how important various issues are to the activities and political concerns of the group.

To develop broad measures of group ideology, I factor analyzed the 17 items in question 11 that tap groups' issue concerns. Principal factor analysis identified three dimensions of ideology presented in Table 4.5: services/care-giving, political/legal, and asylum. As the previous chapter explains, services/care groups pursue goals that are less threatening to the established order, whereas the issue priorities of political/legal and asylum groups reflect values that pose a greater challenge to the political status quo.

Figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate the distribution of the three dimensions of identity in terms of the sample and known population, respectively. In order to classify groups from the population, I used information from the organization's website regarding its mission, goals, objectives, current projects, and/or policy work and made an appropriate classification based on

[20] These outliers include three large groups comprising membership levels of 250,000 in Ireland, 130,000 in the Netherlands, and 75,125 in Spain.

the above criteria. It is possible for a group's objectives to overlap between the categories; thus several groups belong to more than one classification.

Although fairly similar, the biggest difference in comparing the two figures is the proportion of political/legal and asylum groups. In the sample (Figure 4.10), services/care-giving organizations represent the majority of groups, and political/legal organizations, although slightly fewer, represent a comparable number. Proportionally, asylum groups, although well-represented in the sample, account for the fewest groups. Among the known population (Figure 4.11), the proportion is slightly different. While, like the sample, services/care-giving groups make up the bulk of the population, this is followed by asylum groups and finally political/legal organizations. Thus, while still fairly comparable, the sample does not directly mirror the population on each of the ideological dimensions.

There are several implications of the over-representation of political/legal groups in the sample. First, the fact that these groups possess a more challenging ideology makes the empirical analyses more likely to overestimate participation in contentious forms of activity. Moreover, if the nature of their identity limits participation in national or EU-level lobbying, then the analyses will also underestimate the extent of these tactics. Relatedly, it also may make the analyses more likely to overestimate EU-directed protest. In general, then, the analyses are more likely to overestimate contentious tactics versus more conventional forms of influence. Although confrontational activity may still comprise a minor part of groups' political repertoires, the over-representation of more challenging groups likely increases the proportion of contentious versus conventional tactics relative to the overall movement population. Thus, it constitutes a more stringent test of the factors that impact conventional activity.

That said, however, it is important to note that the inclusion of the identity measures constitutes a step beyond the existing research. As explained in detail in the previous chapter, the literature has yet to conceptualize measures of organizational identity within the migrant inclusion movement, instead focusing mainly on simple ethnic, national, or racial classifications.

That I have found evidence of three distinct types of organizational identity suggests that ideological differences between groups within the movement exist, and may play a role in shaping their political behavior.

How Identity Shapes Resource Accumulation. The survey data allow an examination of whether certain groups are likely to be more successful than others in generating resources. To this end, Figures 4.12 – 4.18 show how the different dimensions of group identity affect resource accumulation in terms of: group age, staff and volunteers, income, income trend, membership, and EU funding.

Figure 4.12 displays the origins of PMR groups by group type. For each type, the trend roughly approximates that of the pooled sample (see Figure 4.1). Although there was some level of group activity prior to the 1975-1984 time period, after that time many groups of all types formed at a higher rate. Overall among the sample, services/care groups have the steadiest upward trend after 1975. Political/legal and asylum organizations also exhibit a steady upward trend, but their numbers dip slightly in the 1985-1994 time period. However, since 1995 they have slightly overtaken services/care groups in terms of their numbers.

In examining the membership level of each group type, Figure 4.13 shows that each type clusters around the low end of the scale. The majority of groups, regardless of the identity, have a membership of less than fifty. Moving upward along the scale, services/care and political legal groups have a slightly easier time in mobilizing members. In contrast, asylum organizations generally mobilize the fewest members with a slight exception at the very high end of the scale, likely reflecting a handful of large, international organizations such as Caritas Refugee Service. Thus, asylum groups experience the greatest dispersion in terms of membership, as they tend to cluster around the extreme low and high ends of the scale.

When it comes to mobilizing staff resources, Figure 4.14 shows that all group types cluster around the mid-range of the scale. Although services/care groups have slightly more

success in recruiting higher levels of staff, asylum groups do not recruit staff as effectively, as most operate with only 2-5 paid employees. In contrast, services/care and political/legal groups operate on average with 6-10 staff members. At the same time, however, a greater proportion of political/legal and asylum groups operate with no paid staff at all. In addition, Figure 4.15 shows the trend for volunteers. It indicates that services/care groups tend to rely to a lesser extent on volunteer support compared to the other group types. This is not unexpected, given that more challenging groups tend to face greater difficulties in mobilizing employees and thus rely more strongly on their pool of volunteers.

Figures 4.16 – 4.18 display trends in the ability to mobilize financial resources among each group type. In terms of annual income, Figure 4.16 shows that the majority of all group types operate with an annual budget of 200,000 Euros or less. Thus, all group types are clustered toward the lower end of the scale. In general, there is no clear pattern regarding which group type most successfully mobilizes resources, although services/care organizations tend to have a slightly easier time across several of the categories. Overall, some level of dispersion exists among all group types, as they tend to be clustered on the low and mid-to-high ends of the scale.

When we examine groups' income trend over the past year, Figure 4.17 shows that the general trend is the same for all group types, as a virtual equal amount of groups reported an increase in income over the past year. At the same time, political/legal groups were the most likely of the three to report a decrease, while the income of asylum groups was most likely to remain steady with inflation. Across the board, most groups in the sample experienced an increase in annual income over the past year.

Figure 4.18 shows that services/care groups are slightly most likely to receive a grant from the European Commission compared to the other groups. In addition, there is greater dispersion among services/care groups in terms of the numbers that have received a grant and those that have not. A similar trend holds for political/legal groups, although with slightly less

dispersion. Finally, a relatively comparable number of asylum groups have and have not received a grant. Moreover, these groups are the least likely of the three to receive EU funding.

In summary, the trend for each group types approximates that of the pooled sample when it comes to group age. In addition, most groups have relatively low membership levels, although asylum organizations show the greatest dispersion. Services/care and political/legal groups tend to operate with more employees than asylum groups, and services/care groups depend the least on volunteer support. Moreover, most groups operate with a relatively small annual budget, with political/legal groups being the most likely to report a decrease in income over the past year. Finally, services/care organizations are the most likely to receive Commission funding.

Perceptions of Issue-Specific POS. Among the final two questions in this section of the questionnaire, the one most relevant to the dissertation evaluates how groups perceive their national immigration and asylum policy environments with respect to four policy dimensions: immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment.

When it comes to groups' perceptions of immigration policy, Figure 4.19 shows that the general trend is similar across all types. In other words, all groups, regardless of their identity, cluster toward the stringent end of the scale. Asylum groups are slightly more prone than the others to categorize national immigration policy as some degree of stringent. In terms of citizenship policy, Figure 4.20 shows that, again, all groups cluster toward the stringent end. However, asylum groups are less likely than the others to perceive immigration policy as open, whereas services/care groups are slightly less likely to view it as very stringent. Figure 4.21 displays groups' perceptions of asylum policy. Here there is much less variation, as all groups cluster toward the extreme stringency end of the scale. Political/legal groups are most likely to perceive asylum policy as very stringent, whereas services/care groups are more apt than the others to view it as somewhat open. Finally, there is more variation in perceptions when it comes to employment policy, as shown in Figure 4.22. Although all groups cluster toward the stringent

end, asylum groups are again more likely to perceive employment policy as very stringent, and political/legal groups are more likely to view it as only somewhat stringent.

In sum, all groups tend to view each of the four policy dimensions as having some degree of stringency, and none sees any as predominantly open. At the same time, asylum and political/legal groups are more likely to hold stringent policy perceptions. Although services/care organizations also cluster toward the stringent end of the scale, they are slightly more prone than the others to perceive any openness in these policies. This trend roughly approximates what one would expect given the different group identities. As services/groups tend to espouse issues that are inherently less political in nature, they are more likely to grant some level of openness in national policies than the other group types.

Section II: Cooperation and Collaboration

The section on cooperation and collaboration gets at various ways that PMR organizations may work together with other actors to influence policy, and consists of a battery of five questions. Each question asks the respondent to indicate the extent to which the group interacts with: a) other NGOs within the group's country, b) NGOs in at least one other country, c) business associations and labor unions in the home country, d) business associations and labor unions in at least one other country, and e) groups at the EU level in the following activities: exchanging information, exchanging advice or expertise, exchanging personnel or other resources, and coordinating activities and common projects. In sum, the main goal of this section is to measure the degree of interconnectedness with other actors across levels of governance.

Table 4.6 displays the results of a principal factor analysis confirming the dimensions of interconnectedness used in this study. It identifies six dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 1.0: national NGOs, national business, national labor, EU groups, NGOs abroad, and business and labor abroad.

Figure 4.23 shows how interconnectedness at the national level breaks down by group identity. By far, each group type maintains the strongest links with other NGOs in their country;

the first set of bars indicates that political/legal groups are slightly more apt to maintain strong connections with these actors. In addition, each group type is slightly more likely to form ties with labor unions compared to business associations. However, the middle set of bars indicates that asylum groups are slightly more likely than the others to maintain strong connections with national business associations. In terms of networks that transcend the national level, Figure 4.24 shows that the overall pattern is similar across group types, with very little variation. It indicates that when it comes to maintaining interconnections, all groups are about equally likely to do so with social movement organizations in other countries, EU-level groups, and labor unions in other countries. However, again, asylum groups are more likely than the others to connect with business associations in other countries. Overall, all groups interact most frequently with other NGOs, followed by EU groups, business, and finally labor.

Figure 4.25 disaggregates links with national-level actors by group income. In general, groups with an annual income level below the mean are more likely to maintain strong connections with other NGOs as well as labor unions. However, groups with higher incomes are more likely to maintain strong links with national business associations. Moving beyond the national level, Figure 4.26 shows that low-income groups tend to maintain strong connections with other NGOs and EU-level groups. Groups of both income levels are about equally likely to forge strong ties with business and labor in other countries.

In sum, the interconnectedness of PMR organizations looks remarkably similar across group types. At both the national and transnational levels, groups are most heavily connected to other NGOs, followed by EU-level groups. This indicates a preference among all groups to interact most strongly with other like-minded civil society organizations. At the national level, most groups maintain stronger connections to labor unions than business associations, but this trend reverses when we move beyond the nation-state. Overall, asylum groups are more strongly connected to business associations (across levels) than the other group types. In addition, lower-income groups tend to maintain the strongest ties with other NGOs across levels, national labor,

and EU groups. In contrast, high-income organizations tend to maintain stronger connections with national business.

Section III: Activities

The third section of the questionnaire asks about different types of political activities used to influence policy at different levels of governance, and consists of two questions. The aim of the first is to probe how often groups rely on a host of conventional and challenging activities aimed at the national government. In addition to inquiring about the use of such tactics as formal and informal meetings with civil servants or government ministers, it also asks respondents to indicate how frequently their organization uses protest and is in contact with the media. Thus, the primary aim of this section is to measure the use of different methods of influence at different levels of governance.

Whereas the distribution of each activity for the pooled sample is reported in the empirical chapters, Figure 4.27 displays the percentage of each group by identity (services/care, political/legal, and asylum) that often participate in conventional lobbying tactics at the national level. Services/care groups tend to engage most often in local government contacts, informal meetings with civil servants and ministers, and contacts with political parties, whereas political/legal organizations are the most apt of the three to interact with Parliament. In contrast, asylum groups tend to participate the least often in national lobbying activities, with the exception of participating in government commissions and advisory committees. In addition, consistent with what we would expect, Figure 4.28 shows that political/legal and asylum groups, which tend to pose a greater challenge to the established order, participate more often in contentious activities such as protest and court cases. In contrast, services/care groups are the most likely of the three to use the media.

Moving beyond the national arena, the second question in this section asks about the use of conventional and confrontational methods directed at the EU level. Although it mainly asks

respondents to report how often their group has contacts with various EU institutions, it also inquires into the use of more confrontational tactics against the EU.

Figure 4.29 displays the percentage of each type of group that often participates in conventional lobbying tactics at the EU level. The main activities of all groups consist of contacting the European Commission and Parliament, with services/care groups most likely to engage in the former and asylum organizations most prone to do the latter. Although all group types are equally likely to engage with Coreper, services/care and political/legal tend to participate more often in engaging with the Council of Ministers and the Economic and Social Committee. Overall, the more challenging groups are not generally excluded from EU-level lobbying activity.

Figure 4.30 shows the distribution of more contentious forms of action by group type. Although it accounts for a relatively minor portion of groups' political repertoires, each group type is about equally likely to protest the EU and to use the ECJ. Overall, resorting to the ECJ is the least common activity for all groups, since the process can be expensive, complicated, and time-consuming.

In sum, all groups participate in conventional lobbying activities across levels. In broad terms, asylum groups tend to engage the least often in these tactics at each level, with certain exceptions. Both services/care and political/legal organizations engage heavily in lobbying various institutions. When it comes to more contentious acts, services/care groups are the least likely to participate at the national level, but this effect cancels out at the level of the EU, where all groups are about equally prone to using such tactics.

Section IV: Effectiveness

The fourth section of the questionnaire aims to assess the effectiveness of each activity mentioned in Sections II and III; it consists of a series of nine questions. For the purposes of the empirical analyses, the relevant questions probe the effectiveness of conventional and challenging activities aimed at the national government and EU. The effectiveness of each activity for the pooled

sample is reported in the empirical chapters. Overall, the main goal of this section is to assess the efficacy of each of the various methods of influence that groups employ at each level of governance.

Overall, the main goal of this section is to assess the efficacy of each of the various methods of influence that groups employ at each level of governance. That said, it should be noted that this dissertation does not equate policy effectiveness with concrete policy outcomes. Outcomes measured in terms of legislation would be problematic in this type of study for several reasons. First, although legislation in this area is growing, at this point there are relatively few important pieces of legislation to analyze. Relatedly, in analyzing outcomes one would ideally want to survey not only organizations, but also the civil servants and policymakers involved in order to arrive at unbiased conclusions concerning the impact of migrant inclusion groups in the policy process. Outcomes could alternatively be measured in terms of "softer" indicators, such as influencing policy debates or agendas. However, this would be very difficult to operationalize and accurately measure.

Given these potential issues, this study examines policy effectiveness, defined as how useful a given method of influence is in terms of achieving the group's most important policy goals. Thus, effectiveness can be thought of as an assessment of the political activities the organization employs to affect concrete outcomes. Whereas outcomes relate to a specific piece of legislation or policy, effectiveness relates to a specific activity or method of policy influence. Each organization thus rates a range of activities in terms of their utility in realizing the organization's policy goals.

Figure 4.31 illustrates how effective each group type considers the range of national lobbying activities in achieving its policy goals. In general, services/care organizations report the highest levels of effectiveness among all group types, which is consistent with expectations given that their goals tend to be less challenging. The only activities for which this is not the case are contacts with parliament and participation in government commissions and advisory committees;

all groups report an equal level of efficacy for these activities. In contrast, asylum organizations tend to report the lowest levels of effectiveness across the range of tactics.

The same general pattern also holds with respect to challenging and mobilizing activities, as illustrated in Figure 4.32. All group types tend to equally report low levels of effectiveness when it comes to protest. In contrast, using the courts is seen as significantly more effective, particularly among services/care groups. Finally, media contacts are widely regarded as the most effective activity, with services/care groups reporting the highest levels of effectiveness and asylum organizations reporting the lowest.

At the European level, Figure 4.33 shows that both services/care and political/legal groups are about equally prone to view three of the five lobbying activities as very effective: contacts with the Commission, Parliament, and Council of Ministers. Asylum organizations, in contrast, are least likely to report these actions as very effective. Moreover, all group types have about equally low opinions regarding the efficacy of their interactions with the Economic and Social Committee; similarly, contacts with Coreper are widely viewed as ineffective.

In terms of the more contentious EU-level actions, although each group type is about equally likely to participate in EU-directed protest, Figure 4.34 shows that services/care and political/legal groups are more prone to view this tactic as effective. In contrast, each group has about the same opinion of the effectiveness of using the ECJ, which is widely regarded as the more efficacious tactic than protest.

In sum, when it comes to policy effectiveness, services/care and political/legal organizations tend to view the range of conventional lobbying activities across each level as more efficacious than asylum groups. The same pattern tends to hold when it comes to the more confrontational tactics across levels. Overall, asylum organizations tend to be the least effective across both levels of governance.

Section V: Personal Information

The final section of the questionnaire simply asks the group representative to report his or her job title. The goal is to have the organization's director or other senior employee complete the questionnaire, since they presumably have the most in-depth and comprehensive knowledge of the group's activities. This section, then, basically functions as a quality control regarding the information being supplied by the organization.

Figure 4.35 confirms that the organization's director or other manager has completed the vast majority of the questionnaires (about 80%), while other staff members (typically a project coordinator) have completed about 20%. In all cases, the respondent worked on migrant and refugee issues for the organization. Thus, in no cases did a respondent lack the appropriate knowledge or expertise to accurately fill out the questionnaire.

CONCLUSION

This examination of the data and characteristics of PMR groups attempts to not only describe the sample, but also to put the migrant inclusion movement in a broader context. Overall, it indicates that the sample of organizations within the movement is fairly diverse; there is no single platform representing a monolithic notion of "migrants' interests." Instead, groups are organizationally and politically varied. Migrant and refugee politics encompasses a wide array of issue interests, spanning service/care-giving concerns about discrimination, education, and access to housing, social services, and health care to political/legal and asylum concerns that deal with work permit regulations, free movement, citizenship, and host country residence, as well as a range of issues in between. There are groups that specialize in aiding undocumented migrants, young migrants, migrant women, and migrants or refugees of a specific ethnicity. Some organizations strive to improve the political rights of settled migrants, whereas others provide physical or mental health care to meet the particular needs of new migrant and refugee communities in the host country.

In overall terms, this diverse sample appears fairly representative. In comparing the sample of groups in this study to the known population on available dimensions, it is evident that

in general the sample mirrors the patterns of the known population. The one exception is the proportion of political/legal and asylum groups, which appear to differ slightly between the sample and population. Thus, in general, the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations offers a reasonable basis on which to make preliminary comparisons and estimates about the actions and characteristics of PMR groups active across the EU. The following chapters will examine how these group characteristics and other exogenous factors shape the political behavior of the movement across Europe.

Chapter Four: Tables and Figures

Figure 4.1
Year of Formation of Sample
(Source: Group surveys and websites)



Figure 4.2
Year of Formation of Known Population
(Source: Group Websites)



Figure 4.3
Staff Size
(Paid employees include both full-time and part-time employees)



Figure 4.4
Number of Volunteers



Figure 4.5
Proportion of National versus International Organizations: Sample



Figure 4.6
Proportion of National versus International Organizations: Population



Figure 4.7
Operating Budget of Sample, 2004-2006



Figure 4.8
Income Trend of Sample



Figure 4.9
Membership Size of Sample



Figure 4.10
Ideological Dimensions of Sample



Figure 4.11
Ideological Dimensions of Population
(Source: Group Websites)



Figure 4.12
Group Age by Group Type



Figure 4.13
Membership Size by Group Type



Figure 4.14
Paid Staff by Group Type



Figure 4.15
Volunteers by Group Type



Figure 4.16
Annual Operating Budget by Group Type



Figure 4.17
Income Trend by Group Type



Figure 4.18
EU as a Source of Funding by Group Type



Figure 4.19
Perceptions of Immigration Policy by Group Type



Figure 4.20
Perceptions of Citizenship Policy by Group Type



Figure 4.21
Perceptions of Asylum Policy by Group Type



Figure 4.22
Perceptions of Employment Policy by Group Type



Figure 4.23
National-level Connections by Group Type



Figure 4.24
Connections Beyond National Level by Group Type



Figure 4.25
National Connections by Group Income



Figure 4.26
Connections Beyond National Level by Group Income



Figure 4.27
Participation in National Lobbying Activities by Group Type



Figure 4.28
Participation in National Challenging and Mobilizing Activities by Group Type



Figure 4.29
Participation in EU Lobbying Activity by Group Type



Figure 4.30
Participation in EU Challenging Activity by Group Type



Figure 4.31
Effectiveness of National Lobbying Activities by Group Type



Figure 4.32
Effectiveness of National Challenging and Mobilizing Activities by Group Type



Figure 4.33
Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activities by Group Type



Figure 4.34
Effectiveness of EU Challenging Activity by Group Type



Figure 4.35
Participation in Survey by Type of Employee

Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max
Country	114	10.12	5.99	1	25
No. groups	114	57.5	33.05	1	114
Year founded	114	1990	12.46	1932	2004
Membership	114	4,302	27,104	0	250,000
Full-time staff	113	6.07	12.18	0	90
Part-time staff	112	3.63	6.59	0	50
No. volunteers	113	17.87	61.28	0	500
Income (in Euros)	96	1,141.36	3,419.49	0	19,000
Income trend	112	1.68	.77	1	3
EU grant	114	1.53	.57	1	3
Services/Care	114	.52	.32	0	1
Political/Legal	113	.39	.30	0	1
Asylum	114	.46	.40	0	1
Group focus	112	1.68	.73	1	3
Group target	112	1.31	.75	1	4

Note: The Income variable is scaled by dividing the group's income by 1000. The Income Trend variable is coded 1 if income increased over the past year, 2 if it decreased, and 3 if it kept pace with inflation. The EU Grant variable is coded 1 if the group received funds from the EU, 2 if it did not, and 3 if future funds are expected. The Group Focus variable is coded as follows: 1=primary focus is migrants/refugees, 2=primary focus is migrants/refugees and other groups, 3=primary focus is other disadvantaged groups but migrants/refugees are included. The Group Target variable is coded as follows: 1=all migrants/refugees, 2=migrants/refugees of a particular nationality/ethnicity, 3=women migrants/refugees, 4=young migrants/refugees.

Table 4.2
European Commission as a Source of Income for Pro-Migrant and Refugee Groups

	% of Groups
Have Received Grant	50.88%
Will Receive Grant	3.51%
Have Not Received Grant	45.61%

Table 4.3
National Differences in Membership of Pro-Migrant and Refugee Groups

Country	Membership	No. Groups	Mean membership	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Membership as % of population
Austria	284	7	40.6	44.3	0	120	0.004
Belgium	893	11	81.2	161.7	0	563	0.006
Denmark	149	2	74.5	7.8	69	80	0.003
Finland	695	3	231.7	252	0	500	0.01
France	1,203	6	200.5	393.3	0	1000	0.002
Germany	1,133	8	141.6	136.6	8	400	0.001
Greece	2,030	3	676.7	1146.1	8	2000	0.02
Ireland	252,583	9	28064.8	83226.3	0	250,000	6.3
Italy	429	5	85.8	84.7	9	200	0.001
Luxembourg	49	3	16.3	1.5	15	18	0.01
Netherlands	131,254	13	10096.5	36027.3	0	130,000	0.81
Portugal	4,369	3	1456.3	2208.4	29	4000	0.04
Spain	75,130	2	37565	53117.9	5	75125	0.18
Sweden	4,635	5	927	976.3	5	2300	0.05
UK	7,565	19	398.2	917.8	0	4000	0.01
Hungary	102	4	25.5	36.9	0	80	0.001
Czech Rep.	4,125	3	1375	2274.2	0	4000	0.001
Estonia	559	5	111.8	182.8	0	431	0.01
Cyprus	150	1	150	.	150	150	0.02
Malta	3,100	2	1550	2192	0	3100	0.78

Table 4.4
National Differences in Membership of Pro-Migrant and Refugee Groups Compared to Adjusted Average Membership

Country	Above Average	Below Average
Austria		--
Belgium	+	
Denmark		--
Finland	+	
France	+	
Germany	+	
Greece	+	
Ireland	+	
Italy	+	
Luxembourg		--
Netherlands	+	
Portugal	+	
Spain	+	
Sweden	+	
UK	+	
Hungary		--
Czech Republic	+	
Estonia	+	
Cyprus		--
Malta	+	

Note: Adjusted average membership for sample is about 318.

Table 4.5
Factor Analysis of Group Identity

Variable	Political/Legal	Services/Care	Asylum
Voting-nat'l	.83	.10	-.16
Voting-EU	.78	.08	-.03
Voting-local	.70	.26	-.05
Facilitate EU citizenship	.70	.10	-.39
Facilitate free movement	.70	.10	-.21
Fight discrimination	.47	.28	.26
Improve legal rights	.45	.38	-.35
Health care	.07	.82	-.23
Psychological adjustment	-.01	.70	-.21
Housing	.09	.70	-.10
Find employment	.29	.66	.04
Provide education	.40	.61	-.03
Learn national language/customs	.18	.51	-.14
Improve tolerance	.32	.49	.37
Improve national citizenship proc.	.48	.17	-.66
Improve visa/work permit proc.	.33	.22	-.65
Improve asylum procedures	.07	.23	-.54
% variance	58	19	13

Note: A principal factor analysis of the 17 group identity variables yields 3 dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Above is the varimax-rotated solution.

Table 4.6

Factor Analysis of Interconnectedness

Variable	Nat'l NGOs	Nat'l business	Nat'l labor	EU groups	NGOs abroad	Business/ labor abroad
Share info, national NGOs	.67	-.16	-.08	-.13	.14	-.24
Share advice, national NGOs	.75	-.26	-.17	.01	.09	-.18
Share resources, national NGOs	.53	-.04	-.10	.10	.10	.06
Common projects, national NGOs	.54	-.19	-.19	-.04	.24	-.18
Share info, national business	.17	-.83	-.23	.07	.05	.15
Share advice, national business	.10	-.84	-.25	.13	.02	.19
Share resources, national business	.04	-.59	-.15	.01	.06	.32
Common projects, national business	.12	-.75	-.21	.10	.08	.18
Share info, national labor	.13	-.36	-.80	.10	.11	.09
Share advice, national labor	.12	-.32	-.79	.14	.06	.11
Share resources, national labor	-.06	-.33	-.35	.10	.04	.20
Common projects, national labor	.08	-.25	-.78	.12	.15	.08
Share info, EU groups	-.04	-.11	-.07	.83	.16	.09
Share advice, EU groups	.06	-.11	-.11	.85	.25	.14
Share resources, EU groups	-.05	.03	-.11	.60	.10	.24
Common projects, EU groups	-.05	-.08	-.11	.85	.19	.15
Share info, NGOs abroad	.09	-.07	-.07	.22	.84	.11
Share advice, NGOs abroad	.15	-.11	-.13	.25	.83	.07
Share resources, NGOs abroad	.06	.12	-.08	.21	.45	.32
Common projects, NGOs abroad	-.00	.01	.-14	.24	.73	.19
Share info, business abroad	-.02	-.23	.04	.10	.07	.90
Share advice, business abroad	.04	-.22	.04	.20	.03	.88
Share resources, business abroad	-.13	-.26	.03	.05	.05	.81
Common projects, business abroad	-.10	-.24	.03	.03	.03	.83
Share info, labor abroad	.02	.18	-.44	.09	.19	.72
Share advice, labor abroad	-.04	.06	-.41	.20	.16	.71
Share resources, labor abroad	-.23	-.04	-.19	.07	.04	.77
Common projects, labor abroad	-.06	.22	-.44	.09	.18	.69
% variance	.18	.08	.07	.04	.13	.40

Note: A principal factor analysis of the 28 items yields six dimensions with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Above is the varimax-rotated solution.

Appendix A to Chapter Four

The survey questionnaire:

SURVEY OF EUROPEAN PRO-MIGRANT AND REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS

Section I. Background Information:

1. In what year was the group founded? _____

2. About how many members do you have at the present time? _____

3. About how many people work in the central office of the organization?:
_____ full time for pay _____ part time for pay _____volunteers (in average week)

4. What is your annual operating budget (excluding one-time grants or contracts)?

_____ (in your currency)

5. Over the past 2-3 years has the group's income (*please type an "X" next to your answer*):

_____a. increased _____b. decreased _____c. kept pace with inflation

6. How would you describe the types of issues that most concern your organization?

_____a. Mainly issues that affect migrants or refugees
_____b. Issues that equally affect migrants/refugees and other disadvantaged groups
_____c. Mainly issues that affect other disadvantaged groups

7. How would you describe the migrants toward whom your group's work is directed?

_____ a. All migrants or refugees / no particular distinction

_____ b. Migrants/refugees of a particular nationality/ethnicity
(if so, which one?_____)
_____ c. Migrants/refugees of a particular gender (if so, which one?_____)
_____ d. Migrants/refugees of a particular age (if so, please describe _____)

8. Has your group received funds from the European Commission to implement a project?

_____a. Yes _____b. No _____c. Will Receive

9. How would you describe current laws in your nation that affect migrants?

	Very Open=1	**Somewhat Open=2**	**Somewhat Stringent=3**	**Very Stringent=4**	**Don't Know=9**
a. Immigration laws					
b. Citizenship laws					
c. Asylum procedures					
d. Employment regulations					

10. To what extent does your group provide advice or expertise to the following European institutions?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. European Commission
b. European Parliament
c. Other institution:
_____

11. Here is a list of issues that may be affecting migrants/refugees throughout the European Union. Could you indicate how important each issue is to the activities and political concerns of your group?

	Highest Priority=1	**Very Important=2**	**Important=3**	**Not a Priority=4**
a. Learning national language /customs				
b. Improving asylum procedures				
c. Facilitating national citizenship procedures				
d. Facilitating procedures for obtaining visas or work permits				
e. Voting in national Presidential or Parliamentary elections				
f. Voting in local elections				
g. Voting in European elections				
h. Finding employment				
i. Psychological adjustment				
j. Physical health / Health care				
k. Housing				
l. Improving society's tolerance				
m. Access to European citizenship				
n. Facilitating free movement within Europe for work				
o. Fighting discrimination				
p. Improving migrants' legal rights				
q. Providing education to migrants				

Section II. Cooperation and Collaboration:

12. The next four questions list various ways that groups might work together to impact policy. In the past 2-3 years, how often has your group collaborated with non-governmental organizations *from your own country* in the following activities?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. To exchange information
b. To exchange advice/expertise
c. To exchange personnel/resources
d. To coordinate activities/projects

13. In the past 2-3 years, how often has your group collaborated with non-governmental organizations *from another country* in the following activities?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. To exchange information
b. To exchange advice/expertise
c. To exchange personnel/resources
d. To coordinate activities/projects

14. In the past 2-3 years, how often has your group collaborated with business associations and/or labor unions *from your country* in the following activities?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. Business associations to exchange information
b. Business associations to exchange advice/expertise
c. Business associations to exchange personnel/resources
d. Business associations to coordinate activities/projects

e. Labor unions to exchange information
f. Labor unions to exchange advice/expertise
g. Labor unions to exchange personnel/resources
h. Labor unions to coordinate activities/projects

15. In the past 2-3 years, how often has your group collaborated with business associations and/or labor unions *from another country* in the following activities?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. Business associations to exchange information
b. Business associations to exchange advice/expertise
c. Business associations to exchange personnel/resources
d. Business associations to coordinate activities/projects

e. Labor unions to exchange information
f. Labor unions to exchange advice/expertise
g. Labor unions to exchange personnel/resources
h. Labor unions to coordinate activities/projects

16. Finally, in the past 2-3 years, how often have you collaborated with groups at the European level, such as the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia or the Migration Policy Group?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. European groups to exchange information
b. European groups to exchange advice/expertise
c. European groups to exchange personnel/resources
d. European groups to coordinate activities/projects

Section III. Activities:

17. Now I'd like to ask about activities within your own country that groups might use to influence policy. For each of the following activities would you indicate how frequently your organization uses the method?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. Formal meetings with civil servants or ministers
b. Informal contacts with civil servants/ministers
c. Contacts with officials of political parties
d. Contacts with local government authorities
e. Demonstrations, protests, direct actions
f. Legal recourse to courts/other judicial bodies
g. Contacts with people in the media
h. Participation in government commissions and advisory committees
i. Contacts with members of Parliament

18. Some groups work with international or European institutions to influence policy. For each of the following activities would you indicate how frequently your organization uses the method?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. Contacts with officials of the European Commission
b. Contacts with members of the European Parliament
c. Legal recourse to the European Court of Justice
d. Contacts with officials of the Council of Ministers
e. Demonstrations/protests that target the European Union
f. Contacts with the Economic and Social Committee
g. Contacts with members of COREPER
h. Contacts with members of the European Council
i. Contacts with the United Nations

19. How often are your contacts with groups from outside your nation stimulated by the following types of policy developments?

Often=1 Sometimes=2 Rarely=3 Never=4

a. Stimulated mainly by national policy
b. Stimulated about equally by national and European Policy
c. Stimulated mainly by European policy

Section IV. Effectiveness:

20. In general, how would you evaluate the effectiveness of your collaborations *with groups from your own country* in achieving your organization's policy objectives? Please evaluate the following activities:

Very Effective=1	Somewhat Effective=2	Not Very Effective=3	Not At All Effective=4	Don't Know=9

a. Exchanging information
b. Exchanging advice/expertise
c. Exchanging personnel/resources
d. Coordinating activities/projects

21. And how would you evaluate the effectiveness of your collaborations *with groups from another country*? Please evaluate the following activities:

Very Effective=1	Somewhat Effective=2	Not Very Effective=3	Not At All Effective=4	Don't Know=9

a. Exchanging information
b. Exchanging advice/expertise
c. Exchanging personnel/resources
d. Coordinating activities/projects

22. Now I'd like to ask you to evaluate your collaborations with business associations and labor unions *from your own country* in achieving your organization's policy objectives. Please evaluate the following activities:

Very Effective=1	Somewhat Effective=2	Not Very Effective=3	Not At All Effective=4	Don't Know=9

a. Business associations to exchange information
b. Business associations to exchange advice/expertise
c. Business associations to exchange personnel/resources
d. Business associations to coordinate activities/projects

e. Labor unions to exchange information
f. Labor unions to exchange advice/expertise
g. Labor unions to exchange personnel/resources
h. Labor unions to coordinate activities/projects

23. Please evaluate your collaborations with business associations and labor unions *from another country:*

Very Effective=1	**Somewhat Effective=2**	**Not Very Effective=3**	**Not At All Effective=4**	**Don't Know=9**

a. Business associations to exchange information
b. Business associations to exchange advice/expertise
c. Business associations to exchange personnel/resources
d. Business associations to coordinate activities/projects

e. Labor unions to exchange information
f. Labor unions to exchange advice/expertise
g. Labor unions to exchange personnel/resources
h. Labor unions to coordinate activities/projects

24. When it comes to your collaborations with groups at the European level, how would you evaluate the following activities in achieving your policy objectives?

Very Effective=1	**Somewhat Effective=2**	**Not Very Effective=3**	**Not At All Effective=4**	**Don't Know=9**

a. European groups to exchange information
b. European groups to exchange advice/expertise
c. European groups to exchange personnel/resources
d. European groups to coordinate activities/projects

25. On average, how useful are the following activities you undertake within your country in achieving your group's policy objectives?

Very Effective=1	**Somewhat Effective=2**	**Not Very Effective=3**	**Not At All Effective=4**	**Don't Know=9**

a. Formal meetings with civil servants or ministers
b. Informal contacts with civil servants/ministers
c. Contacts with officials of political parties
d. Contacts with local government authorities
e. Demonstrations, protests, direct actions
f. Legal recourse to courts/other judicial bodies
g. Contacts with people in the media
h. Participation in government commissions and advisory committees
i. Contacts with members of Parliament

26. And how would you evaluate the following international and European activities in achieving your groups' policy objectives?:

Very Effective=1	**Somewhat Effective=2**	**Not Very Effective=3**	**Not At All Effective=4**	**Don't Know=9**

a. Contacts with officials of the European Commission
b. Contacts with members of the European Parliament
c. Legal recourse to the European Court of Justice
d. Contacts with officials of the Council of Ministers
e. Demonstrations/protests that target the European Union
f. Contacts with the Economic and Social Committee
g. Contacts with members of COREPER
h. Contacts with members of the European Council
i. Contacts with the United Nations

27. In general, would you please indicate which one of these three statements you tend to agree with most:

_____a. Groups working on migrants' issues are more effective when they focus their efforts mainly within their own country.
_____ b. Groups working on migrants' issues are more effective when they focus their efforts equally within their own country and an institution/agency of the European Union.
_____ c. Groups working on migrants' issues are more effective when they focus their efforts mainly within an institution/agency of the European Union.

28. Overall, when it comes to issues that affect migrants, how would you describe the receptiveness of the European Union versus your national government? (*Please type an "X" next to the number of your response*).

_____ 1	_____ 2	_____ 3
In general, European institutions/agencies are more receptive than the national government to issues that affect migrants	In general, European institutions/agencies are as receptive as the national governments to issues that affect migrants	In general, European institutions/agencies are less receptive than the national government to issues that affect migrants

Section V. Personal Information:

29. What is your job position? _____

Interview Questions for Migrant Inclusion Organizations:

1. What are your preferred strategies in achieving your policy goals, and why have you chosen these?
2. Do you ever collaborate with other actors, and if so, what prompts you to do so?
3. Does your group resort to protest or other direct actions? If so, whom do you protest: the EU or the national government, and why?
4. Under what conditions do you direct your activities or strategies at the EU, versus your national government? Are there any factors in particular that push you towards action at the EU level?
5. How would you describe the importance of forming networks/alliances with other actors to combat racism and discrimination or to work for issues that affect migrants?
6. To what extent do you collaborate or communicate with other organizations whose work may not focus on migrants' issues? For example, with environmental groups, ethnic associations, business interests, or labor unions? Why?
7. Some people have argued that since the European Commission doesn't have to face the scrutiny of public opinion or electoral pressures, it has more freedom to propose legislation that favors migrants' rights or migrant inclusion in Europe. To what extent does this influence your lobbying strategies? In other words, do you feel your chances of achieving your policy goals are greater by lobbying the Commission rather than your national government?
8. Would your group like to see deeper EU integration in this policy area? In other words, would you like to see a stronger role for the Commission, the EP, and the ECJ when it comes to anti-discrimination? Why/why not?
9. In your opinion, what do you think of the efforts of the European Union and the national government in the area of anti-discrimination? How can they improve?

Interview Questions for European Commission:

1. Why are relations with civil society organizations important to the Commission?
2. How extensive is your interaction with civil society groups or organizations that work for migrant inclusion/anti-discrimination?
3. In what ways do anti-discrimination NGOs interact with the Commission to institutionalize their policy agendas/achieve their policy goals?

   Do specific activities by these NGOs help to expand the Commission's authority in this policy area? In other words, in pursuing policy goals at the EU level, do NGOs help to expand the capacity of the Commission when it comes to the policy area of anti-discrimination? If so, how?
4. To what extent does the Commission facilitate, encourage or provide incentives for groups to either communicate or work together cross-nationally or across different policy sectors?
5. Are trade unions and/or employers involved in the anti-discrimination policy sector? If so, how? Do they collaborate with NGOs?
6. How do NGOs attempt to form alliances with the Commission? Do they lobby, etc?
7. Does the Commission form alliances with pro-migrant/anti-racist groups to work for deeper integration in the areas of immigration and asylum? If so, what factors determine effectiveness?
8. How would you describe the importance of forming networks/alliances with other actors to combat racism and/or discrimination?
9. How do you perceive the effectiveness of NGOs that work with the Commission in achieving their policy goals?
10. To what extent do you utilize private, non-governmental experts to inform policy/to come up with new policy ideas that deal with migrant inclusion, anti-racism, or anti-discrimination?

11. Do you believe that there needs to be closer cooperation among the different DGs in the area of anti-discrimination?
12. In your opinion, where can the Commission most effectively direct its action against discrimination? Why?
13. What is the European "value added" of your efforts at combating discrimination?
14. In your opinion, did the inclusion of Article 13 in the Amsterdam Treaty increase the level of activity by NGOs in this policy area?
15. What are the most pressing tasks that need to be accomplished in the future?

Interview Questions for Members of the European Parliament:

1. In the context of your committee work, how would you describe your interactions with NGOs, particularly those that work on behalf of anti-racism, immigration, or asylum issues?
2. In your opinion, are these NGOs a valid source of policy ideas?
3. How much of an impact would you say that these NGOs have on policy-making, or on policy outcomes?
4. What is it that makes you listen to these NGOs, or to consider their input? In other words, why do you find it important to form relationships with these groups?
5. Do you think that the EP is a good/effective avenue for influence for migrant inclusion NGOs seeking to impact policy?

Appendix B to Chapter Four

Table A.4.1
Sample of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Groups, by Country

Group	Year Founded	Membership	Approximate 2004 Budget (in thousands of Euros)
Austria			
Interkulturelles Zentrum	1987	60	810
Verein fur Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit	1999	70	400
Caritas Refugee Service Vienna	2003	15	-
Fair Play VIDC	1997	7	200
Bruno Kreisky Foundation for Human Rights	1976	0	17,500
Megaphon	1995	120	200
Auslander Integrationsbeirat	1996	12	-
N=7			
Belgium			
Le Monde des Possibles	2001	563	40
Mentor Escale	1997	10	250
Migration Policy Group	1995	0	1,000
L'Olivier	1996	30	48
Anti-Poverty Network	1990	26	1,100
Universal Embassy	2001	30	0
Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen	1987	15	19,000
Jesuit Refugee Services	1980	80	250
CRACPE	1997	70	3
Caritas	1974	48	1,000
Church’s Commission for Migrants in Europe	1964	21	340
N=11			
Denmark			
Akelin	1995	69	0
Euro-Mediterranean Network for Human Rights	1997	80	800
N=2			
Finland			
EU Migrant Artists' Network	1997	195	20
Refugee Advice Centre	1988	0	-
Finnish League for Human Rights	1979	500	300
N=3			
France			
-	1982	8	-
Femmes de la Terre	1992	0	-
Forum Refugies	1982	100	9,575.06
Centre d'Information et d'Etudes sur les Migrations Internationales (CIEMI)	1973	45	200

Reseau pour l'Autonomie Juridique des Femmes Immigrees (RAJFIR)	1998	50	0
Service National de la Pastorale des Migrants	1972	1,000	70
N=6			
Germany			
Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland	1999	60	3.6
ARIC Berlin	1993	20	90
Forum Menschenrechte	1994	45	56
Aktion Courage	1992	200	-
Informationsverbund Asyl	1998	8	-
Anti-Fascist League	1946	150	5
Internationale Liga fur Menschenrechte	1997	400	-
SOS Rassismus	1983	250	50
N=8			
Greece			
Research and Support Center for Victims of Maltreatment and Social Exclusion (CVME)	1994	22	60
Antigone Center	1995	8	80
Neolaia Synaspismou	1994	2,000	200
N=3			
Ireland			
African Refugee Network	1997	263	63
Anti-Poverty Network	1990	300	200
National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI)	1998	0	-
Mercy Justice Office	2000	1,000	170
Union of Students in Ireland	1959	250,000	400
Refugee Information Service	1998	0	300
Nasc: Irish Immigrant Support Centre	2000	200	50
Irish Refugee Council	1992	200	500
Vincentian Refugee Centre	1999	620	177.78
N=9			
Italy			
-	1990	200	-
I Nostri Diritti	1997	20	-
European Coordination for Foreigners' Right to Family Life	1994	50	25
Comitato per I Diritti Civili	1982	9	-
Trama di Terre	1997	150	130
N=5			
Luxembourg			
Service Refugie Caritas	1932	15	-
Commission Luxembourgeoise Justice et Paix	1971	16	5
Centre de Documentation sue les Migrations Humaines	1996	18	100
N=3			

Netherlands			
Discriminatie Meldpunt Tumba	2000	0	0
Steunpunt Minderheden Overijssel (SMO)	1995	26	1,700
Stichting Train	1990	0	170
Bureau Discriminatiezaken Utrecht	1985	0	160
Stichting Alleenstaande Minderjarige Asielzoekers Humanitas (SAMAH)	1999	0	350
RADAR Rotterdam	1983	0	300
Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam	1996	0	280
Stichting Vluchtelingen in de Knel	1996	0	162.5
Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk Utrecht	1976	750	0
Landelijk Bureau ter Bestreiding van Rassendiscriminatie (LBR)	1985	28	1,300
Dutch Refugee Foundation	1976	130,000	12,000
Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk Midden Gelderland	1985	450	1,000
Palet	1997	0	2,800
N=13			
Portugal			
Associacao dos Emigrantes de Tame	1999	340	13.88
Liga de Amizade Internacional	1984	4,000	29.226
Intercooperacao e Desenvolvimento (INDE)	1988	29	-
N=3			
Spain			
Caritas Diocesana	1985	5	135
Medicos del Mundo	1990	75,125	16,623.48
N=2			
Sweden			
Immigrantinstitutet	1973	5	1,653.49
FARR	1988	750	33.276
Afrikagrupperna	1974	2,300	-
Svenska Fredskommitten	1949	1,500	44.355
Filmdays against Racism	1993	80	85.858
N=5			
UK			
North of England Refugee Service Limited	1989	45	2,836.17
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants	1967	1,000	1,205.37
-	1995	100	-
Minorities of Europe (MOE)	1995	200	28.362
European Multicultural Foundation	1996	170	11.323
Manchester Refugee Support Network	1996	13	194.278
National Association of British Arabs	2001	120	0
No One is Illegal	2003	10	0
Student Action for Refugees (STAR)	1994	4,000	142.625
Asylum Aid	1997	60	128.337
Racial Equality Council	1994	80	87.523

Birmingham Race Action Partnership	1999	0	707.662
Refugee Survival Trust	1996	25	101.709
The Runnymede Trust	1968	0	424.675
Positive Action in Housing (PAIH)	1997	250	4,370.31
Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales	1991	80	-
The Voice of Congo	2004	12	0
COMPAS-ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society	2003	800	1,017.24
Scottish Human Rights Centre	1970	600	103.372
N=19			
Hungary			
International Law Research and Human Rights Monitoring Centre	2003	16	61.619
Utilapu Halozat	1993	80	32.863
Unity Movement Foundation	1998	6	11.175
Roma Participation Program	1997	0	1028.594
N=4			
Czech Republic			
Dzeno Association	1994	125	0
Ecumenical Network for Youth Action	1995	4,000	300
MKC	1999	0	245.862
N=3			
Estonia			
Non-Estonians' Integration Foundation	1998	0	1,597.79
People to People Estonia	1993	100	0.12782
Estonian Refugee Council	2000	12	38.347
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR)	1994	16	0.0975
NGO Youth Union	2001	431	1.917
N=5			
Cyprus			
Apanemi Information and Support Centre	2004	150	80.413
N=1			
Malta			
Euro-Mediterranean Youth Platform	2003	3,100	200
Jesuit Refugee Service	1980	0	-
N=2			

CHAPTER FIVE

Conventional and Challenging Political Activity at the National Level

"We participate in regular formal and informal meetings with government ministers. We need to engage dialogue with the government, not confrontation," Representative from Caritas Refugee Service in Sweden.

"Protest organizations have no influence with politicians," Representative from Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (Human Rights League) in Brussels.

INTRODUCTION

Social movement organizations (SMOs) can choose from a wide variety of possible tactics in responding to or interacting with their government. For example, groups can mount a protest, stage a demonstration, meet with national ministers, contact parliament and political parties, participate in government commissions, use the media, take action in the courts, interact with local government authorities, and more. Their choice of tactics can be either confrontational in nature (e.g., protests) or more conventional (e.g., lobbying). Among pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) organizations across Europe, how common is protest versus institutional lobbying? Are certain types of groups more prone to using challenging methods? What factors increase or decrease the use of specific tactics? Which factors prompt groups to choose more challenging methods over more conventional activities? This chapter addresses these questions and shows that the nature of a group's interconnections strongly shapes its domestic activity patterns. Moreover, the national POS, along with group identity and resources, also shapes political action.

Over the last decade, PMR organizations have become increasingly conspicuous political actors throughout the countries of the European Union (EU). Their actions focus governmental and public attention on the existing and emerging problems of migrants, refugees, the relations between third country nationals and the host country, as well as the features of advanced industrial societies that generate such problems as intolerance. As part of a social movement for migrant inclusion, the new issue demands and political values that these groups espouse

sometimes conflict with the dominant paradigms of advanced industrial societies. Consequently, they may end up challenging well-established social interests and governments that contest their policy objectives. In short, in attempting to exert political influence, PMR organizations find themselves faced with the predicament of other SMOs. They must decide to work conventionally within established political channels or rely on protest to influence political reform.

Research on other new social movements, such as the peace movement and environmentalism, reflects this friction over participation in conventional versus unconventional tactics (Rochon 1988; Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003), and highlights one of the ongoing debates within the social movement literature over the choice of tactics among SMOs. One element of the literature argues that because SMOs represent distinct political interests that challenge the political status quo, they are forced to rely predominantly on contentious and direct tactics, such as demonstrations and protests, to confront political institutions (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1997). Highly visible and confrontational action focuses public attention on migrant and refugee issues that would otherwise not occur through conventional political processes. Furthermore, SMOs arguably espouse an image of political dissent that opposes close collaboration with the institutions and government officials they attempt to influence. SMOs are able to mobilize public support and thereby increase the resources at their disposal by challenging and critiquing the political establishment (McAdam 1997). Thus, according to some scholars, direct and confrontational tactics (including visible and disruptive hunger strikes, sit-ins, and marches exemplified in Chapter 1) characterize the political style and key values of the migrant inclusion movement.

Others argue that the most influential SMOs undertake the right type and combination of activities that will most effectively promote their objectives. This can occur either through conventional lobbying or protest, depending on the issue (Jenkins 1983; Zald and McCarthy 1987; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Since governments endorse and administer policy, groups must use conventional lobbying activities to persuade elites to support

specific legislation, as the above quotes illustrate. There are many examples in SMO research of groups engaging in a range of lobbying activities, including meeting with members of parliament and participating in advisory committees (Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003). This perspective assumes that groups do not just confront established interests, but will also choose to work with them. This is an important assumption, as it leads researchers to expand their analytical lens beyond the protest activities for which SMOs are so well known to also include a focus on institutional lobbying and other less confrontational methods. Thus, research can begin to realize a more complete and accurate picture of movement behavior. This naturally leads to the question: Under what conditions will groups protest versus lobby?

In sum, even if one assumes that migrant inclusion groups, like other SMOs, use a broad range of tactics to exert political influence, the exact distribution of these tactics and the factors that increase or decrease participation in (and the efficacy of) different activity types remain unknown. Moreover, it is also unknown which factors lead groups to choose to protest versus lobby. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify these issues. Understanding them will help build a deeper and more robust understanding of social movement behavior.

DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL ACTION REPERTOIRES: HYPOTHESES

An integrative model of activity controls for several different explanatory factors: interconnectedness, the national POS, group identity, and organizational resources. Chapter 3 elaborated on how each of these is expected to shape various facets of movement activity. The following sections summarize the theoretical propositions and put forth hypotheses in the context of national-level action.

Interconnectedness and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 proposes a set of relationships about how groups' connections shape their activity patterns. At the national level, the important links concern other SMOs based in the home country, as well as national business associations and labor unions. The model first posits that more extensive connections with other domestic SMOs can be expected to produce more

contentious forms of activity within the nation-state, such as protests, demonstrations, and court action. As elaborated in Chapter 3, social movement organizations promote goals and uphold political values that pose a challenge to the established order of advanced democracies. By definition, SMOs are part of a movement to challenge and change socio-political norms. For example, women's, environmental, peace, and migrant inclusion groups all seek to effect some degree of social or political change. Previous research in the European context has found that contentious action is quite common among networks or coalitions of new social movement (NSM) actors (see Imig and Tarrow 2001). Thus, group ties based on a common NSM ideology may underscore and strengthen a group's sense of political alienation and perceived estrangement from traditional political institutions and policy processes. In turn, the group may be more prone to confrontational political tactics that target the national government (Tilly 1978). Therefore, *increasingly strong connections to other domestic SMOs are expected to increase the likelihood of employing contentious tactics*.

In contrast, the model also proposes that ties with national business associations and labor unions likely produce a moderation of tactics. In corporatist systems such as those in Europe, business and labor occupy a privileged position in the policy process in which they are routinely and formally consulted by government for the purposes of policy input. Thus, they spend a good portion of time interacting in a lobbying capacity with government agents. In turn, PMR groups that maintain strong links with national business and labor may be able to use their connections to increase ties to government agencies and policymakers. With facilitated access to members of the polity, PMR groups should be more likely to lobby rather than protest. Additionally, as SMOs interact more with business and labor, they may simply choose to adopt similar methods of influence. Thus, lobbying and other conventional activities should become more common. Previous work has suggested that business in particular should make a willing ally for PMR groups, as they tend to lobby for more open immigration policies to fill labor market demand

(Favell and Hansen 2002). Therefore, *increasingly strong connections to national business and labor are expected to increase the likelihood of institutional lobbying tactics.*

The National POS and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

Many scholars have argued that a relatively open POS encourages conventional modes of action oriented toward the national government. This proposition should hold for both the broad and issue-specific aspects of the POS. One aspect of the broad POS is the relative openness of the political system to the tactics and goals of a movement (Tarrow 1994). Studies have found that the degree of system openness relates to the tactics the SMO chooses (Eisenger 1973; Tarrow 1989, 1994; Kitschelt 1986). Relatively open systems should promote conventional strategies because they provide groups more opportunities to act via institutional channels, whereas closed systems tend to encourage more challenging tactics by cutting off these avenues for influence. In the context of an open political system, research has shown that groups tend to employ conventional tactics, such as lobbying and participating in formal and informal meetings with government officials, but in closed systems, when conventional channels of influence are less available, disruptive tactics such as civil disobedience and protest are more likely (Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Previous research suggests that when a country's competitiveness of participation is more open, SMOs are more likely to use institutional methods of influence (Dalton et al. 2003). Moreover, federal versus centralized systems should encourage conventional tactics since they afford SMOs more access point for influence (Dalton et al. 2003).

The presence or absence of elite political allies is also expected to shape political behavior (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994). As discussed in Chapter 3, the presence of allies within the political process indicates a relatively favorable POS, making groups more likely to employ conventional activities. In contrast, when connections to members of the polity are weak or non-existent, avenues for influence become more constrained and groups are thus more likely to resort to contentious tactics. Since studies show that Left-leaning governments tend to be more receptive to social movement issues (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995), SMOs

should be more likely to lobby when the Left is in a position of power. Further, multiparty systems increase the odds that an SMO will find political allies in government (Lijphart 1999; Dalton et al. 2003), making groups more likely to lobby and less likely to protest.

Beyond the broad POS, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) argue that it may even be more important for research to examine the issue-specific POS. As Chapter 3 discusses, issue-specific opportunities represent those elements of the political-institutional environment most likely to affect the movement in question. Migrant inclusion research has found that certain elements of the issue-specific POS relate to political behavior (Ireland 1994; Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 1999c, 2001, 2005). This and the following chapters examine the issue-specific POS most relevant to migrants and refugees with new data from the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index. The Index operationalizes five policy areas at the national level: labor market inclusion, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination. Where this "policy context" is relatively open to migrant inclusion interests, one would expect groups to use conventional participation strategies, such as formal meetings and lobbying. In addition, data from the survey that ask group representatives about their perceptions of national immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment policies also measure the issue-specific POS. Because an open environment affords groups the opportunities to express their political interests through traditional national channels, protest becomes unnecessary. Thus, *a national POS (in both broad and specific forms) that is more open to SMO demands is expected to increase the likelihood of using conventional tactics and decrease confrontational activities.*

Group Identity and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

An organization's political identity, or ideology, has been found to be a significant factor in explaining movement behavior (Dalton 1994; Zald 2000). Because a group's identity acts as a lens through which it interprets the political world (Dalton 1994), it defines its key issues and priorities, and shapes the tactics it uses to address its policy concerns.

Based on a factor analysis, Chapter 4 provided evidence for three separate dimensions of PMR group identity: services/care, political/legal, and asylum. Each type of group is expected to rely on certain political methods based on its identity. First, the concerns of services/care groups center on providing a needed social service to immigrant communities, rather than calling for changes in the existing system. Because their issue priorities tend not to pose a large threat to the established order, their values should be less challenging. In turn, their identity should shape their political options. Thus, because they are more likely than more challenging groups to receive support and build alliances with members of the social and political establishment, *services-care groups are more likely to act conventionally and less likely to be contentious.*

In contrast, the values of political/legal and asylum groups should reflect a more challenging identity because their issue priorities tend to pose a greater threat to existing social and political-legal relations. These groups generally reject the dominant order of relations between migrants and refugees on the one hand, and state and society on the other. In short, they attempt to bring about social, political, and legal change. Therefore, because their identity may constrain their options for action, *political/legal and asylum groups are more likely to resort to confrontational tactics and less likely to act conventionally.*

Organizational Resources and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

As discussed in Chapter 3, resources can work in two different ways to shape national activity. First, organizations with higher levels of resources are better positioned to undertake a wide range of activity and are more likely to be effective in their tactics. This is because participation in both conventional and challenging activities requires planned efforts that are organized and financed by the group. For example, groups with more paid staff may be better able to engage in letter-writing campaigns, organize meetings with government officials, and offer expertise. At the same time, these groups can also choose to focus their resources on organizing a demonstration or mounting a protest. Previous social movement research shows that resources influence groups' overall levels of political activity and success across a range of activity types (Schlozman and

Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Dalton et al. 2003).Therefore, *groups with more versus fewer overall resources are likely more politically active and effective, regardless of the activity type*.

In contrast to the linear and straightforward relationship posited above, other social movement research has found that groups with specific types of resources tend to use certain methods of influence over others. In other words, resources could differentially affect the choice of activities. For example, groups with a higher annual budget and a large professional staff may choose to maintain relationships with other social groups, political elites, and other actors, thereby providing the group with long-term stability and effectiveness. These organizations may thus opt for more conventional strategies, including lobbying and mobilizing the public (Oberschall 1993; Milofsky 1988). On the other hand, Piven and Cloward (1977) have shown that SMOs with limited resources rely more heavily on their volunteer activists and are more prone to staging confrontational displays such as protest. Therefore, *organizations with few financial resources, a small staff, and more volunteers are more likely to use challenging activities*.

An organization's age has also been shown to shape its political activities. For example, Dalton (1994) demonstrated that older groups tend to use conventional modes of action whereas younger organizations are more likely to protest. As a group develops and gains experience over time, it increases its legitimacy among the public as well as members of the polity. It also creates links to established social and political institutions. Thus, *older groups are more likely than younger organizations to participate in conventional tactics*.

DATA AND METHODS

The dependent variables in this chapter capture three broad forms of activity: conventional, challenging/mobilizing, and challenging versus conventional. The analyses of conventional activity examine six types: contacts with local government authorities, formal meetings with civil servants/national ministers, informal contacts with civil servants/national ministers, contacts with political parties, contacts with parliament, and participation in government commissions/advisory

committees. Challenging/mobilizing activity is operationalized as: protests, demonstrations or other direct actions; legal recourse to the courts or other judicial bodies; and contacts with the media. Finally, challenging versus conventional versus activity is captured by an additive index of all challenging versus conventional actions, where challenging acts are coded 1 and conventional acts are coded 0. All data for the dependent variables come from the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations.

In addition, I operationalize a set of dependent variables that capture the effectiveness of each activity in terms of meeting the group's policy goals. Each measure of effectiveness comes from questions in the survey that ask groups to report how effective the given activity is (not at all effective, not very effective, somewhat effective, and very effective). Higher scores indicate greater efficacy.

The independent variables that measure interconnectedness are constructed using data from the survey. Interconnectedness, or group ties, is operationalized using an additive index of how frequently (never, rarely, sometimes, or often) the group interacts with the given actor: domestic NGOs, domestic business associations, domestic labor unions, EU organizations, NGOs in other countries, business associations in other countries, and labor unions in other countries. More frequent interactions suggest a stronger relationship, and infrequent interactions suggest a weak or non-existent relationship.

Data for the broad aspects of the POS come from various sources. System openness to the tactics and goals of a movement is operationalized as a country's competitiveness of participation (or the extent to which non-elites can access institutional channels of political expression), and whether the country has a federal versus centralized system. Polity IV data is used to measure competitiveness of participation, and Polity III data is used to obtain each country's federalism-centralism score. I operationalize the presence of political allies as a Leftist chief executive or

government,[21] and the number of political parties in the country. I obtained all data on political parties from the Database of Political Institutions and the CIA World Factbook.[22]

I use data from various sources to measure the issue-specific POS. First, the policy context specific to migrants and refugees is measured using data from the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index. This data source compares a range of country level indicators grouped into five primary policy areas that strongly affect migrants and refugees: labor market inclusion, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination. Within each policy area, each country is rated on the following four criteria: eligibility/scope of policy, conditions/remedies, integration measures, and the extent to which the policy is rights-associated. Higher scores reflect more favorable policies. Due to the presence of multicollinearity between these policy areas, I develop an additive index comprising each of the five policy areas to measure the "policy context." In addition, perceptions of the issue-specific policy environment are captured using data from the survey that ask groups to rate their country's stringency versus openness in terms of: immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment policies. Higher scores indicate more open policy perceptions. Again, due to the presence of multicollinearity, I create an index that measures groups' policy perceptions.

Finally, all data on group identity and resources come from the survey. I created measures of group identity based on the results of the factor analysis explained in Chapter 4. Services/care groups have goals that tend to be more moderate, whereas political/legal and asylum groups tend to pose a greater challenge to the political status quo. Organizational resources are measured by the group's: age; number of full-time staff; part-time staff; volunteers; annual budget; an increasing annual budget; whether or not the group has received funding from the European Commission; and membership size. Higher scores indicate: older groups, more

[21] The multivariate analyses use only the measure of a Leftist government (as opposed to the chief executive) due to the presence of multicollinearity between the variables.
[22] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mt.html#Govt, accessed 22 September 2005.

staff, more volunteers, a higher annual budget, an increasing budget over the past year, receipt of funds from the European Commission, and more members.

I estimate several models of activity and effectiveness. First, the purpose of the conventional activity models is to ascertain the factors that cause levels of participation in each type of activity to increase or decrease (as well as effectiveness). Thus, I use binary logistic regression to compare acting frequently (often + sometimes) to acting infrequently (rarely + never), and general efficacy (very effective + somewhat effective) to general inefficacy (not very effective + not at all effective). I use the same method in examining increases and decreases in challenging activity, as well as its effectiveness. Finally, I construct three relational models to ascertain the factors that prompt groups to use challenging *versus* conventional tactics. Rather than identifying the factors that increase or decrease levels of activity, the first relational model analyzes the factors that produce *a shift in tactics* from the more conventional toward the more confrontational. Thus, it will provide information on the conditions under which contentious activity becomes more likely. I estimate this model using multinomial logistic regression techniques where no activity is coded 0, conventional acts are coded 1, a mixture of conventional and confrontational action is coded 2, and confrontational acts are coded 3. The analysis compares confrontational action to a base category of conventional tactics. The final two relational models compare the likelihood of using a mix of tactics (i.e., category 2 above) to reliance on a single baseline method (i.e., categories 1 or 3 above). I include a regional control variable in each model to account for any unobserved regional effects across Europe. This helps to guard against omitted variable bias and adds regional fixed effects to the models.

Overall, the methods used reflect the research questions being asked in this chapter. First, I ask several descriptive questions: how common is protest versus institutional lobbying? How effective do groups perceive each activity type in achieving their policy goals? To address these questions, I analyzed some descriptive statistics on the data to determine the breakdown of

participation in each mode of conventional and challenging activity, and to determine participation in each activity by type of group (i.e., services/care, political/legal, and asylum).

The second set of research questions is interested in the factors that cause changes in activity patterns among groups: Are certain types of groups more prone to using challenging methods? What factors increase or decrease the use of specific tactics? Which factors prompt groups to choose more challenging methods over more conventional activities? To address these questions, I first examined the bivariate correlations between the predictor and dependent variables for each model. I then estimated a series of multivariate equations according to the models discussed above. Thus, I estimated a separate model for participation in each type of activity and its efficacy, as well as a separate model for each qualitative assessment of activity choice. Although the multivariate tables present the results of the analyses by groupings of independent variables, in all cases where a regression was performed on the data all predictor variables were included together in the full model (regardless of how the results are presented). In other words, each regression controls for all predictor variables. The following sections discuss the results of the analyses.

RESULTS

Descriptive Patterns

Table 5.1 displays the percentages of groups that engage frequently in the various modes of institutional lobbying activities, as well as the more contentious and mobilizing forms of action. Contacts with the media are by far the most common activity, as 80% of PMR groups do so frequently. Moreover, 24% of all groups report that media contacts are very effective in enabling them to achieve their policy goals. Consistent with other studies of social movements (Dalton 1994; Dalton et. al. 2003), expressive tactics seem to constitute an essential part of the political repertoire of PMR organizations; their work often includes attempts to educate and mobilize the public.

Aside from the media, conventional lobbying activities are far more common than challenging acts. In terms of frequent participation (i.e., often + sometimes), the most popular tactic is contacting local government authorities (72%), followed by formal meetings (67%) and informal meetings (66%) with civil servants or national ministers. A good proportion of groups also engage in contacts with political parties (60%) and members of parliament (58%). Finally, many organizations choose to consult on government commissions or advisory committees (46%). Tellingly, although a majority of groups participate in most of these lobbying activities, very few consider any given activity very effective. Of all activities, informal contacts with civil servants and national ministers is ranked the highest in terms of efficacy (24%), and participating on government commissions and advisory committees is ranked the lowest (11%).

In contrast, comparatively fewer organizations resort to outright challenging or confrontational acts against the government, yet these activities are not altogether uncommon. For example, 47% of groups frequently protest; this is comparable to the percentage that serves on government commissions and advisory committees. Yet, protest is viewed as far less effective (4% versus 11%). Moreover, 37% of organizations frequently bring about court cases. Of the more contentious acts, this is regarded as the more effective (13%). Court action is even considered more or as effective a strategy as most of the conventional lobbying activities.

Figures 5.1 – 5.4 show that some variation in activity and effectiveness exists by group identity. Overall, Figure 5.1 illustrates that services/care groups (which have less threatening goals) are slightly more likely to lobby the national government than political/legal and asylum groups (which champion more challenging ideals). Moreover, they tend to view a range of activities as effective means of policy influence, from the conventional to the more confrontational and mobilizing (Figures 5.2 and 5.4). In contrast, political/legal and asylum organizations are more likely to protest and use the courts, confirming that their activity choices are likely shaped in part by their political identity (Figure 5.3).

Overall, the data confirm that most group activity is conventional in nature, adding to the literature that finds that SMOs behave much like traditional interest groups (Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Dalton et al. 2003) and challenging the image of new social movements as predominantly reliant on unconventional political action. In general, the data reveal an understanding among PMR organizations that policy effectiveness requires active involvement in the policymaking process, yet groups also appear to display an awareness of the potential problems of being perceived as allying too closely with government. Direct actions are unlikely to change policy alone; rather, groups' repertoires reflect a combination of tactical lobbying interspersed with more confrontational actions.

Main Findings: The Influence of Interconnectedness on Activity/Effectiveness

Recall that the interconnectedness hypotheses predict that increasingly strong links with other domestic NGOs are expected to increase the odds of confrontational tactics, whereas increasingly strong connections with national business and labor are expected to lead to a moderation of tactics whereby lobbying becomes more likely. Tables 5.6 – 5.11 display the results of how interconnectedness impacts activity and policy effectiveness. First, Table 5.6 shows that increasingly strong links with other domestic NGOs actually increase the odds of each mode of institutional lobbying. PMR groups with such relationships are 52% ($p<.10$) more likely to engage with the local government, 72% ($p<.05$) more likely to have informal contacts and over twice as likely (2.03, $p<.05$) to have formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers, 59% ($p<.05$) more likely to contact parliament, 47% ($p<.10$) more likely to engage in contacts with members of political parties, and are over twice as likely (2.46, $p<.01$) to serve on government commissions and advisory committees than groups with weaker NGO ties. Likewise, groups with stronger connections to national business and labor are over twice as likely (2.42, $p<.01$) to contact local government authorities, 49% ($p<.10$) more likely to have informal contacts with civil servants and national ministers, 57% ($p<.10$) more likely to have contacts with political parties, and are over three times as likely (3.61, $p<.01$) to serve on government

commissions and advisory committees versus groups with weaker connections. Moreover, group ties with EU-level organizations also strongly increase many forms of domestic lobbying.

In contrast, stronger group ties with actors from abroad – including NGOs, business and labor – generally decrease the odds of domestic lobbying activity. For example, stronger links with NGOs in other countries decrease the odds of local government contacts by 35% ($p<.10$), of informal contacts with civil servants and national ministers by 50% ($p<.05$), of formal meetings with these actors by 53% ($p<.01$), and of serving on government commissions and advisory committees by 66% ($p<.01$). Moreover, although stronger links with business and labor in other countries increases local government contacts, they decrease contacts with the parliament by 35% ($p<.10$) and of serving on government commissions and advisory committees by 56% ($p<.01$). Overall, the results in Table 5.6 suggest that simply being better connected with other domestic actors – whether NGOs or business and labor – increases the odds that a group will engage in many modes of institutional lobbying, while being better connected to actors in other countries decreases the odds.

Table 5.7, which illustrates how interconnectedness impacts levels of participation in challenging and mobilizing activities, points to similar findings. First, stronger group ties with other domestic NGOs do, as the hypothesis suggests, increase the odds of protesting the national government by 53% ($p<.05$). Moreover, they increase the likelihood of media contacts by a factor of 2.25 ($p<.01$). Yet, stronger connections with national business and labor also increase these activities. Groups with such connections are 56% ($p<.10$) more likely to protest, 64% ($p<.10$) more likely to bring court action, and over twice as likely (2.30, $p<.05$) to mobilize supporters via the media versus groups with weaker ties to these actors. In contrast, stronger ties to NGOs and business and labor in other countries decrease the odds of engaging in confrontational or mobilizing activities at home. Consistent with the previous results, strong domestic connections, regardless of the type, mobilize domestic activity while non-domestic relationships depress it.

When it comes to the effectiveness of conventional lobbying in achieving groups' policy goals, Table 5.8 shows that virtually any type of network – domestic or non-domestic – increases reported policy effectiveness. The one exception is stronger ties with NGOs abroad, which decreases the reported efficacy of local government contacts by 38% ($p<.05$). The connections that have the most consistently positive effect on lobbying efficacy are those with national actors, and particularly with national business and labor. For instance, stronger links with national business and labor increase the reported policy effectiveness of local government contacts by 54% ($p<.10$), formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers by 78% ($p<.05$), contacts with parliament by 46% ($p<.10$), and make groups over twice as likely to view party contacts (2.72, $p<.01$) and serving on government commissions and advisory committees (2.30, $p<.01$) as effective. In terms of the more confrontational and mobilizing tactics, Table 5.9 illustrates that stronger connections with domestic actors increase their reported policy effectiveness, as do connections with EU-level organizations. In contrast, groups with stronger ties to NGOs and business and labor from abroad are less likely to consider these tactics effective.

Table 5.10 displays the effects of interconnectedness on the choice to engage in challenging versus conventional lobbying tactics. That is, rather than examining increases or decreases in specific activity modes, the table illustrates how connections shape groups' choice of one activity type over another. Interestingly, the results show that stronger domestic level ties decrease the odds of acting confrontationally versus more conventionally. For example, increasingly strong connections with other domestic NGOs decrease the odds of challenging versus lobbying activity by 98% ($p<.01$), and those with national business and labor decrease it by 96% ($p<.10$). Overall, these results suggest that more isolated PMR organizations (i.e., those with weaker connections to other domestic actors) are more prone to confrontation.

Finally, Table 5.11 shows that interconnectedness has quite strong effects on the choice to use a single type of strategy (i.e., lobby or act confrontationally) versus adopting a mix of both conventional and more contentious strategies. Stronger links with national business and labor

have the strongest effect on promoting a mix of both types of tactics. For instance, it increases the odds of employing a mix of tactics versus using only conventional lobbying by a factor of 8.56 ($p<.01$), and of a mix versus only confrontational action by a factor of 228.85 ($p<.01$). Similarly, stronger group ties with other domestic NGOs increase the odds of using a combination of strategies versus only confrontational tactics by a factor of 41.99 ($p<.01$), suggesting that NGO networks actually produce a moderation of tactics. Interestingly, stronger links with EU-level organizations appear to encourage groups to use a mix of more confrontational tactics in addition to lobbying (versus lobbying alone). This implies that groups with stronger connections to EU organizations are over three times as likely to act both confrontationally *and* conventionally as opposed to solely lobby. Finally, increasingly strong links with NGOs abroad decreases the odds that a group will adopt a mix of tactics. For instance, it decreases the odds of employing a mix of conventional and contentious tactics (versus conventional only) by 82% ($p<.01$), and of employing a mix of tactics versus only using confrontational methods by 90% ($p<.01$). Overall, these patterns suggest that connections with national business and labor increase all modes of action, connections with national NGOs mobilize groups to add lobbying methods to their repertoires, and ties to EU groups mobilize the addition of more confrontational methods to groups' repertoires.

In sum, the data on interconnectedness suggest a more complex picture than put forth by the hypotheses. Rather than producing different types of political action, stronger links with other national actors generally increase all types of activities, from the more conventional to the more challenging. Stronger connections to all national actors also increase the odds of choosing to lobby versus act more confrontationally, and to adopt a mix of strategies versus rely on a single type of tactic. Moreover, there is more to the picture than simply positing that connections that span beyond the country decrease the odds of national level action. Stronger links with EU level organizations actually increase various forms of national lobbying, yet they also prompt groups to add more confrontational methods, such as court action, to their repertoires. In general, PMR

groups with strong connections to actors beyond the state are less likely to engage in national-level activity of any type, and are less likely to use a broad mix of strategies at the national level.

Other Findings: The Influence of the National POS on Activity/Effectiveness

Tables 5.12 – 5.17 illustrate how the national POS shapes activity and effectiveness. In terms of the broad aspects, Table 5.12 shows that an open national POS generally decreases the likelihood of institutional lobbying. For instance, groups based in a federal versus centralized system are 37% ($p<.10$) less likely to hold formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers, and are 55% ($p<.01$) less likely to sit on government commissions and advisory committees. Likewise, groups based in countries with a Left-leaning government are 41% ($p<.10$) less likely to engage in informal contacts and 47% ($p<.05$) less likely to hold formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers, are 37% ($p<.10$) less likely to contact parliament, and are 75% ($p<.01$) less likely to participate in government commissions and advisory committees. Overall, a more open broad institutional environment makes groups less likely to lobby, perhaps because they believe their governments are already addressing their issue concerns. On the other hand, a more open issue-specific POS has the opposite effect. A more open national policy context specific to migrant and refugee issues increases the odds of interacting with the local government by a factor of 5.11 ($p<.10$). Moreover, groups that perceive their specific national policy contexts to be more open versus stringent are 86% ($p<.01$) more likely to engage in informal contacts with national civil servants and ministers, and are 59% ($p<.05$) more likely to contact parliament. Thus, it is not enough to posit that an open national POS increases activity; rather it depends on which aspects of the POS are examined.

Table 5.13 shows that most aspects of the broad POS similarly decrease the odds of challenging and mobilizing activity, except for competitiveness of participation. Groups based in countries where competitiveness of participation is relatively more open are over twice as likely to protest (2.15, $p<.05$), and are 86% ($p<.10$) more likely to take judicial action. In contrast, where the Left is in power, groups are 64% less likely to mobilize potential supporters via the

media ($p<.01$), perhaps because there is less of a need to do so when allies are present in the elected government. In terms of the specific policy context, a more open institutional environment specific to migrants and refugees increases the odds of court action by a factor of 8.60 ($p<.05$). Because the national climate is already favorable to their goals, groups likely believe they can achieve much by way of the national courts.

Tables 5.14 and 5.15 illustrate that the effects of the POS are more mixed when it comes to the effectiveness of the different activities. In terms of the broad POS, Table 5.14 shows that both a federal system (1.49, $p<.10$) and a Left-leaning government (1.66, $p<.10$) increase the reported efficacy of informal meetings with civil servants and national ministers, but greater competitiveness of participation counteracts these effects (.38, $p<.05$). Moreover, a federal system and more favorable migrant and refugee policy perceptions increase the odds of reporting formal meetings with civil servants and national ministers as effective by 51% ($p<.10$) and 81% ($p<.05$) respectively. However, at the same time that a federal system and a Leftist government increase the odds of reporting informal contacts as effective, they have the opposite effect on contacts with political parties. Moreover, groups based in a country where the Left holds power are 31% less likely to report that serving on government commissions and advisory committees is effective. Overall, an open POS does not uniformly increase the efficacy of all lobbying activities.

In terms of challenging and mobilizing tactics, Table 5.15 illustrates that no aspect of an open POS increases the reported efficacy of protest per se, except for the number of political parties in a country. Groups based in countries with more versus fewer parties are over twice as likely to view protest as an effective means of policy influence (2.45, $p<.01$). This is likely because where there are more parties, protest has a greater chance of eliciting a reaction from government and drawing attention to a particular issue. Yet at the same time, more versus fewer parties decreases the reported efficacy of judicial action by 50% ($p<.01$), and of media contacts by 56% ($p<.05$). With greater potential governmental allies, it is probably more effective to lobby. A Leftist government supports this contention. Groups based in countries with a Left-

leaning government, a sign of political allies, are 58% ($p<.05$) less likely to consider protest effective, and 57% ($p<.05$) less likely to view media contacts as effective. On the other hand, greater competitiveness of participation – a sign of an open system – makes groups over twice as likely to report that judicial action (2.51, $p<.05$) and media contacts (2.06, $p<.05$) are effective. An open issue-specific POS tends to decrease the odds of finding protest effective (.02, $p<.01$), but increases the odds that groups report judicial action (48.82, $p<.01$) and media contacts (1.75, $p<.05$) effective. In sum, these results suggest that system openness increases the reported efficacy of these tactics, while the presence of elite allies decreases it. Moreover, the effects of the issue-specific POS depend on the activity examined.

Examining the qualitative choice of using more conventional versus more confrontational tactics may help shed light on whether an open POS broadly encourages lobbying while discouraging protest. To this end, Table 5.16 presents the effects of the POS on activity choice. It shows that both an open broad and specific POS decrease the odds of using challenging tactics versus lobbying. For instance, a federal system decreases these odds by 83% ($p<.05$), and more open migrant and refugee policy perceptions decrease the odds by 99% ($p<.01$). Moreover, Table 5.17 generally confirms this pattern. It shows that while political allies (in the form of a Leftist government) mobilize a mix of both conventional and challenging tactics as opposed to a single type of strategy, groups in a federal versus centralized system are 59% ($p<.05$) less likely to add challenging tactics to a repertoire based mainly on institutional lobbying. The same effect holds for groups with more open migrant and refugee policy perceptions, decreasing the odds by 63% ($p<.01$). Moreover, these groups are over one hundred times more likely to adopt lobbying strategies in addition to a predominantly contentious repertoire versus organizations that hold more stringent policy perceptions (127.14, $p<.01$).

In sum, the findings reveal that an open broad POS actually decreases the odds of participation in most forms of national lobbying, suggesting that groups are less active institutionally when the national POS is relatively favorable. In contrast, an open issue-specific

POS mobilizes these activities, suggesting that when both aspects of the POS are controlled, a relatively open *issue-specific* policy environment encourages groups to interact with national policymakers. These interactions are most likely to occur both at the local level and at the national level through informal contacts and interactions with members of parliament. When it comes to challenging acts, both system openness and a more favorable issue-specific policy context increase their odds, but political allies decrease the need to turn to the media. Finally, both an open broad and issue-specific POS decrease the odds of choosing protest versus more conventional lobbying activities, lending the greatest support to the hypothesis. Also supporting the hypothesis is the fact that both aspects of the POS generally decrease the odds that groups will add contentious tactics to a baseline of conventional repertoires, while an open issue-specific POS increases the likelihood of adding lobbying tactics to a baseline of more confrontational methods.

The Influence of Group Identity on Activity/Effectiveness

The group identity hypotheses predict that services/care organizations, which espouse goals that are less challenging to the political status quo, are more likely to engage in institutional methods of influence such as lobbying rather than act contentiously. In contrast, political/legal and asylum groups, whose goals tend to pose a greater challenge to the established order, are more likely to engage in confrontational or mobilizing activities. Tables 5.18 – 5.23 display the effects of organizational identity on activity and effectiveness. When it comes to lobbying the various national institutions, Table 5.18 shows that indeed services/care groups are more likely to do so. For instance, they are 60% ($p<.05$) more likely to interact with the local government. Moreover, even where the odds ratios do not reach levels of statistical significance, they are consistently positive. In contrast, the odds ratios for political/legal and asylum groups are consistently negative, suggesting that these organizations are less likely to lobby. For instance, political/legal groups are 61% ($p<.01$) less likely to serve on government commissions and advisory committees, and asylum groups are 40% ($p<.05$) less likely to contact their local government. In

addition, Table 5.20 suggests that these groups are more likely to report that lobbying activities are an ineffective means of policy influence, where the opposite holds for services/care groups.

Similarly, Table 5.19 illustrates that services/care organizations are less likely to use confrontational methods. For example, they are 30% ($p<.10$) less likely to bring cases before national courts. However, they are over twice as likely to use the media (2.42, $p<.01$), even though they face greater opportunities for institutional methods of influence. In contrast, asylum organizations are 68% ($p<.01$) less likely to do so, suggesting that mobilizing activities are more common among those groups with greater opportunities for influence. At the same time, Table 5.21 shows that the slightly more challenging groups are more likely to report protest and court action as effective means of achieving their policy goals. For instance, being a political/legal group increases the odds of considering protest an effective tactic by 98% ($p<.05$), and being an asylum organization increases the odds of viewing court action as effective by 66% ($p<.05$).

Although organizational identity does not appear to shape groups' choice to use challenging versus more conventional tactics (Table 5.22), Table 5.23 illustrates that it does impact the odds of using a mix of tactics versus a single mode of influence. The results show that services/care groups are most likely to use a wide array of tactics, both conventional and more challenging. For instance, being a services/care group increases the odds of employing both conventional and more confrontational means of influence versus conventional means alone by a factor of 3.79 ($p<.01$), and of using both types of methods versus only challenging tactics by a factor of 6.53 ($p<.01$). Simply because their goals pose less of a challenge does not mean that services/care groups only use conventional tactics. Rather, they use the broadest range of activities. In contrast, asylum groups are less likely to rely solely on conventional methods. When conventional tactics are the base category, being an asylum group increases the odds of adding contentious activities to the mix by a factor of 1.00 ($p<.05$). Moreover, they are 90% ($p<.05$) less likely to add conventional acts to a baseline strategy of challenging tactics.

In sum, the results support the contention that organizational identity influences how groups choose to act. As the hypotheses predict, services/care groups are more likely to use conventional tactics, whereas political/legal and asylum groups are more likely to act confrontationally. That is not to say, however, that services/care groups never resort to challenging methods. On the contrary, Table 5.23 shows that they are the most likely to utilize a range of tactics. Moreover, they are more likely than the others to use the media. These findings are illustrative of the fact that all of these groups comprise a larger social movement to bring about change, barring none from the use of more challenging or mobilizing tactics. In general, however, the patterns show that the less challenging groups are more prone to conventional action, whereas the slightly more radical organizations are more prone to confrontation.

The Influence of Resources on Activity/Effectiveness

Resources were hypothesized to affect activity in two alternate ways. First, groups with more resources were expected to participate at higher levels in all types of activity. This expectation tends to hold mainly for groups with larger annual budgets. For example, Table 5.24 shows that such groups are 60% ($p<.10$) more likely to hold formal meetings, and are over twice as likely (2.09, $p<.01$) to have contacts with political parties as organizations with smaller budgets. In addition, organizations with more staff members are significantly more likely to hold formal and informal meetings with civil servants and national ministers. At the same time, Table 5.25 illustrates that a larger budget also increases the odds of challenging and mobilizing activities. These groups are 61% ($p<.05$) more likely to protest and 54% ($p<.10$) more likely to use the media than groups with smaller budgets. In general, larger annual budgets facilitate all types of political activity.

In addition to the above hypothesis, smaller, less professionalized groups were expected to be more likely to use challenging versus conventional tactics. Indeed, Table 5.25 shows that organizations with more full-time employees are 52% ($p<.01$) less likely to protest, and are 38% ($p<.05$) less likely to use the national courts than groups with fewer staff members. Media usage,

however, appears to be driven by more financial resources. For example, organizations with a larger annual budget are 54% ($p<.10$) more likely to use the media, and groups whose budgets have increased over the past year are 65% ($p<.05$) more likely to do so. In addition, more volunteers actually decreases the odds of using the media by 48% ($p<.05$), suggesting that, unlike protest, mobilizing activity is structured in favor of more professionalized organizations.

When it comes to policy effectiveness, Table 5.26 illustrates that groups with larger annual budgets are far more likely to find most of the conventional lobbying activities an effective means of influence versus organizations with smaller budgets. For example, having a larger annual budget increases the odds of reporting informal meetings effective by a factor of 1.76 ($p<.05$), formal meetings by a factor of 2.04 ($p<.05$), contacts with parliament by a factor of 1.52 ($p<.05$), and contacts with political parties by a factor of 1.72 ($p<.10$). Moreover, older versus younger groups are 46% ($p<.10$) more likely to view party contacts as effective. At the same time, Table 5.27 shows that these groups are also more likely to find challenging and mobilizing activities effective.

The final resource hypothesis posited that older groups should be more prone to conventional lobbying. Table 5.28 illustrates that this is not at all the case. In fact, older PMR groups are over three times as likely as younger organizations to engage in challenging versus lobbying tactics (3.14, $p<.10$). Moreover, an interesting finding is that organizations that have received funding from the European Commission are over 11 times as likely as those that have not to use challenging versus conventional tactics at the national level (11.87, $p<.10$). This suggests that, given a choice of activities, age and EU funding promote more confrontational tactics such as judicial action. Finally, Table 5.29 suggests that an increasing budget also promotes more challenging tactics. Organizations whose budgets have increased versus decreased over the past year are over seven and a half times more likely (7.55, $p<.05$) to use a mix of challenging and conventional tactics rather than rely solely on conventional activities. Moreover,

they are 86% ($p<.05$) less likely to adopt a mix of both tactics versus rely solely on confrontational methods.

In sum, PMR organizations with large annual budgets are better positioned to engage in a variety of activity modes, from the more conventional to the more challenging. These groups also tend to report that a wide range of activities are effective in achieving their policy goals. At the same time, however, more professionalized groups with higher levels of full-time employees are less likely to act confrontationally. When given the choice of how to act, older PMR organizations and those with an EU grant are more likely to choose confrontational over lobbying methods of influence. In terms of group age, this may highlight the presence of path-dependency when it comes to groups' political strategies. This will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion. In addition, those groups whose budgets have increased over the past year are only more likely to adopt a mix of strategies when they include contentious activity. Otherwise, they are more prone to relying solely on challenging methods.

CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL-LEVEL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate how an organization's interconnectedness shapes its national-level political behavior and effectiveness while controlling for competing effects including the national POS, identity and resources. On a broad level, I expected changes in group ties (and other factors) to produce changes in groups' political activities, and the effectiveness of those activities in achieving policy goals. I expected these changes to be reflected in both the *types* of activities undertaken (i.e., qualitative changes), and the *levels of participation* in these activities (quantitative changes). Overall, the data supported most of the hypotheses put forth at the beginning of this chapter, with several qualifications.

In comparing the performance of the interconnectedness variables to the other predictors, the results of this chapter show that group ties are the strongest and most consistent predictors of lobbying, are among the strongest predictors of challenging and mobilizing activity, and have the strongest effects on the moderation of groups' political tactics. In examining these ties, the data

suggest that simply being better connected with other *domestic* actors increases the odds that a group will be politically active, regardless of the type of activity. This relationship holds regardless of the type of network being examined (e.g., NGO, business and labor). In contrast, being better connected to actors *beyond the state* decreases the odds of national-level activity. In general, then, strong domestic ties, regardless of the type, mobilize domestic activity while non-domestic ties depress it. Moreover, interconnectedness in general tends to increase policy effectiveness. In terms of activity choice, the results suggest that more isolated PMR organizations (i.e., those with weaker connections to other domestic actors) are more prone to confrontation. In addition, being better connected via national business and labor networks encourages groups to adopt a mix of tactics versus rely on a single method of influence. Similarly, being better connected to national NGOs mobilizes groups to adopt a mix of strategies versus acting confrontationally. In contrast, stronger ties with EU groups mobilize the addition of more confrontational methods to groups' repertoires. Overall, the data illustrate two general patterns: being better connected to any type of actor at the domestic level increases political activity of all kinds, and it also has a moderating effect on groups' choice of tactics.

This chapter also controlled for other explanations of political behavior. First, it found that an open *broad* POS generally decreases the likelihood of institutional lobbying, whereas a more open *issue-specific* POS has the opposite effect. This suggests that groups are less active institutionally when the broad POS is relatively favorable, but when both aspects of the POS are controlled, an open *issue-specific* policy environment mobilizes groups to interact with national policymakers. Similarly, an open broad POS also decreases the odds of undertaking challenging and mobilizing activity. These results point to a pattern whereby having certain broad institutional configurations in place at the national level decreases groups' overall levels of political activity. The implication is that there is less of a need to mobilize when allies are present in the elected government. Even when these broad institutional configurations are in place, however, groups will still mobilize if the specific institutional environment in terms of migrant and refugee

policies is *favorable*. This suggests that when the national climate is already favorable to their goals, groups likely believe they can achieve much in terms of policy influence and are thus more active in lobbying policymakers. Given the choice to protest or lobby, both an open broad and specific POS decrease the odds of using challenging tactics while increasing the likelihood of lobbying the national government. In sum, the results suggest several patterns: groups are generally less politically active when those broad aspects of the POS are relatively open; yet, groups are more likely to be active when the issue-specific environment is open; and an open broad and specific POS tends to moderate groups' tactics by mobilizing lobbying activity.

In addition, the findings highlight widespread support for the group identity hypotheses. As predicted, the more moderate groups (services/care) are more likely to use conventional tactics, whereas the more challenging groups (political/legal and asylum) tend to act confrontationally against their government. However, this pattern does not suggest that services/care groups never resort to challenging methods. Rather, they are the most likely to undertake a wide range of activities, from the more conventional to the confrontational. Overall, the findings underscore the fact that although certain group types are more or less confrontational, all belong to a larger social movement to bring about change, barring none from the use of more challenging or mobilizing tactics. However, the general pattern reveals that the less challenging groups are more prone to undertaking conventional action and a mix of strategies, whereas the slightly more radical groups are more prone to confrontation.

Finally, this chapter found both expected and unexpected results in terms of how group resources impact activity. As expected, groups with larger annual budgets undertake a variety of activities, from the more conventional to the more challenging. These groups also tend to report that a wide range of activities are effective in achieving their policy goals, suggesting that finances facilitate the ability to act and the scope of action. In addition, an expected finding highlights that more professionalized groups with more full-time employees are less likely to act confrontationally. An unexpected finding, however, is that older organizations are more likely to

undertake challenging versus lobbying activities. This runs counter to theoretical arguments in the social movement literature that over time, the increasing legitimacy of social movement groups causes them to develop political relationships and to work within established channels of participation. In the migrant inclusion movement, it may be that older groups that were established before the 1990s, when migrant and refugee issues began to occupy a prominent place in the public debate, were simply used to challenging their governments because they faced few options for influence via institutional means. As policy debates evolved over time, groups became more likely to find political allies in government. In general, then, this finding could reflect some degree of path dependency in the tactics of older groups; protest may be a tried and true method that they are reluctant to give up.

In sum, this chapter's results highlight the important effects of interconnectedness, among other factors, in shaping groups' political behavior toward government. Activity levels, activity choice, and efficacy are each impacted by whom the group has ties with and how strong those connections are. In addition, they are shaped by the national institutional environment, as well as the characteristics of the organizations themselves. The following chapter will expand upon this by examining how interconnectedness among other factors structures activity at the EU level, and impacts the choice to act within versus beyond the nation-state.

Chapter Five: Tables and Figures

Figure 5.1
Conventional Lobbying Activity by Group Type



Figure 5.2
Effectiveness of National Conventional Activities by Group Type



Figure 5.3
Challenging/Mobilizing Activity by Group Type



Figure 5.4
Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity by Group Type



Table 5.1
Conventional and Challenging/Mobilizing Political Activities: National Level

Activity	% often	% sometimes	% very effective
Conventional			
Informal contacts with civil servants/ministers	34	32	24
Contact local government	31	41	18
Formal meetings with civil servants or ministers	31	36	12
Contact parliament	27	31	13
Party contacts	23	37	12
Participate in government commissions/advisory committees	19	27	11
Challenging			
Judicial action	18	19	13
Protests aimed at national government	15	32	4
Mobilizing			
Media contacts	45	35	24

N=114

Note: Figures are percentages of groups that reported frequently ("often" or "sometimes") utilizing the given activity to address their primary issues of concern over the past two to three years, and that reported the given activity to be "very effective."

Table 5.2

Bivariate Associations: Independent Variables and Conventional Lobbying Activity

Variable	Informal contacts: civil servants/ ministers	Local gov't	Formal meetings: civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Interconnectedness						
national NGOs	.26**	.28**	.28**	.34**	.34**	.38**
national business	.23**	.32**	.26**	.09	.20**	.35**
national labor	.21**	.24**	.14	.21**	.32**	.35**
EU groups	.31**	.02	.31**	.27**	.21**	.30**
non-national NGOs	.11	-.11	.08	.21**	.12	.07
non-national bus.	.12	.12	.11	.04	.10	.16*
non-national labor	.18*	.10	.16*	.09	.25**	.11
Broad POS						
competitiveness of participation	-.03	.04	-.16*	-.06	.16*	-.11
federal system	-.01	-.12	-.12	-.13	-.05	-.16*
Left chief executive	-.05	.15	-.06	-.05	.12	-.14
Left government	-.11	.04	-.14	-.10	.03	-.24**
number of parties	.03	.07	-.01	.07	-.05	.14
Issue-Specific POS						
labor market policy	.06	.16*	-.03	.03	.19**	.03
long-term residence	.05	.13	-.05	-.00	.18*	-.00
family reunification	.07	.13	-.03	.05	.22**	.03
naturalization	.11	.20**	-.01	.06	.24**	.07
anti-discrimination	.08	.18**	-.01	.05	.23**	.04
immigration policy perception	.10	.02	.05	.16*	.02	-.01
citizenship policy perception	.17*	-.05	.16*	.24**	.07	.01
asylum policy perception	.17*	-.01	.11	.10	-.06	-.03
employment policy perception	.04	.02	.08	.04	-.02	.11
Identity						
services/care	.08	.29**	.06	.12	.20**	.16*
political/legal	.03	.04	-.04	.04	.03	-.03
asylum	-.01	-.09	-.05	-.04	.05	.02
Resources						
EU grant	.14	.12	.15	-.00	.09	.19**
group age	-.03	.11	.11	.10	.09	.07
full-time staff	.14	.04	.25**	.09	.13	.13
Volunteers	-.01	.19**	.09	.11	-.05	.10
budget	.06	.09	.14	-.00	.17*	.10
income trend	-.05	-.19**	.00	.05	.03	.08
Members	-.04	-.04	.03	.04	.05	.10

Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05.

Table 5.3
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Variable	Protests	Judicial action	Media
Interconnectedness			
national NGOs	.22**	.15	.37**
national business	.15	.19**	.16*
national labor	.18*	.06	.20**
EU groups	.00	.10	.03
non-national NGOs	-.03	-.08	.06
non-national business	-.04	.03	-.02
non-national labor	.09	-.12	-.11
Broad POS			
competitiveness of participation	.17*	-.01	-.11
federal system	-.05	-.01	-.05
Left chief executive	.05	-.10	-.08
Left government	.08	-.05	-.11
number of parties	.02	.05	-.03
Issue-Specific POS			
labor market policy	.10	-.03	.01
long-term residence policy	.10	-.05	-.02
family reunification policy	.12	-.06	.00
naturalization policy	.13	-.06	-.01
anti-discrimination policy	.11	-.01	.06
immigration policy perception	.01	-.00	-.03
citizenship policy perception	-.06	-.12	.04
asylum policy perception	-.04	-.10	-.10
employment policy perception	.02	.04	-.03
Identity			
services/care	.21**	.14	.13
political/legal	.23**	.10	-.00
asylum	.05	.19**	-.11
Resources			
EU grant	-.10	.09	.07
group age	.15	.04	.13
full-time staff	-.16*	-.12	.17*
part-time staff	.13	.04	.09
volunteers	.12	.14	.09
budget	-.04	.04	.13
income trend	-.09	-.04	.12
members	.16*	-.02	.15

Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05.

Table 5.4
Bivariate Associations: Independent Variables and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying Activity

Variable	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Local gov't	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Interconnectedness						
national NGOs	.24**	.04	.15	.17*	.22**	.21**
national business	.26**	.27**	.30**	.20**	.28**	.41**
national labor	.12	.08	.08	.21**	.29**	.22**
EU groups	.24**	.05	.20**	.19**	.11	.18*
non-national NGOs	.14	-.06	.07	.18*	.13	.15
non-national bus.	.22**	.13	.19**	.12	.10	.28**
non-national labor	.12	-.06	.14	.03	.11	.11
Broad POS						
competitiveness of participation	.02	.04	-.03	.12	.16*	.05
federal system	.10	-.01	.10	.01	-.21**	-.01
Left chief executive	.02	.06	-.00	.13	.14	-.02
Left government	-.02	.04	-.05	.11	.12	-.05
number of parties	.07	.05	.06	.09	.04	.17*
Issue-Specific POS						
labor market policy	.07	.09	.04	.13	.18*	.10
long-term residence	.05	.09	.01	.11	.16*	.08
family reunification	.05	.06	.00	.11	.18*	.07
Naturalization	.09	.07	.04	.11	.19**	.05
anti-discrimination	.09	.10	.06	.13	.19**	.09
immigration policy perception	.01	.05	.08	-.08	.00	-.12
citizenship policy perception	.12	.03	.15	.01	.05	.06
asylum policy perception	.00	.02	.10	-.18*	-.02	-.02
employment policy perception	-.06	.07	-.02	.03	.06	-.08
Identity						
services/care	.09	.16*	.02	-.04	.12	.08
political/legal	-.04	-.03	-.11	.04	.02	.04
asylum	-.09	-.06	-.10	.02	.02	-.04
Resources						
EU grant	.11	.17*	.17*	-.02	.07	.16*
group age	.07	.14	.04	.15	.20**	-.01
full-time staff	.18*	.11	.13	-.05	-.06	.05
part-time staff	.15	.11	.15	-.01	.05	.14
Volunteers	-.05	.03	-.12	.03	.04	.02
budget	.15	.11	.17*	.11	.05	.09
income trend	.00	-.11	-.01	.04	-.21**	.07
Members	.10	.03	.08	.06	.11	-.04

Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05.

Table 5.5
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Variable	Protests	Judicial action	Media
Interconnectedness			
national NGOs	.09	.01	.18*
national business	.15	.19**	.21**
national labor	.10	.04	.14
EU groups	.17*	.13	.04
non-national NGOs	.02	-.06	.11
non-national business	.07	.00	.05
non-national labor	-.01	-.08	-.07
Broad POS			
competitiveness of participation	.11	-.01	-.05
federal system	.02	.10	.02
Left chief executive	-.17*	-.08	-.11
Left government	-.15	-.05	-.06
number of parties	-.19**	.04	-.02
Issue-Specific POS			
labor market policy	-.03	-.01	-.11
long-term residence policy	-.05	-.05	-.13
family reunification policy	-.01	-.08	-.12
naturalization policy	.03	-.09	-.12
anti-discrimination policy	-.01	.00	-.10
immigration policy perception	.03	-.07	.02
citizenship policy perception	.01	-.05	.07
asylum policy perception	.06	-.04	.01
employment policy perception	.01	-.16*	.01
Identity			
services/care	.20**	.21**	.16*
political/legal	.31**	-.00	.17*
asylum	.20**	.16*	.08
Resources			
EU grant	-.05	.02	-.09
group age	.03	-.01	.01
full-time staff	-.15	-.03	-.07
part-time staff	.01	-.01	.03
volunteers	-.03	.00	-.00
budget	-.11	.05	-.01
income trend	.03	.00	.09
members	.06	.01	.04

Note: Entries are Pearson's r bivariate associations. *p<.10, **p<.05.

Table 5.6
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Interconnectedness						
national NGOs	1.52* (.42)	1.72** (.54)	2.03** (.69)	1.59** (.42)	1.47* (.38)	2.46*** (.90)
national social partners	2.42*** (.88)	1.49* (.42)	1.28 (.38)	1.23 (.39)	1.57* (.44)	3.61*** (1.37)
EU groups	1.01 (.30)	2.01*** (.53)	2.10*** (.58)	1.69** (.42)	1.24 (.39)	3.21*** (1.15)
non-national NGOs	.65* (.21)	.50** (.16)	.47*** (.14)	1.06 (.30)	.88 (.26)	.34*** (.14)
non-national social partners	1.67** (.47)	.95 (.24)	1.61 (.74)	.65* (.18)	.95 (.27)	.44*** (.15)
N=	107	110	109	110	110	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.7
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Interconnectedness			
national NGOs	1.53**	1.13	2.25***
	(.35)	(.28)	(.83)
national social partners	1.56*	1.64*	2.30**
	(.45)	(.55)	(1.14)
EU groups	1.02	1.33	.75
	(.28)	(.39)	(.25)
non-national NGOs	.80	.50**	.48**
	(.22)	(.16)	(.20)
non-national social partners	1.18	.79	.40**
	(.28)	(.21)	(.17)
N=	106	109	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.8
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Interconnectedness						
national NGOs	1.17	2.11***	1.78**	1.40	1.75**	1.34
	(.29)	(.65)	(.56)	(.41)	(.59)	(.35)
national social partners	1.54*	1.12	1.78**	1.46*	2.72***	2.30***
	(.42)	(.41)	(.61)	(.37)	(.97)	(.55)
EU groups	1.19	1.50*	1.31	1.71**	1.14	1.14
	(.31)	(.46)	(.36)	(.47)	(.42)	(.29)
non-national NGOs	.62**	.95	.71	.90	1.16	.78
	(.17)	(.30)	(.22)	(.27)	(.40)	(.24)
non-national social partners	.99	2.05*	2.01*	.88	1.17	1.22
	(.33)	(.98)	(1.02)	(.21)	(.40)	(.29)
N=	110	107	109	110	107	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.9
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Interconnectedness			
national NGOs	1.51*	1.09	1.65*
	(.39)	(.31)	(.52)
national social partners	1.59*	2.02***	2.44***
	(.53)	(.64)	(.91)
EU groups	1.60*	1.35	.76
	(.55)	(.41)	(.28)
non-national NGOs	.60*	.39***	.98
	(.23)	(.14)	(.34)
non-national social partners	1.07	1.08	.73*
	(.35)	(.36)	(.17)
N=	109	106	106

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.10
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

Predictor	Odds
Interconnectedness	
national NGOs	.02***
	(.02)
national social partners	.04*
	(.09)
EU groups	2.63
	(2.71)
non-national NGOs	1.76
	(1.40)
non-national social partners	.36
	(.34)
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting confrontationally versus conventionally increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.11
Multivariate Results for Interconnectedness and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics

Predictor	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Conventional Only	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Challenging Only
Interconnectedness		
national NGOs	.78	41.99***
	(.29)	(10.82)
national social partners	8.56***	228.85***
	(7.06)	(11.37)
EU groups	3.39*	1.29
	(2.81)	(.96)
non-national NGOs	.18***	.10***
	(.11)	(.08)
non-national social partners	.16	.46
	(.31)	(.65)
N=	110	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a single type of tactic versus a mix of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.12
Multivariate Results for POS and Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Broad POS						
compet. of participation	.63 (.32)	---	---	---	---	---
federal system	1.14 (.32)	.81 (.23)	.63* (.19)	.70 (.21)	.83 (.23)	.45*** (.14)
Left government	1.46 (.57)	.59* (.21)	.53** (.16)	.67* (.20)	.71 (.23)	.25*** (.12)
Issue-Specific POS						
policy context index	5.11* (5.36)	.28 (.31)	.44 (.45)	.47 (.49)	.66 (.54)	.22 (.26)
policy perceptions index	.98 (.24)	1.86*** (.53)	1.43 (.49)	1.59** (.43)	1.04 (.26)	.98 (.28)
N=	107	110	109	110	110	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.13
Multivariate Results for POS and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Broad POS			
competitiveness of participation	2.15**	1.86*	---
	(1.02)	(.89)	
federal system	1.06	.73	.91
	.32	(.26)	(.34)
Left government	.67	.66	.36***
	(.23)	(.26)	(.14)
Issue-Specific POS			
policy context index	1.13	8.60**	3.49
	(1.22)	(9.50)	(4.77)
policy perceptions index	1.08	1.18	.92
	(.24)	(.27)	(.25)
N=	106	109	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.14
Multivariate Results for POS and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Broad POS						
competit. of participation	---	.38** (.23)	---	---	1.86 (1.18)	---
federal system	.93 (.21)	1.49* (.41)	1.51* (.44)	.90 (.23)	.44*** (.15)	.98 (.29)
Left government	1.01 (.29)	1.66* (.61)	.77 (.25)	1.00 (.32)	.57* (.24)	.69* (.19)
number of parties	---	1.36 (.45)	---	---	---	1.32 (.37)
Issue-Specific POS						
policy context index	.84 (.78)	2.65 (2.92)	.43 (.50)	1.51 (1.48)	3.61 (4.46)	.77 (.97)
policy perceptions index	1.05 (.22)	1.23 (.36)	1.81** (.58)	.99 (.23)	.94 (.27)	1.19 (.29)
N=	110	107	109	110	107	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.15
Multivariate Results for POS and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Broad POS			
competitiveness of participation	---	2.51**	2.06**
		(1.33)	(.91)
federal system	.78	1.28	1.25
	(.28)	(.35)	(.50)
Left government	.42**	.82	.43**
	(.17)	(.34)	(.18)
number of parties	2.45***	.50***	.44**
	(.77)	(.14)	(.18)
Issue-Specific POS			
policy context index	.02***	48.82***	2.37
	(.02)	(6.44)	(3.22)
policy perceptions index	1.24	1.00	1.75**
	(.30)	(.26)	(.54)
N=	109	106	106

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.16
Multivariate Results for POS and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

Predictor	Odds
Broad POS	
competitiveness of participation	---
federal system	.17**
	(.18)
Left government	6.30
	(9.06)
number of parties	4.34
	(6.37)
Issue-Specific POS	
policy context index	---
policy perceptions index	.01***
	(.01)
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting confrontationally versus conventionally increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.17
Multivariate Results for POS and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics

Predictor	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Conventional Only	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Challenging Only
Broad POS		
competitiveness of participation	---	---
federal system	.41** (.20)	2.48 (2.63)
Left government	.33* (.28)	.05** (.08)
number of parties	.92 (1.06)	.21 (.25)
Issue-Specific POS		
policy context index	.17 (.83)	.01 (.01)
policy perceptions index	.37*** (.14)	127.14*** (14.68)
N=	110	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a single type of tactic versus a mix of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.18
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Identity						
services/care	1.60**	1.11	1.04	1.17	1.12	1.41
	(.45)	(.34)	(.28)	(.31)	(.30)	(.48)
political/legal	---	---	.95	---	---	.39***
			(.27)			(.12)
asylum	.60**	.96	---	.83	.95	---
	(.18)	(.30)		(.21)	(.25)	
N=	107	110	109	110	110	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.19
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Identity			
services/care	.82	.70*	2.42***
	(.21)	(.18)	(.74)
political/legal	1.25	---	---
	(.32)		
Asylum	---	1.38	.32***
		(.38)	(.13)
N=	106	109	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.20
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Identity						
services/care	1.41*	1.35	.91	.73	1.19	.89
	(.36)	(.39)	(.25)	(.20)	(.36)	(.24)
political/legal	---	---	.55***	---	---	.86
			(.14)			(.22)
asylum	.68*	.56**	---	1.13	.76	---
	(.17)	(.18)		(.29)	(.22)	
N=	110	107	109	110	107	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.21
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Identity			
services/care	1.11	1.18	1.42
	(.30)	(.28)	(.42)
political/legal	1.98**	---	1.06
	(.71)		(.33)
Asylum	---	1.66**	---
		(.47)	
N=	109	106	106

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.22
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

Predictor	Odds
Identity	
services/care	.58
	(.43)
political/legal	---
asylum	.94
	(1.51)
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting confrontationally versus conventionally increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.23
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics

Predictor	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Conventional Only	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Challenging Only
Identity		
services/care	3.79***	6.53***
	(1.47)	(4.88)
political/legal	---	---
asylum	1.00**	.10**
	(.13)	(.13)
N=	110	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a single type of tactic versus a mix of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.24
Multivariate Results for Resources and Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Resources						
EU grant	1.07	.77	.76	.69*	.91	.98
	(.37)	(.21)	(.20)	(.19)	(.27)	(.35)
full-time staff	.94	1.64*	2.18**	1.24	.84	1.36
	(.26)	(.52)	(.93)	(.29)	(.22)	(.40)
volunteers	.90	.73*	1.06	1.04	.75	.87
	(.22)	(.16)	(.26)	(.24)	(.17)	(.25)
budget	1.44	.88	1.60*	1.34	2.09***	1.49
	(.41)	(.26)	(.56)	(.32)	(.62)	(.50)
budget increasing	.51**	.85	1.20	.95	.90	1.21
	(.16)	(.25)	(.36)	(.22)	(.22)	(.36)
N=	107	110	109	110	110	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.25
Multivariate Results for Resources and Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Resources			
EU grant	1.09	1.20	.61
	(.30)	(.35)	(.26)
full-time staff	.48***	.62**	1.78
	(.13)	(.17)	(.87)
Volunteers	1.18	1.23	.52**
	(.25)	(.27)	(.17)
Budget	1.61**	1.32	1.54*
	(.46)	(.33)	(.51)
budget increasing	.89	---	1.65**
	(.21)		(.49)
Members	---	.97	---
		(.19)	
N=	106	109	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=non-frequent participation in the given activity (rarely + never), 1=frequent participation (sometimes + often). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.26
Multivariate Results for Resources and Effectiveness of Conventional Lobbying Activity

Predictor	Local gov't	Informal contacts with civil servants/ ministers	Formal meetings with civil servants/ ministers	Parliament	Parties	Commissions/ advisory committees
Resources						
EU grant	1.19 (.31)	.68* (.20)	.80 (.25)	.74 (.21)	.75 (.20)	.76 (.21)
group age	1.21 (.29)	.74 (.21)	.96 (.26)	1.24 (.29)	1.46* (.42)	.92 (.24)
full-time staff	1.09 (.27)	1.47 (.50)	1.37 (.42)	.73 (.19)	.78 (.17)	1.11 (.29)
budget	.94 (.24)	1.76** (.57)	2.04** (.80)	1.52** (.37)	1.72* (.61)	1.16 (.32)
budget increasing	.87 (.20)	.76 (.23)	.62* (.19)	.87 (.21)	.54** (.15)	1.24 (.33)
N=	110	107	109	110	107	109

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.27
Multivariate Results Resources and Effectiveness of Challenging/Mobilizing Activity

Predictor	Protest	Judicial	Media
Resources			
EU grant	.49** (.20)	.99 (.32)	.48** (.17)
group age	1.97** (.63)	1.06 (.31)	.94 (.26)
full-time staff	.54** (.17)	.70 (.23)	1.03 (.33)
Budget	.90 (.28)	1.88** (.54)	2.03*** (.64)
budget increasing	1.15 (.30)	.91 (.25)	1.09 (.30)
N=	109	106	106

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (somewhat effective + very effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported as "effective" versus "ineffective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.28
Multivariate Results for Resources and Challenging versus Conventional Activity

Predictor	Odds
Resources	
EU grant	11.87*
	(2.19)
group age	3.14*
	(2.69)
full-time staff	.32
	(.75)
budget	---
budget increasing	---
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting confrontationally versus conventionally increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 5.29
Multivariate Results for Resources and Single Tactic versus Mix of Tactics

Predictor	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Conventional Only	Mix of Conventional and Challenging | Challenging Only
Resources		
EU grant	2.60	.22
	(3.70)	(.28)
group age	1.39	.44
	(.66)	(.34)
full-time staff	.12	.37
	(.24)	(.39)
budget	---	---
budget increasing	7.55**	.14**
	(8.85)	(.13)
N=	110	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no activity, 1=conventional activity only 2=both conventional and confrontational activity, 3=confrontational activity only. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of using a single type of tactic versus a mix of tactics increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

CHAPTER SIX

From the National to the Supranational: Institutional Lobbying and Challenging Activity at the EU Level

"*Policy on migration is becoming more and more European; we are moving toward a complete withdrawal of it from the realm of the Member State governments within the next 15 to 20 years," Representative from the King Baudouin Foundation in Brussels.*

"We are seeing a new EU dimension in the area of [migrant] integration. It's not very defined yet, but it's moving along," Representative from the European Policy Center in Brussels.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter investigates the political behavior of pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) organizations at the supranational level, and is interested in why and how groups use the EU to achieve their policy goals. Whereas the previous chapter showed that groups undertake a variety of political initiatives in their own nation-states directed at their governments, this chapter is interested in the factors that produce activity directed at the EU. It asks: What proportion of groups aim their tactics at the EU? Are certain types of PMR groups more likely to lobby EU institutions versus challenge them? What factors influence the likelihood of lobbying the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, Economic and Social Committee, and Coreper? What factors lead groups to challenge the EU via the European Court of Justice or by direct action? What conditions produce a qualitative shift in the arena of activity from the national to the EU level? In addressing these research questions, this chapter is predominantly interested in how interconnectedness impacts activity. At the same time, like the others, it integrates and builds on aspects of various theoretical approaches to studying social movement organizations (SMOs). It aims to address these questions surrounding supranational activity by examining the variables discussed in the previous chapter (interconnectedness, the national POS, group identity and resources), and relating changes in these variables to changes in EU-level activity patterns.

Previous research has shown that organizations act in both national and supranational settings, and that groups' activity patterns tend to differ at the level of the EU versus the nation-state (Imig and Tarrow 2001). For example, contentious activity is found to be much more common at the national level, as the political-institutional environment of the EU policy process is such that it creates incentives for lobbying, holding meetings, etc. (Marks and McAdam 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Although we know that the nature of activity differs across levels of governance, we do not know whether an organization's connections, along with other factors, influence the level or choice of EU activity. Do groups with strong connections to EU organizations and other actors beyond their country have a greater likelihood of acting at the EU versus the national level? Will groups turn to the EU when the national institutional environment is relatively closed? Are political/legal and asylum groups shut out of EU political processes due to the nature of their identity? Are groups with a grant from the Commission more likely to lobby it or other EU institutions? This chapter seeks to fill a theoretical gap by going beyond documenting differences in national versus EU activity and assessing the factors that produce quantitative changes in the odds of specific EU activities as well as qualitative changes in the choice to act at the national versus the supranational level.

There are two alternative perspectives in assessing the relationship between sub-national actors and the EU, and the ways in which the nation-state influences that interaction. First, the liberal intergovernmental approach to EU integration views the nation-state as the most important actor in international or supranational politics (Moravcsik 1994, 1999). Thus, it sees the mobilization of sub-national actors as a process dominated primarily by states acting as the sole intermediary with the EU (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001). In this perspective, groups are likely to affect EU political processes only when their objectives overlap with those of the state; thus, they function as extensions of their national governments.

In contrast, proponents of the multi-level governance approach to EU integration view the process of mobilization by sub-national groups as independent from the nation-state. Thus, it

becomes possible for groups to use the EU as an *alternative arena* for influencing politics (Marks 1992, 1993, 1996). This view holds that groups can influence politics not simply by acting as extensions of the state, but rather by acting independently of it.

It is likely that both intergovernmental and multi-level governance processes influence the interactions between PMR groups and supranational political processes. PMR actors have been shown to mobilize independently of their governments at the level of the EU, as the multi-level governance approach would suggest (Geddes 1995, 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2003). At the same time, however, the national institutional environment of states undoubtedly influences group activities, including the likelihood of turning to the EU. Moreover, interconnectedness may facilitate mobilization independently of the state. The previous chapter illustrated that each of these factors in some way influences the propensity to mobilize, suggesting that even if organizations do mobilize independently of their governments, national and group level factors likely shape their activity in some way. This leads to the question: under what conditions will groups act at the EU level, and what factors prompt them to turn away from the state and choose EU versus national political activity?

BACKGROUND: THE CONTEXT OF MIGRANT AND REFUGEE POLITICS IN THE EU

The European Union[23] embodies the notion of supranational governance, that is, governance beyond the nation-state. As a unique supranational actor, scholars have argued that its governance processes with respect to immigration and refugee policymaking afford certain avenues of influence for PMR organizations (Geddes 1998, 2000b). The idea of free movement within a single market underlies the foundations of immigration and asylum policymaking at the EU level. In general, the quest toward free movement has highlighted issues of migration and has brought them to the forefront of debates concerning European integration (Butt Philip 1994; Ireland 1991;

[23] The term European Union refers to the current structure of the European Union as well as past embodiments including the European Community, EC, and EEC.

Koslowski 1994, 1998). The following sections provide an overview of migration-related issues in the context of the EU while highlighting the interplay of intergovernmental and multi-level governance forces.

Immigration Control, Security Frames, and the Third Pillar

Since the early 1980s, police and other law and order officials have become increasingly involved with migration management at the EU level. Migration control experts have regularly participated in intergovernmental working groups on security-related issues, such as the 1970s Trevi group (Guiraudon 2003). These working groups tend to adopt an informal and secretive nature, allowing migration control officials to set the agenda of intergovernmental cooperation by emphasizing the sorts of technical solutions to the migration "problem" that required their expertise (Guiraudon 2003). During the Schengen Implementation Agreement (SIA), these officials were very much involved in negotiating on behalf of migration control and in framing immigration as a security issue. Interior and Justice personnel dominated these negotiations, resulting in the security-oriented content of the SIA and subsequent negotiated agreements.

The character of intergovernmental cooperation at this time, which involved non-binding decisions rather than integration as such, resulted in part from national-level constraints on migration control that occurred in the early 1980s (Guiraudon 2000a). In many instances, for example, court decisions prevented individual governments from blocking family reunification. The 1980s also witnessed the first clashes between immigrant integration agencies and those that dealt with migration control. These developments provided incentives for migration control forces to seek a new policy environment free from national legal constraints and conflicting policy goals (Guiraudon 2003). Thus, instead of opting for a "regime" at the EU level to institutionalize policy, national officials chose to negotiate and cooperate in an intergovernmental forum to promote migration control outside of domestic constraints.

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty formalized the existing network of intergovernmental cooperation among national ministries of justice and the interior (and related national ministries)

into the Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Title VI of the Treaty of the European Union, consisting of articles K.1 to K.9, covers "cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs…for the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free movement of persons," (Wallace and Wallace 2000). Its subject matter, as defined in K.1, includes the development of a common asylum policy, rules on external border controls, immigration policy, and rules for third country nationals (among other issues pertaining to civil and criminal matters and police cooperation). The scale of activity within the Third Pillar increased during the first half of the 1990s, and became the largest single field for which the Council Secretariat serviced meetings. In 1997, for example, this amounted to a third of the meetings convened and over 40% of the papers circulated (Wallace and Wallace 2000).

Throughout much of the 1990s, migration continued to be framed as a security rather than a social inclusion or labor market issue. The Third Pillar on JHA had become the predominant institutional framework for handling migration concerns at the EU level. This framework required unanimous decisions on migration-related issues by the Council of Ministers, and thus remained outside the Community legal order. Moreover, the Commission lacked the right of initiative that it enjoyed in other policy areas, and as a consequence could not adopt an entrepreneurial, agenda-setting role in the immigration policy domain (Wallace and Wallace 2000).

From the Maastricht Treaty to the Amsterdam Treaty, the JHA Council found little to agree on. The crowning achievement was an agreement on a single joint position pertaining to a common definition of a refugee, and on five related legally binding joint actions (Wallace and Wallace 2000). The complicated decision-making structure of the Third Pillar has been faulted for the lack of formal agreements during this time (Guiraudon 2003). However, the Third Pillar was only one of several policy venues dealing with migration issues. Forums on migration and asylum, such as the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies, were also taking place at this time. This resulted in an expanding arena in which to

debate and propose measures regarding common immigration and asylum policies that went beyond the domain of the Council of Ministers (Guiraudon 2003).

The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in May of 1999, shifted the entire immigration policy sector from the Third Pillar of JHA to the First Pillar of supranational decision making, facilitating cooperation in this area (Wallace and Wallace 2000). This shift effectively separated the issue of immigration from other sensitive issues dealing with national security, such as cross-border crime and drugs. This was a significant development, as decisions on migration now fell into the Community framework, which gave the European Commission a stronger voice and paved the way for deeper integration in this policy area, albeit with certain limitations on the role of EU institutions. Since that time, the logic of the immigration and asylum policy process has been slow to change. For a period of five years after the treaty, the Commission faced competition from member states that had a right of co-initiative in policymaking. At the same time, law enforcement measures tend to meet more success than efforts emphasizing migrants' rights (Guiraudon 2003), illustrating that this policy sector has proceeded largely according to the intergovernmental model.

These developments confirm the importance of the migration issue within the EU. Although law and order officials remain key players, since the Amsterdam Treaty they have become increasingly constrained and forced to cooperate with EU institutions. Although they moved beyond national-level constraints to successfully define the EU migration policy frame in terms of security and favored intergovernmental policy forums, this may be slowly changing. PMR groups have been able to mobilize independently of their governments and develop a competing agenda in favor of migrant inclusion, particularly since the Amsterdam Treaty. The following section addresses these efforts.

Pro-Migrant Actors and Migrant Inclusion

At the time when the first Schengen agreement was signed in 1985, the Commission issued new guidelines on migration and adopted the stance that European integration could provide foreign

residents with better access to rights (CEC 1985). Despite setbacks from contesting member states, the Commission, along with pro-migrant transnational organizations, continued efforts to carve out a policy space for migrants' rights and migrant inclusion within Europe.

The unit (D.4) within the Commission Directorate for Employment and Social Affairs, subsequently called "Free Movement of Workers, Migrant Integration, and Anti-Racism," was created in 1958 to address issues related to the free movement of labor, among other issues (Guiraudon 2003). Individuals within this unit have an incentive to adopt the larger migrant inclusion policy agenda to increase the Commission's own scope for action (Geddes 2000a). This logic of "purposeful opportunism" (Cram 1997) also applies to other EU institutions seeking to expand their competencies, such as the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Because much of their activities take place away from the public's eye, these institutions may be used to achieve successful initiatives in the area of migrant inclusion.

As one scholar writes, "To help mobilization on this agenda, the Commission sought to increase its legitimacy as a spokesperson for 'civil society' by engineering an official channel of interest representation," (Guiraudon 2003: 273). Thus, in 1991, the Commission founded the EU Migrants' Forum, which was an umbrella lobby organization comprising 130 individual migrant associations (Geddes 1998). Although ethnic differences produced internal divisions and thus inefficacy, it was followed by other lobbies organized at the EU level (Geddes 1998).

On a side note, an important function of the European Commission has been to provide funding to numerous migrant associations and their initiatives (CEC 1995a). Because Directorate General V (Employment, Industrial Relations, and Social Affairs)[24] finances projects against racism and xenophobia, actions in favor of migrant workers and their free movement, and initiatives favoring the integration of refugees, it has been the primary source of funding for

[24] Since the fall of 1999, the numbers of the directorate generals are no longer operative. Additionally, their names and attributions have changed somewhat, due to the implementation of a new treaty, an internal reform of the Commission, and the nomination of a new college of Commissioners headed by Romano Prodi. Because this discussion involves the time period up to these changes, I employ the names and numbers of the Delors and Santer commissions.

migrant NGOs (CEC 1995b). After 1995, the Commission developed a clear set of criteria for support. Part of this stemmed from the Delors commission's expansionist attitude and the skepticism it caused among the member states (Guiraudon 2001). Member states began to increasingly invoke the subsidiarity principle (i.e., what can best be solved locally or nationally should be dealt with at that level). This meant that all Commission units managing projects increasingly had to explain why they – rather than the national governments or institutions – should intervene. A second part of this change stemmed from discussions of the opaqueness of the Commission's funding procedures (Guiraudon 2001). The DG-V responded by establishing clearer funding requirements that also demonstrated the added value of EU funding. From this point on, the unit decided to include "transnationality" (i.e., projects involving the cooperation of multinational teams) as a criterion for receiving Commission funds. This came about due to the legal constraints facing the Commission – without an underlying "European" justification, member states could attempt to terminate programs due to non-respect of the subsidiarity principle before the European Court of Justice. In general, securing these funds would seem to be an incentive for migrant NGOs to inscribe their action in a "European" context.

By 1992 it was evident that what had been the predominant strategy of linking migrants' rights to the concept of European citizenship was ineffective. Instead, the Commission and the Brussels-based NGO Migration Policy Group (MPG) shifted their agenda to the EU war on "social exclusion" (Article 137 of the Treaty of Amsterdam) (Guiraudon 2003). Because social exclusion encompasses a range of programs, the MPG linked migrant integration to this agenda in the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. This frame proved beneficial to established transnational networks that could rely on their expertise in the area of anti-discrimination (Geddes 2000b). In 1992, for example, the Starting Line Group was founded and supported by the MPG. Its organizational structure and expertise has enabled the organization to successfully lobby in favor of anti-discrimination policies (Geddes 1998). Linking migrant inclusion to an anti-discrimination policy frame proved quite successful and resulted in the adoption of the "race directive" in June

of 2000 (Guiraudon 2003). The mere seven months it took was "a record for the adoption of a piece of Community law requiring substantive legislative changes at national level," (Tyson 2001: 112). At present, PMR groups continue to link migrant inclusion to anti-discrimination.

In sum, pro-migrant NGOs have been able to expand the EU's sphere of influence to include immigrant-related issues, as have their migration control counterparts. The migrant inclusion agenda may be more likely to succeed through lobbying EU institutions (a process that occurs away from public scrutiny) rather than via actions at the national level (where opposing public opinion and anti-immigrant mobilization may constrain the migrant inclusion agenda), particularly now that asylum policy decisions are taken on the basis of qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. This argument suggests that groups may turn to the EU when their national environments are unfavorable to their policy goals. Particularly since the shift from the Third Pillar (JHA) to the First, the migrant inclusion agenda has met increasing opportunities to involve not only the Commission, but also the EP and ECJ (under certain circumstances), in counter-balancing the Council's intergovernmental nature. At the same time, however, migration policies at the EU level present problems for the aims of the single market and the integration of different national-level practices. As a result, migration-related policy developments at the EU level reflect certain conflicts. First, there are tensions between competing agendas – those that advocate for migration control versus migrant inclusion. Second, tensions exist between the creation of common policies that deal with migration and the preservation of member states' national policies. These tensions underlie the majority of PMR group activity at the EU level.

EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING FUNCTIONS

The Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations allows a more nuanced investigation into supranational conventional activity than previous studies have been able to accomplish. For example, the data permit a breakdown of activity by EU institution. This is useful in that although previous research has documented the predominant use of lobbying activity at the EU level, it has not been refined enough to analyze the factors that prompt groups

to target specific policymaking bodies. There are several institutions involved in formulating, adopting, and implementing EU policies in the area of immigration and asylum. Among the most significant are the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A brief overview of each institution is provided below.

The Council of Ministers is composed of representatives of member state governments, and represents the most important legislative body in the EU (Marks and McAdam 1999). Migrant and refugee issues represent a component of the Council's agenda. This is due, in part, to the growing national concern over migration as a security issue since 9/11. The nature of its composition suggests that groups likely apply pressure at the national level to influence the Council. PMR groups can hold meetings with national officials to attempt to exert influence before Council negotiations. However, given that groups can choose to lobby other EU institutions, such as the Commission, it is possible that PMR organizations will shift their focus from the Council to other institutions when opportunities become constrained. In other words, groups may increase their EU-level activity when they lack influence at home.

The European Commission is one institution to which PMR groups may turn when the national context is unfavorable. The role of the Commission includes proposing and drafting legislation that is then debated within the European Parliament and Council of Ministers. Within the Commission, the Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs, Unit D/3 Anti-Discrimination and Civil Society, is responsible for migrant inclusion affairs. Because the Commission also researches the feasibility of new migrant inclusion policies, it serves as an access point for PMR groups. However, the openness of the Commission to civil society input is counterbalanced by its heavy workload. In many cases, group interviews confirmed that the most successful PMR groups are those that have the technical knowledge and resources to draft legislation proposals and present them to the Commission; in other words, groups must be willing and able to do the Commission's work. Moreover, the Commission is biased toward groups with

more moderate goals, since its proposed legislation must pass Council and EP debate. This suggests that EU-level activity may be just as likely to be driven by the resources and identity of an organization as by the national context.

The European Parliament is the sole decision-making institution in the EU that is directly elected by the public. In most policy areas, the EP has the power of co-decision with the Council to decide legislation. As individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can champion various causes, PMR groups also have an incentive to lobby the EP. This may be the most viable strategy for PMR groups seeking to influence EU policy, since the EP is often a willing ally that consistently calls for Europeanized immigration and asylum policies and for legislative action against racist and xenophobic discrimination (European Parliament 1998). MEPs can influence the Commission in back-and-forth negotiations over drafts of proposed legislation, can work with the Council to approve legislation, and can garner support within the EP for various initiatives.

In addition to the major policymaking institutions above, groups may attempt to wield influence via other EU bodies. For example, the 1957 Treaty of Rome established the Economic and Social Committee as a consultative body to unite representatives of business, employers, and trade unions and to allow their positions to be heard by the Commission, EP, and Council (Wallace and Wallace 2000). Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Committee's domain was expanded to include issues of social policy, social and economic cohesion, environment, education, and more. Thus, it is a target of activity for many different interest groups. In addition, Coreper is an EU body directly affiliated with the Council of Ministers. It comprises the permanent representatives of each EU government in Brussels, and deals with preparing all items to appear on the agenda of meetings of the Council of Ministers. As such, groups may choose to target Coreper in attempting to indirectly influence the agenda or policy decisions of the Council.

Although the structure of EU policymaking favors conventional activity, research has shown that challenging tactics via the European Court of Justice have at times been effective (Guiraudon 1998, 2003). Although the role of the ECJ is limited in the area of migrant inclusion,

it nonetheless can offer activists a potential avenue of influence. The ECJ can be particularly effective in the case of agreements between the EU and third countries. Agreements with Turkey, Morocco, and Algeria, for instance, contain provisions for labor market rights for third country nationals, and have been used as the basis for proposing expansion of the rights of all third country nationals (Starting Line Group 1998). Moreover, the ECJ has been an important actor in the development of an intra-EU migration regime based on the supranationalization of policy areas such as free movement and anti-discrimination (Geddes 1998). For instance, in 1990 it ruled that a company could move its location to another member state and retain its own staff, even if some of the employees are third country nationals (Guiraudon 1998). Further, some ECJ decisions have been outright opposed to the intentions of member states (despite efforts by states to limit the role of the ECJ in immigration matters). For example, it has ruled that nationals of states with which the EU holds contracts have directly enforceable rights in a way that makes them part of the *acquis communautaire*, and these rights must be upheld by national courts (Guiraudon 1998).

HYPOTHESES

Interconnectedness and Supranational Activity

Recall that Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 outlines a set of relationships about how interconnectedness, or group ties, shapes activity. The previous chapter tested the first two sets of relationships concerning how groups' national-level connections shape their domestic political tactics. The analyses found that more extensive national-level ties of any kind increase the odds of activity, suggesting that domestic connections mobilize domestic activity. Moreover, the chapter found that less connected, more isolated PMR groups are more prone to acting confrontationally against their governments. Although this might suggest that those more isolated groups are also more likely to act confrontationally against the EU, I argue that this is probably not the case. Since any type of EU-directed activity requires more in terms of mobilization and is more costly in terms of time and finances than acting at the national level, the types of groups that target the EU are

likely to be fairly well-connected regardless of the mode of activity they choose to employ. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that stronger connections to national NGOs increase the odds of EU-targeted protest. Taking these findings into consideration, we would broadly expect that *when groups have increasingly strong connections with domestic actors, the likelihood of acting conventionally beyond the nation-state at the level of the EU decreases.* In addition, we would expect that *when groups have stronger connections with national NGOs, the likelihood of confrontational activity at the EU level increases.*

Conversely, the last set of relationships in Figure 3.1 postulates that a stronger connection with any type of non-national actor increases the odds that the group will act at the EU level. As interconnectedness develops beyond the nation-state, groups are more likely to shift the target of their activities beyond the national arena. For example, connections with an EU organization, such as the Migration Policy Group, may mobilize groups to lobby the EP or contact the Commission in addition to, or instead of, targeting the national government. Moreover, business and labor are routinely and formally consulted in matters of EU policymaking. Relationships with business and labor interests across many countries may thus make groups more likely to capitalize off of their influence and target the EU. Therefore, a plausible expectation is that *increasingly strong connections with EU groups or actors beyond the nation-state will increase the odds of EU directed activity. Moreover, they should also make groups more likely to act at the EU versus the national level.*

The National POS and Supranational Activity

The results of the previous chapter found differences in how the broad and issue-specific aspects of the POS mobilize political activity. First, an open broad POS tended to decrease the odds of domestic activity. One might expect this to carry over to the EU context as well. For example, where the national political system is relatively open to the tactics and goals of a movement (Tarrow 1994), one would expect less EU-directed activity. In providing groups more opportunities to influence political processes via national institutional channels, relatively open

systems should promote activities in the domestic arena. The same expectation holds when political allies are present in the national government, as this presumably decreases the need to turn to other arenas. In contrast, relatively closed systems or a lack of political allies may increase the odds of EU activity since groups lack access to institutional avenues of influence to some degree. Previous research has shown that groups tend to target the EU when national opportunities are relatively closed (Geddes 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2001). Therefore, *a relatively open broad national POS is expected to decrease EU activity, and is expected to decrease the odds of EU versus national activity.*

In contrast, the previous chapter illustrated that the issue-specific POS most relevant to the migrant inclusion movement mobilizes domestic activity. When the issue-specific POS is relatively open, groups are more active politically. This suggests that organizations take advantage of a favorable political climate surrounding their policy issues of concern. Some have argued that this open political climate also exists at the level of the EU. The EU's democratic deficit, in shielding policymakers from the scrutiny of public opinion, has the potential to produce an environment favorable to the goals of the movement. Thus, an open issue-specific POS at the national level may also mobilize EU-directed activity. Therefore, *a more open issue-specific policy context is expected to increase the odds of EU activity, and to increase the likelihood of EU versus national activity.*

Group Identity and Supranational Activity

The previous chapter found that an organization's political identity, or ideology, is a significant factor in explaining its political behavior in the national context. The less challenging organizations were more prone to lobbying, whereas the slightly more radical groups tended to use protest and other challenging methods. Because the political-institutional environment of the EU is such that it encourages conventional over spectacular tactics, I expect identity to work differently in shaping EU as opposed to national action. Scholars have found that the democratic deficit of the EU makes it much less receptive to protest (Imig and Tarrow 2001). The low

democratic accountability of most supranational institutions insulates them from protest (Eisinger 1973). Rather, Marks and McAdam (1999) have argued that the institutional structure of the EU makes it more likely that groups will undertake conventional activities, as these tactics are better suited to influence the EU policy process (Tarrow 1995; Rucht 1990).

Recall that three dimensions of PMR organizational identity exist: services/care, political/legal, and asylum. The goals of services/care groups tend to be less challenging, whereas those of political/legal and asylum groups tend to pose a greater challenge to the political status quo. At the EU level, I expect that instead of trying to coordinate protest-based tactics, the more challenging groups may simply be excluded from EU political processes. Thus, *services/care groups are the most likely to engage in a variety of tactics at the EU level. Moreover, these groups should be more likely to act at the EU versus the national level.* In contrast, political/legal and asylum groups are likely to be insignificant actors in the EU policy process. Thus, *political/legal and asylum groups are less likely to act at the EU versus the national level.*

Resources and Supranational Activity

Organizational resources are also important to account for, as previous research and the prior chapter has found them to mobilize many forms of political action (Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). Groups with more financial resources in particular were more likely to undertake a variety of activities at the national level. Presumably, higher levels of resources should produce the same effect at the supranational level, as these groups possess the means to be politically active across different levels. For example, they can serve on government commissions and advisory commissions as well as lobby the European Parliament and attempt to influence the Council of Ministers. In contrast, organizations with fewer resources are more limited in the activities they can undertake. Presumably, this limitation also affects their ability to act beyond the state setting. Therefore, *groups with more resources are more likely to undertake a variety of EU-level activities, and are more likely to act at the EU level.*

In addition to resource levels, resource mobilization theory also emphasizes the source of group resources. The source of an organization's resources is important to consider, as it likely influences the type of activity the group selects. For instance, groups that rely mainly on individual donations may be more apt to stage a demonstration against the government versus those that depend on a government grant. This chapter will examine the effect of EU funding on groups' propensities to act at the EU level. The previous chapter found that a grant from the EU actually encourages confrontational methods of influence, such as court action, in the national context. In the context of the EU, a plausible expectation is that *EU funding increases the likelihood that groups will lobby the EU*. As discussed in prior sections, groups that receive such funds must have a transnational dimension to their proposed activity (CEC 1995b). To the extent that this encourages interactions at the supranational level, *EU funding can be expected to increase the odds of supranational versus national activity*.

DATA AND METHODS

The dependent variables to be analyzed in this chapter reflect both quantitative measures of levels of activities as well as qualitative measures of activity choice. They measure: level of participation in a series of conventional lobbying activities by EU institution (the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, Economic and Social Committee, and Coreper); level of participation in bringing court cases before the ECJ and protest against the EU; participation in EU versus national lobbying activity; and EU versus national court action and protest. All data for the dependent variables come from the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations.

The dependent variables above are all coded dichotomously. Those that measure activity levels are coded so that 1=participation in the given activity, 0=non participation. Those that measure activity choice are coded so that 1=EU activity, 0=national activity. Given the binary nature of the dependent variables, logistic regression for survey data is the appropriate technique. The latter type of dependent variables are particularly useful in that they allow an assessment of

the factors that cause groups to *shift their arena of action* and move beyond the national level. Although prior research has shown that EU activities tend to be more conventional in nature (Marks and McAdam 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001), it has not yet shown which factors cause groups to shift their focus from the national to the supranational setting. The ensuing analyses will be positioned to answer this question.

In addition to the activity measures, a set of dependent variables measures the effectiveness of EU action in achieving the organization's policy goals. The effectiveness measures are also coded dichotomously so that 1=generally effective (somewhat effective + very effective), 0=generally ineffective (not very effective + not at all effective). Due to their binary nature, these variables also require estimation using binary logistic regression techniques for survey data.

The data for most of the independent variables come from the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations. The POS data come from a variety of sources. The construction and data source of each independent variable was discussed at length in the previous chapter. As before, the models also include a regional control variable to account for any unobserved regional effects across Europe in order to guard against omitted variable bias and add regional fixed effects to the models.

As in each empirical chapter, the methods used reflect the research questions being asked. I begin by asking a series of descriptive questions: What proportion of groups engage in tactics directed at the EU? Are certain types of PMR groups more likely to lobby EU institutions versus challenge them? To address these questions, I analyzed some descriptive statistics on the data to determine the distribution of participation in each mode of EU activity, and to determine participation in each EU activity by type of group (i.e., services/care, political/legal, and asylum).

The second set of research questions inquires about the factors that produce changes in activity patterns among groups: What factors increase or decrease the likelihood of lobbying the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, Economic and Social

Committee, and Coreper? What factors affect the odds of challenging the EU via the European Court of Justice or by direct action? What conditions produce a qualitative shift in the arena of activity from the national to the EU level? In order to answer these questions, I first examined the bivariate correlations between the predictor and dependent variables for each model (which are presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3). I then estimated a series of multivariate equations according to the models discussed above. Thus, I estimated a separate model for participation in each type of EU activity, as well as a separate model for each EU versus national level activity choice.

The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in tables by groupings of independent variables. Thus, there is a separate table for the effects of interconnectedness, the POS, identity, and resources on EU activity. In all cases where a regression was performed on the data, all predictor variables were included together in the full model (regardless of how the results are presented). In other words, each regression controls for all predictor variables even though they are presented separately. The subsequent sections discuss the results of the analyses.

RESULTS

Descriptive Patterns

Table 6.1 illustrates the percentage breakdown of participation in both conventional and challenging political activities at the EU level. The two most common activities are interacting with the European Commission and lobbying the European Parliament. When it comes to frequent participation in these activities (often + sometimes), 40% of all groups engage in the former and 43% in the latter. Moreover, a comparable proportion of groups view each activity as a very effective method of policy influence (10% and 9%, respectively). When it comes to lobbying the other EU institutions, however, the numbers drop off dramatically. For example, only 13% of all PMR organizations frequently attempt to influence the Council of Ministers, only 13% frequently interact with the Economic and Social Committee, and only 5% have frequent contacts with Coreper. In addition, very few groups consider these activities highly effective ways to influence policy. Only 5% consider contacts with the Council very effective, only 1%

report the same about interactions with the Economic and Social Committee, and no groups believe that interacting with Coreper is a very effective method. These numbers illustrate which institutions open potential opportunities for groups to access and influence the EU policy process, and where they may look for political allies.

When it comes to protests directed at the EU, research has shown that they are indeed a rare event (Imig and Tarrow 2001). Nonetheless, 15% of PMR groups frequently engage in protests against the EU. Because the questionnaire simply asked groups to describe how often they engage in "protests or demonstrations that target the EU," groups have the option to define protest in different ways. In fact, one European Commission official who interacts with migrant inclusion groups on a regular basis described their "protests" as mainly taking the form of petitions or letter-writing campaigns, while emphasizing that these were rare events. Thus, this figure is likely not driven by demonstrations or other acts in which groups take to the streets, but rather more mild forms of protest that may not be as visible. In any case, protest is not considered a very effective method of policy influence (2%). Similarly, only 4% of all groups frequently bring court cases before the ECJ, and only 3% believe this method to be very effective.

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate that some variation in these activities is driven by group identity. By and large, services/care groups tend to participate slightly more than the others in all types of conventional lobbying (Figure 6.1). This is expected given that they are the least challenging of the three group types. The interesting exception is targeting the Council of Ministers, which asylum groups seem to do more frequently that the others. Figure 6.2 shows that asylum organizations are also more likely to protest against the EU. When it comes to bringing court cases before the ECJ, however, each group is about equally likely to do so.

Overall, the descriptive data confirm that, like the national level, the majority of EU-directed activities are conventional in nature. This largely affirms the literature that finds the EU policy process more receptive to institutional lobbying activities than protest (Marks and McAdam 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001). However, it would be misleading to say that PMR

groups never protest the EU. In fact, they may do so more than one would expect. At the same time, however, protest can be defined in many different ways, including less visible or public displays. Because it is costly in terms of time, money, and mobilization effort to mount a demonstration in Brussels, when groups protest the EU it is likely via letter-writing campaigns or similar methods. Finally, using the ECJ is the least popular EU activity of all, confirming that it is costly to bring challenges out of the national arena and into the sphere of EU politics.

Main Findings: Interconnectedness and EU Directed Activity

Tables 6.4 – 6.8 display the effects of group ties on the likelihood of activity aimed at the EU. In disaggregating lobbying activity by EU institution, Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that stronger ties with actors outside of the group's nation-state increase both the odds of activity and the odds of reporting EU lobbying as a very effective method of influence. For example, while strong ties with national actors decrease the odds, groups with stronger connections to organizations at the EU level (such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles) have more than five times the odds of targeting the Commission (5.69, $p<.01$). Similarly, maintaining a strong relationship with NGOs abroad increases the likelihood of Commission-directed activity by a factor of 1.88 ($p<.05$). Finally, more regular interactions with business associations and labor unions from beyond the group's home country increase the odds of targeting the Commission by a factor of 1.82 ($p<.10$). Overall, interconnectedness has a powerful effect on the likelihood that a PMR group will interact with the Commission and lend support to the theoretical model put forth in Chapter 3.

In addition, Table 6.4 illustrates that connections with non-national actors significantly impact activity directed at the European Parliament. Links with EU organizations and NGOs abroad, for example, render groups over twice as likely to lobby the EP (2.90, $p<.01$ and 2.07, $p<.05$, respectively). Moreover, those with the social partners in other countries increase the odds by a factor of 3.05 ($p<.01$). In addition, the fact that stronger national-level connections decrease the odds of this activity lends further support to the model of interconnectedness.

Group ties also powerfully shape Council-directed activity. Consistent with the theoretical model, national ties decrease the odds of activity whereas those beyond the country increase them. For example, groups with stronger links to EU organizations are over six times as likely to try to influence the Council (6.61, $p<.01$). Likewise, those with strong relationships with the social partners that span beyond the country level are over three times as likely to do so (3.14, $p<.05$). Conversely, connections with the national social partners decrease the odds by 48% ($p<.05$). Overall, the results thus far suggest that group ties that extend beyond the national level tend to facilitate access to EU institutions.

In terms of the less conspicuous institutions, the pattern is largely the same when it comes to interacting with the Economic and Social Committee. When it comes to lobbying Coreper, which is linked to the Council of Ministers, Table 6.4 illustrates that the pattern changes slightly. Whereas increasingly regular networking with EU organizations and NGOs abroad strongly increases the likelihood of targeting Coreper, so do links with *national* business and labor. Groups with such connections are over eight times as likely to lobby Coreper as organizations with weak or non-existent ties to the national social partners (8.40, $p<.01$). Although this finding contradicts the interconnectedness hypothesis, it is not without explanation. Because its members comprise the permanent representatives of each EU government, groups are dealing mainly with national political actors in their interactions with Coreper. Moreover, because the social partners are formally consulted in matters of national policy, it makes sense that migrant inclusion groups with stronger links to them would attempt to influence policy via Coreper. In general, however, the results presented in Table 6.4 support the hypothesis that increasingly strong ties to actors outside of the state mobilize EU lobbying activity, whereas ties with national-level actors generally decrease this likelihood.

Table 6.6 presents the effects of interconnectedness on the odds of acting confrontationally against the EU. Consistent with the hypothesis, stronger links with national NGOs increase the odds of protesting the EU by a factor of 3.07 ($p<.01$). However, there is more

to the picture. The findings indicate that increasingly strong ties to the social partners in other countries also increase this likelihood by a factor of 2.56 ($p<.01$). Moreover, strong ties to EU groups increase the odds of bringing court cases before the ECJ by 68% ($p<.05$). Thus, although connections with domestic NGOs increase the likelihood of EU protest, so do those that exist beyond the state level.

Tables 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the likelihood of including the EU as a target of action versus acting strictly at the national level. Confirming the hypothesis, the results presented in Table 6.7 show that group ties that extend beyond the country increase the odds of acting at the EU level. For example, increasingly strong ties to EU groups (3.24, $p<.01$) and the social partners (3.31, $p<.05$) abroad make groups over three times as likely to extend the scope of their action beyond the national-level. Likewise, links with NGOs in other countries increase the odds by 82% ($p<.10$). In terms of protest, Table 6.8 shows that increasingly strong links with national NGOs make groups over twice as likely (2.91, $p<.05$) to include the EU in their protest campaigns versus confining their protest to the national arena. Moreover, networking with the social partners abroad increases the odds that groups will include the EU as a target of protest by a factor of 3.61 ($p<.01$). When it comes to judicial action, stronger relationahips with NGOs and the social partners in other countries increase the odds of including the ECJ in groups' litigation strategies by 75% ($p<.05$) and 59% ($p<.10$) respectively versus only using the national courts. Overall, interconnectedness strongly increases the odds of each type of lobbying activity in ways that generally support this chapter's hypotheses.

Other Findings: The National POS and EU Directed Activity

Tables 6.9 – 6.13 display the effects of the national POS, in both broad and issue-specific forms, on EU activity. Overall, the results do not confirm the hypothesis that an open national POS in its broad form decreases the need to turn to the EU. In examining lobbying by EU institution, Table 6.9 shows that in all cases not involving the Council or its related body Coreper, an open broad POS actually increases the odds of lobbying the EU, and Table 6.10 shows that it

increases the likelihood that groups will find these activities effective. For example, the presence of national political allies in the form of a Left leaning government and more political parties increases the odds of contacting the Commission by a factor of 2.22 ($p<.10$), and 2.17 ($p<.10$), respectively. Similarly, groups based in countries that have a greater number of political parties are 99% ($p<.05$) more likely to lobby the EP and are over twice as likely (2.62, $p<.01$) to target the Economic and Social Committee. In contrast, a Leftist government makes groups less likely to try to influence the Council, and combined with a federal system makes groups less likely to target Coreper. Overall, an open institutional environment at home prompts, and does not discourage, lobbying at the EU level except for the national representatives of the Council and Coreper. Although this does not support the hypothesis, a plausible explanation is that such groups have less of a need to take action via domestic actors if they believe their national environments are already receptive to migrant and refugee issues. In such cases, groups may turn to the other EU institutions in an attempt to transmit their national standards to EU policy.

The effects of the issue-specific POS are quite mixed, neither confirming nor refuting the hypothesis that its open form mobilizes EU activity. On the one hand, Table 6.9 shows that the perception of an open national policy context specific to migrants and refugees clearly increases the odds of Commission contacts by 83% ($p<.10$), and of targeting the Council by 87% ($p<.01$). Yet at the same time, it has mixed effects on prompting groups to interact with the Economic and Social Committee and Coreper. Moreover, it tends to decrease the reported effectiveness of many of the lobbying activities.

An open national POS in its broad form also influences groups to use the ECJ, as illustrated in Table 6.11. PMR organizations based in a federal versus centralized system are 55% more likely to use the ECJ, and those based in countries with Left leaning versus Right leaning governments are over twice as likely to do so (2.40, $p<.05$). In general, an open broad national POS mobilizes activity of all types directed at the EU. Tables 6.12 and 6.13 lend further support to this conclusion. Groups based in countries with more versus fewer political parties are over

twice as likely (2.34, p<.05) to include the EU institutions as targets of group lobbying, versus lobbying strictly national institutions (Table 6.12). Moreover, organizations in countries with a Leftist government are 93% (p<.10) more likely to include the ECJ in their litigation strategies versus bringing cases before strictly national courts (Table 6.13).

Group Identity and EU Directed Activity

Tables 6.14 – 6.18 illustrate that there is a rather clear breakdown of EU directed activity by group identity. First, in examining Table 6.14 it becomes apparent that the slightly more challenging groups are less likely to target the Council and are more prone to interacting with the more minor institutional players. For example, political/legal groups, whose goals tend to pose a greater challenge to the political status quo, are 46% (p<.10) less likely to lobby the Council. Yet they are more likely to target the Committee by 80% (p<.10), whereas the less challenging services/care groups are 43% (p<.10) less likely to do so. Moreover, asylum organizations are over nineteen times as likely to target Coreper (19.59, p<.05). This suggests that groups with a more challenging identity are not necessarily excluded from the EU policy process, as the hypothesis suggests, but may try to exert influence through "back door" strategies that involve targeting the relatively less conspicuous players and avoiding contact with the major policymaking institutions. In terms of effectiveness, Table 6.15 shows that there is no clear pattern in terms of how group identity structures the reported efficacy of EU lobbying activities.

Table 6.16 displays the results of how identity affects the odds of challenging the EU. Similar to the national-level findings of the previous chapter, it shows that the slightly more challenging groups tend to mount challenges against the EU. Specifically, political/legal organizations are 60% (p<.05) more likely to protest the EU and asylum groups are over twice as likely to use the ECJ (2.37, p<.01). Although Table 6.17 illustrates that identity does not significantly shape the odds of lobbying the EU versus the national government, Table 6.18 shows that it does have an effect on EU versus national challenging activity. Asylum groups are more likely to include the ECJ in their litigation strategies versus strictly rely on the national

courts (2.83, p<.01). Overall, the results do not support the identity hypotheses. Services/care groups do not appear to use a wide range of tactics at the EU level (as they do in the national arena), and they are not more likely than the others to act at the EU level in the first place. Moreover, the slightly more radical groups are not less likely to target the EU versus the national government, suggesting that they are not necessarily shut out from supranational political processes.

Resources and EU Directed Activity

The effects of group resources on EU directed activity are displayed in Tables 6.19 – 6.23. Table 6.19 shows that group age has a rather consistent effect on EU lobbying. For example, older organizations are over two times more likely (2.11, p<.10) to target the Council of Ministers and are over nine times more likely (9.60, p<.05) to interact with Coreper versus younger groups. At the same time, they are 46% (p<.05) less likely to have contacts with the Economic and Social Committee, but those groups with more full time staff are 61% (p<.10) more likely to do so. In addition, more employees also increases the odds of targeting Coreper (3.37, p<.10). Table 6.20 illustrates that the effect of resources on effectiveness is very mixed. Those groups that have received a Commission grant are more likely to report contacts with the Economic and Social Committee and Coreper as very effective (1.99, p<.10 and 2.71, p<.05 respectively). In addition, having a larger annual budget increases the odds of reporting contacts with the Council as very effective (2.25, p<.05), and a larger paid staff increases the reported efficacy of interacting with the Commission (1.44, p<.10).

Table 6.21 shows that resources do not shape challenging actions taken against the EU, and Table 6.22 illustrates that they do not significantly affect the odds of lobbying the EU versus national government when other factors are controlled. However, they do weakly shape the odds of EU versus national challenging tactics, as illustrated in Table 6.23. Resources have inconsistent effects on protest, as groups with more versus fewer full time staff are 35% (p<.10) less likely to include the EU as a target of protest, but organizations with a larger annual budget

are 53% ($p<.10$) more likely to do so. Finally, older groups are more likely to limit their court action to the national level, as they are 39% ($p<.10$) less likely than younger groups to include the ECJ in their litigation strategies.

CONCLUSIONS: SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The goal of this chapter was to investigate how an organization's level of interconnectedness impacts its EU directed activity independently of other relevant factors, such as the national POS, group identity and resources. Yet this chapter was also interested in how these other factors shape groups' supranational political behavior in and of themselves. Overall, the data lend support to the interconnectedness hypotheses advanced in this chapter. However, the findings lend mixed or no support to many of the other hypotheses. These are discussed below.

Chapter 3 put forth a theoretical model of political action, and part of that model was tested in this chapter. In short, I first hypothesized that stronger connections with domestic actors would decrease the odds of lobbying beyond the nation-state at the level of the EU, while those with EU groups or actors beyond the nation-state would increase the odds of EU activity. The data broadly support these propositions. Links with national NGOs do, in fact, significantly decrease the odds of targeting the Commission and Coreper. Similarly, connections with the national social partners decrease the odds of most lobbying activities as well. On the other hand, EU lobbying is mobilized by networks that reach beyond the state and include EU organizations, NGOs in other countries, and business and labor in other countries. Moreover, these types of relationships make groups more likely to include the EU in their lobbying activities versus focusing strictly on national institutions.

In addition, I expected stronger ties with national NGOs to increase the likelihood of confrontational activity at the EU level. The data also support this contention. I found that strong links to national NGOs increase the odds of EU directed protest, and increase the odds that groups will target their protest against the EU versus only the national government. However, this is not the end of the story as the hypothesis would suggest. Links to actors beyond the state

significantly increase confrontational activity as well, suggesting that the more "connected" groups endure the added costs of mounting challenges against the EU. Overall, connections beyond the state were found to mobilize all types of EU political activity – from the conventional to the more challenging. However, ties with national NGO only served to mobilize more confrontational tactics.

Although I am most interested in the performance of the interconnectedness predictors, an integrative model of activity controls for other explanatory factors as well. Among these is the national POS. I hypothesized that a relatively open broad national POS would decrease EU activity, and would decrease the odds of EU versus national activity. In fact, the results suggest that the effect is exactly the opposite. Aside from activity directed at the Council and Coreper (which are comprised of national-level actors), an open broad POS increases the odds of each type of EU lobbying activity. Moreover, it increases the likelihood of using the ECJ, suggesting that when the national broad POS is open, groups are mobilized across a spectrum of EU activity. These conditions also increase the odds that a group will include the EU in its lobbying tactics versus lobbying exclusively national institutions, and increase the likelihood of expanding litigation strategies beyond the national sphere to include the ECJ.

Unlike at the national level where they increase the odds of activity, the issue-specific POS has mixed effects on EU activity. I hypothesized that a more open issue-specific policy context would increase the odds of EU activity, and would increase the likelihood of EU versus national activity. In general, the national policy context specific to migrant and refugees has no significant effect on challenging the EU, or on the odds of EU versus national activity. Where its effects are clear, an open policy context only increases the likelihood of lobbying the Commission and Council. Interestingly, although an open policy context mobilized national activity, it does not have a consistent effect on EU action, suggesting that the effects of the issue-specific POS on groups' political repertoires are most pronounced in the national arena.

Based on the findings from the previous chapter, the identity hypotheses predicted that services/care groups would be the most likely to engage in a variety of tactics at the EU level, and would be most likely to act at the EU versus the national level. In contrast, I expected political/legal and asylum groups to be less likely to act at the EU versus the national level. The data reveal that this is not at all the case. Just as at the national level, there is a rather clear distribution of activity by identity at the level of the EU. In general, the more challenging groups tend to channel their lobbying activity through the less conspicuous EU institutions, suggesting a "back door" strategy to policy influence. While these groups, due to their political values and the issues they espouse, may be relatively excluded from the more common practices of lobbying the major EU policymaking institutions, they nonetheless participate in the supranational political process by attempting to express their views through the institution that serves as a link between civil society organizations and the EU institutions (i.e., the Committee) and through the permanent representatives of Coreper, which interacts with the Council of Ministers. This highlights a clever means of attempting to influence policy via the less prominent EU bodies that, in turn, interact and have influence with the major policymaking institutions. In addition, the more challenging groups are more likely to protest the EU and make use of the ECJ. Asylum groups are also more likely to include the ECJ in their litigation strategies versus strictly bring cases before the national courts. Thus, although it is structured in favor of conventional strategies, the more challenging groups nonetheless devise means of challenging the EU.

Finally, I expected that groups with EU funding would be more likely to lobby the EU. Surprisingly, this is not supported by the data, as EU funding is insignificant in each model. Moreover, I hypothesized that groups with more resources would be more likely to undertake a variety of EU-level activities, and would be more likely to act at the EU versus national level. Because of their inconsistent effects, there is mixed support for the former hypothesis depending on which resources one examines. Older groups and those with more employees are more likely to lobby at least two of the five EU institutions examined. In addition, organizations with higher

annual budgets are more likely to include the EU as a target of protest in addition to the national government, since this is a costly activity. Considering all resources together, they do mobilize a broad spectrum of EU activities. However, no single resource has a consistent effect on activity.

In sum, the magnitude of the odds ratios, together with the significance levels and consistency of effects, suggests that group ties are the strongest set of predictors when it comes to lobbying the EU, and when it comes to EU versus national lobbying and protest. Moreover, they are among the most powerful predictors of EU challenging activity, and of EU versus national court action. Overall, groups' choice of activity depends to a large extent on who they know and how well they know them. Interconnectedness thus works in conjunction with other factors to mobilize groups to move their struggles beyond the nation-state and into the realm of EU politics. Thus, at both the EU and national levels, connections help to mobilize activity. The following chapter will test the effects of interconnectedness (while controlling for other factors) on collaborative activity among actors across levels of governance.

Chapter Six: Tables and Figures

Figure 6.1
EU Lobbying Activity by Group Identity



Figure 6.2
EU Challenging Activity by Group Identity



Table 6.1
Conventional and Challenging Political Activities: EU Level

Activity	% often	% sometimes	% very effective
Conventional			
Contact European Commission	15	25	10
Contact Member(s) of European Parliament	10	33	9
Contact Council of Ministers	2	11	5
Contact Economic and Social Committee	2	11	1
Contact COREPER	1	4	0
Challenging			
Protests aimed at EU	4	11	2
Judicial action in ECJ	1	3	3

N=114

Note: Figures are percentages of groups that reported frequently utilizing the given activity to address their primary issues of concern over the past two to three years ("often" or "sometimes"), and that reported the given activity to be "very effective."

Table 6.2
Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables, EU Conventional Activity, and Effectiveness

	Commission		Parliament		Council		Econ/Soc		Coreper	
Predictor	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E
Network Structures										
national NGOs	.02	-.08	.02	-.02	.06	-.03	-.10	-.19**	.01	-.12
national business	.24**	.20**	.15	.15	.25**	.04	.14	.10	.32**	.11
national labor	.07	.09	.15	.07	.24**	.09	.18**	.09	.32**	.02
EU groups	.53**	.20**	.51**	.24**	.55**	.19**	.42**	.12	.48**	-.02
non-national NGOs	.35**	.22**	.25**	.10	.40**	.02	.37**	-.04	.32**	-.15
non-national bus.	.31**	.23**	.29**	.17*	.40**	.11	.38**	.13	.38**	.03
non-national labor	.28**	.21**	.36**	.19**	.44**	.14	.39**	.05	.37**	-.06
Broad POS										
competitiveness of participation	-.02	.05	.09	.02	.04	.04	-.06	-.04	.13	-.05
federal system	.12	.23**	.06	.07	.21**	.12	.06	.07	.14	-.03
Left chief executive	-.11	-.00	-.10	-.05	-.20**	.00	-.16*	-.09	-.18*	-.04
Left govt	-.14	.01	-.13	-.01	-.26**	-.00	-.20**	-.09	-.21**	-.03
no. of parties	.15	-.04	.17*	.09	.18*	-.06	.24**	.02	.17*	-.03
Issue-Specific POS										
labor market	.01	.02	.09	-.01	.15	.03	-.03	.00	.14	-.02
family reunification	-.00	-.01	.11	-.02	.13	.03	-.02	-.02	.16*	-.03
long-term residence	-.01	.01	.07	-.02	.10	.04	-.06	-.01	.11	-.02
naturalization	.02	.00	.13	-.04	.15	.02	.00	-.03	.20**	-.05
anti-discrimination	-.00	.03	.08	-.04	.19**	.02	-.00	.01	.19**	-.01
immigration policy perception	.18*	-.03	.18*	.00	.11	-.19**	.03	-.15	-.04	-.04
Citizenship policy perception	.18*	.03	.17*	.01	.12	-.06	.07	-.04	.08	.02
asylum policy perception	.19**	.05	.14*	-.00	.16	-.14	.14	-.17*	-.07	-.05
employment policy perception	.11	.06	.07	.14	.13	-.08	.02	-.02	-.03	.08
Identity										
services/care-giving	.03	-.05	-.03	.03	.11	.02	.02	.02	.16*	.10
political/legal	.09	-.02	.07	.09	.03	-.09	.23**	-.05	.13	-.06
asylum	-.02	-.16*	-.02	.05	.07	-.04	.01	.07	.19**	-.01
Resources										
EU grant	.20**	.17*	.08	.18*	.34**	.23**	.32**	.20**	.30**	.18*
age of group	.07	.02	.05	-.04	.21**	.04	-.12	.04	.12	.05
full-time staff	.18**	.09	.07	.05	.14	.07	.06	.11	.14	.07
part-time staff	-.02	.04	-.12	.06	-.12	.04	.02	-.11	-.13	.04
Volunteers	-.08	-.06	-.14	-.05	.06	-.10	.01	-.05	.01	.05
Budget	.07	.06	-.02	.06	.14	.16*	-.06	.10	.06	.18*
income trend	.16*	-.05	.06	-.08	.03	-.00	-.03	.02	.13	-.06
Members	-.09	.04	.00	.03	-.10	.08	-.10	.04	-.07	.05

Note: Table entries are Pearson product moment correlations (r). A=Activity, E=Efficacy. **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.3
Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables, EU Confrontational Activity, and Effectiveness

Predictor	Protest Activity	Efficacy	ECJ Activity	Efficacy
Network Structures				
national NGOs	.27**	-.15	-.07	-.04
national business	.24**	-.00	.23**	.16*
national labor	.23**	-.13	.09	-.03
EU groups	.07	-.00	.23**	.06
non-national NGOs	.01	-.06	.00	-.00
non-national bus.	.17*	-.05	.14	-.01
non-national labor	.21**	-.21**	.11	-.15
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	.21**	.13	.11	-.07
federal system	-.10	.01	.20	.20
Left chief executive	.02	.06	-.01	-.02
Left govt	.00	.07	.00	.01
no. of parties	.31	.18	.04	.22
Issue-Specific POS				
labor market	.18*	.00	.06	-.05
family reunification	.18**	-.02	.04	-.07
long-term residence	.17*	-.01	.05	-.06
naturalization	.19**	-.02	.05	-.10
anti-discrimination	.16*	.01	.04	-.07
immigration policy perception	-.03	-.13	-.01	.07
citizenship policy perception	-.00	.00	-.10	.16*
asylum policy perception	-.08	-.19**	-.04	-.03
employment policy perception	.02	-.09	.03	.15
Identity				
services/care-giving	.25**	.08	.20**	.01
political/legal	.20**	.11	.23**	-.01
asylum	.15	-.05	.27**	-.09
Resources				
EU grant	.01	-.03	.18*	.15
age of group	.05	.01	.05	.16*
full-time staff	-.09	-.06	-.12	.07
part-time staff	.11	.09	.04	.07
volunteers	.03	-.03	.08	-.08
budget	-.05	-.00	.10	.11
income trend	.02	-.00	-.07	.06
members	.05	.07	-.03	.04

Note: Table entries are Pearson product moment correlations (r). **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.4
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Network Structures					
national NGOs	.45**	.89	.72	.68	.02***
	(.21)	(.41)	(.53)	(.34)	(.03)
national social partners	1.08	.58**	.52**	.40***	8.40***
	(.34)	(.16)	(.18)	(.15)	(5.80)
EU groups	5.69***	2.90***	6.61***	2.84***	55.69***
	(2.35)	(.86)	(3.30)	(.96)	(6.85)
non-national NGOs	1.88**	2.07**	2.39	3.45***	24.56***
	(.71)	(.92)	(1.81)	(1.82)	(3.97)
non-national social	1.82*	3.05***	3.14***	2.19**	1.34
partners	(.75)	(1.53)	(1.45)	(.77)	(.73)
N=	110	112	111	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.5
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Network Structures					
national NGOs	.36**	1.17	.89	.89	.61
	(.18)	(.34)	(.31)	(.35)	(.26)
national soc. partners	1.48	.85	1.43	1.49	2.32
	(.54)	(.21)	(.49)	(.47)	(1.75)
EU groups	2.47***	2.59***	1.82**	1.23	1.68*
	(.86)	(.83)	(.63)	(.41)	(.68)
non-national NGOs	2.65**	1.10	1.64**	1.76	1.15
	(1.28)	(.40)	(.49)	(1.50)	(.86)
non-national social	1.26	1.11	.95	1.19	.89
partners	(.45)	(.35)	(.29)	(.35)	(.31)
N=	110	112	96	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not effective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not effective increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.6
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Odds of EU Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest Activity	ECJ Activity
Network Structures		
national NGOs	3.07***	1.15
	(1.18)	(.55)
national social partners	1.11	1.20
	(.28)	(.30)
EU groups	1.05	1.68**
	(.32)	(.51)
non-national NGOs	.80	1.22
	(.27)	(.40)
non-national social partners	2.56***	1.37
	(.84)	(.46)
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.7
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and EU versus National Conventional Activity

Predictor	Lobby EU and Nat'l | Lobby Nat'l
Network Structures	
national NGOs	1.44
	(.55)
national social partners	.67
	(.21)
EU groups	3.24***
	(1.34)
non-national NGOs	1.82*
	(.73)
non-national social partners	3.31**
	(1.98)
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.8
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and EU versus National Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest EU and Nat'l | Protest Nat'l	ECJ and Nat'l courts | Nat'l courts
Network Structures		
national NGOs	2.91**	.70
	(1.55)	(.29)
national social partners	1.28	1.19
	(.38)	(.39)
EU groups	1.10	1.47
	(.39)	(.52)
non-national NGOs	.93	1.75**
	(.35)	(.61)
non-national social partners	3.61***	1.59*
	(1.75)	(.49)
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.9
Multivariate Results for POS and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Broad POS					
competitiveness of participation	---	---	---	---	---
federal system	1.57	.89	.83	.76	.08**
	(.86)	(.27)	(.33)	(.21)	(.09)
Left government	2.22*	.86	.39**	.77	.11**
	(1.23)	(.34)	(.22)	(.26)	(.14)
number of parties	2.17*	1.99**	1.80	2.62***	.73
	(1.12)	(.63)	(.86)	(.93)	(.45)
Issue-Specific POS					
policy context index	.22	.26	1.10	.05**	105.47***
	(.44)	(.43)	(1.99)	(.07)	(7.19)
policy perceptions index	1.83*	1.18	1.87***	1.82**	.05***
	(.69)	(.32)	(.49)	(.60)	(.06)
N=	110	112	111	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.10
Multivariate Results for POS and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Broad POS					
competitiveness of participation	---	---	---	---	---
federal system	3.12***	1.47	1.51	2.04*	1.54
	(1.48)	(.45)	(.50)	(.97)	(.92)
Left government	1.25	.98	.82	.44	.61
	(.55)	(.37)	(.41)	(.29)	(.46)
number of parties	1.33	1.88*	1.52	2.21**	.59
	(.36)	(.78)	(.61)	(.90)	(.33)
Issue-Specific POS					
policy context index	.10**	.10**	.06**	.07	2.18
	(.11)	(.13)	(.08)	(.16)	(2.45)
policy perceptions index	1.36	1.37*	.61	.49**	.11*
	(.35)	(.33)	(.32)	(.18)	(.15)
N=	110	112	96	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not effective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not effective increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.11
Multivariate Results for POS and Odds of EU Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest Activity	ECJ Activity
Broad POS		
competitiveness of participation	---	---
federal system	.77	1.55*
	(.25)	(.46)
Left government	.88	2.40**
	(.43)	(1.09)
number of parties	1.02	1.46
	(.24)	(.51)
Issue-Specific POS		
policy context index	1.54	1.04
	(2.12)	(1.58)
policy perceptions index	.95	1.19
	(.24)	(.40)
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.12
Multivariate Results for POS and EU versus National Conventional Activity

Predictor	Lobby EU and Nat'l | Lobby Nat'l
Broad POS	
competitiveness of participation	---
federal system	1.03
	(.40)
Left government	.67
	(.29)
number of parties	2.34**
	(.91)
Issue-Specific POS	
policy context index	.19
	(.33)
policy perceptions index	1.22
	(.48)
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.13
Multivariate Results for POS and EU versus National Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest EU and Nat'l | Protest Nat'l	ECJ and Nat'l courts | Nat'l courts
Broad POS		
competitiveness of participation	---	---
federal system	.81 (.29)	1.26 (.42)
Left government	.78 (.39)	1.93* (.98)
number of parties	.95 (.27)	1.09 (.43)
Issue-Specific POS		
policy context index	2.90 (4.25)	4.67 (7.21)
policy perceptions index	1.06 (.30)	1.41 (.48)
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.14
Multivariate Results for Identity and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Identity					
services/care	.96	1.15	1.51	.57*	1.57
	(.38)	(.37)	(.82)	(.20)	(1.06)
political/legal	---	---	.54*	1.80*	---
			(.21)	(.70)	
asylum	.70	1.21	---	---	19.59**
	(.22)	(.37)			(2.61)
N=	110	112	111	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.15
Multivariate Results for Identity and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Identity					
services/care	.64	.63*	.75	.83	2.16
	(.22)	(.19)	(.28)	(.42)	(1.53)
political/legal	---	---	1.65**	1.15	---
			(.44)	(.42)	
asylum	.92	1.32	---	---	1.48
	(.30)	(.36)			(.90)
N=	110	112	96	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not effective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not effective increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.16
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Odds of EU Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest Activity	ECJ Activity
Identity		
services/care	1.14 (.37)	1.23 (.39)
political/legal	1.60** (.46)	---
asylum	---	2.37*** (.88)
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.17
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and EU versus National Conventional Activity

Predictor	Lobby EU and Nat'l | Lobby Nat'l
Identity	
services/care	1.12
	(.31)
political/legal	---
asylum	.64
	(.24)
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.18
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and EU versus National Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest EU and Nat'l | Protest Nat'l	ECJ and Nat'l courts | Nat'l courts
Identity		
services/care	.88	1.07
	(.29)	(.40)
political/legal	1.24	---
	(.41)	
asylum	---	2.83***
		(1.14)
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.19
Multivariate Results for Resources and Odds of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Resources					
EU grant	.95	.81	1.53	1.14	---
	(.43)	(.25)	(.56)	(.38)	
full-time staff	1.52	.97	1.36	1.61*	3.37*
	(.69)	(.30)	(.67)	(.51)	(2.76)
age	.71	1.09	2.11*	.54**	9.60**
	(.35)	(.42)	(1.03)	(.16)	(11.23)
budget	.87	1.05	.84	---	.15***
	(.52)	(.38)	(.32)		(.08)
budget increasing	.68	---	---	---	---
	(.23)				
N=	110	112	111	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=participation (often + sometimes). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.20
Multivariate Results for Resources and Odds of Effectiveness of EU Lobbying Activity by Institution

Predictor	Commission	EP	Council	Econ/Soc	Coreper
Resources					
EU grant	1.17	1.00	1.16	1.99*	2.71**
	(.33)	(.26)	(.44)	(.92)	(1.51)
full-time staff	1.44*	1.12	---	1.30	1.84
	(.36)	(.29)		(.63)	(1.17)
age	.74	.93	.95	.64	.79
	(.24)	(.31)	(.28)	(.38)	(.27)
budget	1.24	1.03	2.25**	---	1.60
	(.39)	(.26)	(.86)		(.97)
budget increasing	.58*	---	---	---	---
	(.22)				
N=	110	112	96	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=not effective (not very effective + not at all effective), 1=effective (very effective + somewhat effective). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the given activity being reported effective versus not effective increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.21
Multivariate Results for Resources and Odds of EU Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest Activity	ECJ Activity
Resources		
EU grant	.85 (.26)	.97 (.29)
full-time staff	---	---
volunteers	.86 (.19)	1.31 (.35)
age	.93 (.27)	.84 (.26)
budget	---	---
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating versus not participating increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Low response rates prohibited an analysis of the effectiveness of EU challenging acts. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.22
Multivariate Results for Resources and EU versus National Conventional Activity

Predictor	Lobby EU and Nat'l | Lobby Nat'l
Resources	
EU grant	.75
	(.32)
full-time staff	1.78
	(.80)
age	1.18
	(.39)
budget	.69
	(.27)
budget increasing	1.38
	(.35)
N=	110

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 6.23
Multivariate Results for Resources and EU versus National Challenging Activity

Predictor	Protest EU and Nat'l | Protest Nat'l	ECJ and Nat'l courts | Nat'l courts
Resources		
EU grant	.88	.79
	(.30)	(.28)
full-time staff	.65*	.77
	(.18)	(.31)
volunteers	---	1.21
		(.33)
age	.68	.61*
	(.22)	(.19)
budget	1.53*	1.49
	(.45)	(.62)
N=	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression, where the categories are 0=no participation in the given activity, 1=strictly national level participation, 2=mix of national and EU level participation. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating at both the EU and national levels versus strictly the national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

CHAPTER SEVEN

From the Visible to the "Behind the Scenes:" Collaborative Activity at the National, Transnational and Supranational Levels

"We form alliances with the biggest number possible of other organizations. If we don't make alliances, we are not strong enough to put pressure on politics," Representative from the Flemish Refugee Council in Brussels.

"[Collaborating is] pretty important; it carries weight for different organizations and for different constituencies to speak with the same voice," Representative from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles in Brussels.

INTRODUCTION

Whereas the previous chapters examined a range of politically visible lobbying and contentious activities, this chapter moves out of the realm of visible politics and examines the "behind the scenes" activities that occur among groups. Its overarching purpose is to investigate several research questions regarding collaborative activity among migrant inclusion actors. First, what proportion of pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) groups engages in collaborations with other actors? At which levels of governance do collaborative activities take place and how common is it across levels? Are certain groups more prone to acting in concert with others? Under what conditions will groups act in collaborative arrangements? Do interconnections with specific actors increase or decrease active PMR group collaboration? Which other factors, if any, also play a role? In addressing these questions, this chapter pursues two goals. First, it seeks to better understand the scope and nature of collaborative actions as well as the conditions under which groups will undertake such activities. The equally significant second goal is to examine both domestic collaboration and that which transcends the nation-state. Although recent years have witnessed a proliferation of scholarship on transnational activity among groups, very little research exists on

domestic collaboration. This chapter will illustrate that both types occur among PMR groups and are influenced in part by their group ties.

The status of PMR groups as political challengers and part of a social movement to effect political change suggests that the implementation of policy reforms cannot be accomplished alone. On the contrary, contemporary politics in advanced democracies involves alliance formation, coalition building, and cooperation in order to secure allies and counterbalance opponents (Dalton 1994). Collaboration within the migrant inclusion movement potentially occurs at numerous levels of governance, including the national and supranational levels. Collaboration can also occur at the transnational level, between actors based in different countries. In general, collaborative efforts with a broad range of supporters are a key step in preparing effective political strategies and building political coalitions.

Long before the twentieth century, the rise of the modern nation-state created a national setting and focus for social movement action (Tilly 1984). Similarly, the postwar period has witnessed the proliferation of international institutions and a set of supranational institutions which provide a focus for transnational action among social movement organizations (SMOs) (della Porta et al. 1999). Thus, it is possible for groups to act across levels of governance. Moreover, from the 1960s onward the political landscape in most advanced democracies witnessed a proliferation of SMOs, including many types of migrant inclusion organizations (see Chapters 2 and 4). While these groups are quite active in the domestic arena, some scholars have argued that SMOs, migrant inclusion groups included, increasingly collaborate in transnational arrangements (Beja Horta 2002; Danese 1998; Geddes 2000b; Guiraudon 2001; Kastoryano 1998). This phenomenon has produced claims by some scholars that a global civil society is emerging comprised of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999; Risse-Kappen 1995; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). Overall, research has shown that groups act in concert with other actors and target multiple levels.

The social movement literature has documented many types of transnational collaborative activity. For example, many studies examine the emergence of transnational networks of actors and their influence on policies (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995; Danese 1998). The more quantitative research has shown that well over two-thirds of European SMOs surveyed have met with groups from other countries to exchange information and coordinate common activities (Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). Moreover, a survey of global SMOs found that well over half met with other groups to collaborate in some way (Dalton et al. 2003). Thus, prior research suggests that we can expect groups to spend a good portion of their time and efforts acting in concert with others.

This body of research raises the questions: What factors prompt groups to engage in this type of activity and how common is it across levels? In addition to the literature on transnationalism, groups based in the same country can also be expected to collaborate, since it is comparatively less costly to do so. Although this remains an under-researched area, social movement theory provides much guidance on the factors that plausibly shape different types of collaborative activity. Moreover, although groups may incur costs in coordinating collaborative actions, there are many reasons why we would expect SMOs to bear these costs to more effectively bring about political change; indeed, the above body of research suggests that they quite often do. In this chapter, I broadly hypothesize that group ties, or the extent of groups' connections with specific types of actors, can be expected to work in conjunction with other factors to shape both domestic collaborative activity and that which transcends the state. The following sections will discuss these issues in greater detail.

COLLABORATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Perhaps the best argument in favor of collaborative activity is that it allows groups to band together in order to wield greater influence. In other words, SMOs can achieve greater political leverage when they cooperate. Although groups do compete with one another, it is possible for their common interests to override this tendency and stimulate cooperation. Some elements of

resource mobilization (RM) theory, for example, emphasize the social movement group as an organization that focuses on the process of coalition-building to achieve its goals (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Klandermans 1988). RM theory contends that an organization's behavior is shaped by strategic calculations of how to achieve its resource needs (Dalton 1994), suggesting that groups consciously select activities that will best meet and advance group goals. Thus, we can surmise that organizations strategically choose to emphasize common interests and act together as a means of advancing their interests.

The logical foundation of collaboration is that all SMOs seek some type of socio-political change that requires altering the status quo. Presumably, altering the status quo becomes more likely when groups work in concert rather than in isolation or against one another. Hence, Charles Tilly (1978) posits that it is not uncommon for groups to act in concert in pursuit of a common goal, even if they share no more in common than an opposition to the political status quo. Empirical research indicates the increasing potential for cooperation among SMOs based on common interests (Rochon 1988; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Thus, there is an incentive for social groups to cooperate to challenge the political establishment and advance their interests. Under certain circumstances, groups can be expected to harness their common interests as a basis for collaborative activity. One purpose of this chapter is to determine the circumstances under which this occurs.

Arguments against Collaboration

Political economy arguments suggest that SMOs are unlikely to collaborate with one another because it is a difficult activity to achieve. According to this perspective, movement entrepreneurs are self-interested and prioritize the existence and expansion of the SMO above political reform. Organizations compete for scarce resources, members, and political influence (Zald and McCarthy 1987), which can inhibit cooperation. For example, a study of human rights movements found some level of competition over members among transnational groups (Smith et al. 1997), and other research has identified similar competition among groups in specific

countries (Maney 2000). Moreover, research on pro-migrant groups found that competition hampered group efforts and ultimately led to the demise of a well-known transnational organization (Guiraudon 2001). Thus, although groups may share common interests, competition may preclude collaborative activities.

In addition to resources as obstacles to collaboration, groups may also face ideological impediments. For example, the question of how to frame an issue can constitute a major source of disagreement among organizations (Meyer and Kleidman 1991). Since a common collective action frame must underlie common action (Gerhards and Rucht 1992), ideological disagreements can hamper collaboration. At the heart of such disagreements lie fundamental group differences about the issue at stake and how to best address it. Within the migrant inclusion movement, for example, there is often fierce ideological competition among ethnic-specific organizations (Guiraudon 2001) that each seeks to draw attention to problems of a particular ethnic group. Moreover, political rivalries and other intergroup differences have been the basis for many coordination problems within the French migrant inclusion movement. This dissertation has shown evidence for three distinct ideological dimensions of PMR groups: services/care, political/legal, and asylum. Under what circumstances, if any, will these groups engage in collaborative activity? Do their patterns of collaboration differ?

Given these obstacles, it is remarkable that so many PMR organizations so frequently engage in collaborative activity. A glance at Table 7.1 shows that most PMR groups collaborate frequently across levels (Table 7.1 will be discussed in detail in later sections). What factors best account for this pattern? I have argued throughout this dissertation that group ties are often ignored but important factors that likely play a strong role in shaping PMR group political behavior. Thus, I expect group ties, or interconnectedness, to prompt common action among PMR groups by facilitating their connections with other actors in the movement, thereby making collaborations more likely.

What We Know about Collaboration

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a proliferation of research examining transnational dimensions of social movements. Many of these studies focus not on the conditions that prompt collaborative action, but rather on the development of international norms and the role of non-state actors (such as SMOs) in international policymaking (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999). At the heart of this body of work are questions regarding traditional realist approaches that underscore the utmost importance of states in international politics (Tarrow 2001). The implication of this research is that the role of non-state actors in international politics is growing, and thus so is cooperation among groups seeking to impact change. What these studies leave unanswered for the most part is what factors cause groups to engage in collaborative activities. Although some research suggests that opportunities at the international or supranational levels promote activities in concert with others (Geddes 2000b, Guiraudon 2001), very little work has examined a variety of factors, including those within the domestic environment, in prompting groups to collaborate with others both within and beyond their national borders.

Transnational movement research tends to view global forces as having had a profound effect on social movements (e.g., Guidry et al. 2001). For example, international and supranational institutions like the European Union (EU) shed a new perspective on how social movements interact with their governments and what may prompt those actions. Moreover, most scholars agree that since 1945 cooperation among social movement organizations has become more common. In addition, the number of SMOs (domestic, international, and transnational) has greatly increased.

The likelihood that globalization, to some extent, impacts transnational and collaborative activity among SMOs renders conceptions of social movements as a purely national phenomenon, or as movements and groups that act in isolation, increasingly inappropriate. Although migrant inclusion policy issues may fall mostly within the domain of the state, they do not fall entirely within its domain. Thus, SMOs are becoming increasingly important actors that are able to confront migrant- and refugee-related problems with expertise. Because of their specialized

knowledge and expertise, they are fulfilling certain functions once dominated by the state. Often, these activities have a transnational dimension which leads to the phenomenon of transnational collaboration among SMOs across state boundaries. The EU provides a telling example as the European Commission actively seeks input from civil society groups (Marks and McAdam 1999). In contrast, these types of activities were less likely to take place when the state held a monopoly on migration-related issues.

Globalization and its attendant changes, then, facilitate communication among groups in different countries (Tarrow 1998b). This, in turn, makes it possible for PMR groups in different states to coordinate activity and work toward similar movement goals. In addition, the growth of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations encourages groups to act transnationally; these IGOs are often targets of group activity. Thus, IGOs often provide a focus for group action (Tarrow 1998b).

These arguments about the impact of globalization on social movements provide the impetus for scholars to shift from examining national factors to those transnational and supranational factors that likely shape movement behavior. Indeed, the expansion of opportunities beyond the nation-state is one reason for the phenomenon of transnational collective action (Tarrow 1998b). Moreover, SMOs themselves recruit both local and non-local supporters via the Internet to mount transnational collaborative action (Imig and Tarrow 2001). The implication of such arguments is that the nation-state is losing its ability to structure social movement activity as groups gain access to new allies and resources to organize collective action (Rosenau 1990).

Despite these developments, realist international relations theory serves as a reminder that the state continues to be a powerful and significant force in shaping policy as well as opportunities for SMO activity, even though the activities of non-state actors may be increasing. States remain the dominant agents in most areas of policy. This is particularly true when it comes to immigration and asylum issues, as they embody important notions of border control and state sovereignty that are increasingly associated with national security. While much migrant inclusion

research has focused on the role of transnational actors in shaping policy (Beja Horta 2002; Danese 1998; Geddes 200b; Guiraudon 2001; Kastoryano 1998), in this chapter I investigate what causes groups to collaborate in the first place. As part of an integrative model I argue that in addition to interconnectedness, the national political-institutional environment and group characteristics likely play a role in shaping collaborative activity both within and beyond the state.

Just as it is important for social movement researchers to focus broadly on both conventional and contentious activity, it is equally important to analyze both domestic and non-domestic forms of collaboration in order to arrive at accurate and reliable causal inferences about political behavior. The literature that focuses solely on transnational or supranational action excludes the wealth of collaborative activity that takes place within the state. In confronting an issue, groups may be just as likely to collaborate with domestic actors as those in other countries. In fact, they may be more likely to collaborate domestically since it is less costly to do so. In sum, although activity in the transnational arena may be increasing, the national setting continues to be an important locale for group activities. Whereas the literature has thoroughly documented the nature of collaboration among SMOs, less is known about the factors that prompt organizations to engage in collaborative activities. The following sections will discuss this issue in more detail.

DETERMINANTS OF COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITY

In constructing an integrative model of activity, I incorporate the variables used in previous chapters: interconnectedness, the domestic POS, and group characteristics. The hypothesized effects of each set of predictors are discussed in turn.

Interconnectedness

Recall that Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 outlines a relationship between interconnectedness and group activity. First, it posits that group ties with other domestic social movement actors can be expected to produce activity that targets the national government. The same holds for ties with national business associations and labor unions. As groups forge connections with these actors,

they strengthen their alliance network and thereby create a platform for common action (Dalton 1994). In other words, interconnectedness, by its nature, encourages cooperation among groups. Ties to national actors may affect the nature of that cooperation by encouraging a domestic orientation to group action. Thus, in the context of this chapter, the model predicts that the stronger a group's links are to domestic actors of all kinds, the more likely the group is to engage in collaborative activity within the nation-state. In other words, *collaborative activity in the national arena should be more likely to occur when groups have increasingly strong connections with other domestic actors.*

In contrast, stronger connections with groups in other countries, business and labor in other countries, and EU-level groups can be expected to produce activity beyond the national arena. The previous chapter showed that these types of relationships strongly and significantly shape EU-directed activity. The more frequent groups' interactions are with actors in other countries, the more perspectives they receive on a given issue, and the more opportunities they have to harness their ties to organize common action. As with domestic connections, transnational and supranational ties create a platform for common action and a venue for collaborative mobilization. Thus, *increasingly strong connections with actors from beyond the national level should mobilize transnational and supranational collaborative activity.*

The National POS

This chapter allows for the possibility that groups collaborate not only transnationally and supranationally, but domestically as well. Thus, as in the previous chapters, it adopts a focus on the national POS. I assume that changes in the national POS, both broad and issue-specific aspects, can be expected to produce changes in patterns of collaborative activity. The previous chapter found that the presence of political allies at home (in the form of a Leftist government) decreased groups' propensities to act beyond the nation-state. Similarly, when elites are more open to PMR group demands, groups likely experience less of a need to act in concert with others at any level as their concerns are being met by government.

In addition, some have argued that relatively open rather than closed national systems can be expected to produce transnational activity (Risse-Kappen 1995). Others have found empirical evidence to support this (Westby 2002). In contrast, others have argued that transnational movements are more likely to mobilize in response to issues for which the domestic POS is relatively closed (Smith et al. 1997). In this study, a relatively open system not only reflects the presence of elite allies in power, but also greater competitiveness of participation. Moreover, as argued in previous chapters, federal systems can be thought of as being more open to movement demands versus centralized systems, since they allow groups multiple access points for influence. Thus, groups' demands have a greater chance of being institutionally channeled in a federal system. Moreover, issue-specific opportunities related to the migrant and refugee policy context also need to be considered. The issue-specific POS is considered more open when the national migrant and refugee policy context is less stringent.

In general, then, *when the national POS (in both broad and issue-specific forms) is more open to SMO demands, groups become less likely to engage in collaborative activity*. This is due to the fact that when groups' demands are met institutionally, they incur less of a need to band together for common action. Thus, groups are more likely to act in concert with like-minded allies when their issue concerns are not being addressed by their governments.

Group Identity

In addition to the above factors, Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002) have shown that group characteristics impact transnational collaboration among groups. One group characteristic is that of identity. This study has found evidence for three distinct types of PMR group identity: services/care, political/legal, and asylum. It was shown in the previous chapter that all three types act beyond the national level, although the nature of that action differs. I have also argued in previous chapters that political/legal and asylum groups espouse goals which tend to pose a greater challenge to the political status quo.

Because of their more challenging identity, asylum groups are less likely to undertake conventional activities aimed at the national government, and political/legal groups are more prone to using challenging tactics (see Chapter 5). This suggests that their political identity acts as a constraint when it comes to opportunities for influence. Because of this, these groups are less likely to have their demands met by their government compared to services/care organizations. In turn, *political/legal and asylum groups may be more likely to band together with other like-minded groups to act in concert, as they face fewer opportunities to have their demands met by government.*

Resources

Organizational resources also need to be considered, if only as controls, as previous research has found them to facilitate political activity of all types (Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). Groups with more resources possess the means to organize different types of action in different venues. For example, they can share information with groups in the home country as well as engage in common projects with groups based in other countries. In contrast, organizations with fewer resources are more limited in the activities they can undertake. Presumably, this limitation also applies to collaborative activity. Thus, *groups with more resources are expected to engage in higher levels of collaborative activity across levels*.

I have argued in previous chapters that the resource source is also important in that it can be expected to affect the nature of the group's activity. For example, groups that receive government or private grants are probably less likely to use protest as such methods do not conform to the norms, values, and expectations of the funding source. Because the survey asks groups whether or not they have received a grant from the European Commission, the impact of EU funding on activity can be ascertained. Interestingly, Chapter 6 found that financing from the EU actually mobilizes more confrontational methods of action directed against the EU. In this chapter, we might expect that *EU funding increases the likelihood of transnational or supranational collaboration*. One criterion for receiving such funds is that groups have a

transnational dimension to their proposed activities (CEC 1995b). Thus, EU funding is almost certain to have a positive effect on transnational collaboration.

DATA AND METHODS

All data for the dependent variables are from the Survey of European Pro-Migrant and Refugee Organizations. The data for resources, identity, and perceptions of the migrant and refugee policy context also come from the survey. Data for the broad and specific aspects of the POS[25] come from other sources and have all been discussed in earlier chapters.

I test several models of collaborative activity and its efficacy at the national level, the transnational level and the supranational level. In addition, I test two relational models examining the choice of transnational versus national collaborative activity, and supranational versus national collaborative activity. At the national level, the dependent variables measure collaborative activity by the extent to which groups engage in sharing information, sharing advice/expertise, sharing personnel or other resources, and collaborating on common projects with other social movement organizations based in their country. At the transnational level, the dependent variables measure the same activities but with other social movement organizations based in another country. Similarly, at the EU level, the dependent variables measure the same activities but with EU-level groups.[26] The extent to which groups engage in these activities is gauged from "never" to "often." Moreover, effectiveness of these activities is measured from "not at all effective" to "very effective." Finally, the dependent variable for the relational model of transnational versus national collaboration uses an additive measure of all collaborative

[25] The variables that measure the broad POS include: competitiveness of participation, federal versus centralized system, Leftist government, and number of political parties. Those that measure the issue-specific POS include: each country's stringency measure on five policy dimensions that comprise a "policy context" index, and groups' perceptions of national immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment policies.

[26] Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with national NGOs are not included in the analyses of domestic collaborative activity with those NGOs. Similarly, networks with NGOs in other countries are omitted from analyses of transnational activity, and networks with EU groups are omitted from analyses of supranational activity. However, these networks are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of collaborative activity, as similar problems do not arise.

activities.[27] In terms of the national versus supranational relational model, the dependent variable measures the extent to which groups engage in sharing information, sharing advice/expertise, sharing personnel or other resources, and collaborating on common projects with national versus EU organizations. The relational models add much to the picture by allowing an analysis of the factors that cause groups to move beyond domestic to transnational/supranational collaboration.

The methods conform to the research questions being asked in this chapter. First, this chapter asks a series of descriptive questions: What proportion of PMR groups engages in collaborative activity? At which level does this type of activity occur and how common is it at each level? Are certain types of groups more prone to collaboration than others? To address these questions, I analyzed some descriptive statistics on the data to determine the breakdown of participation in collaborative activity at the national versus transnational and supranational levels, and to determine the influence of group identity in shaping these activity patterns.

The second set of research questions asks about the factors that cause changes in collaborative activity patterns among groups. To address these questions, I first examined the bivariate correlations between the predictor and dependent variables for each model. Following this, I estimated a series of logistic and multinomial logistic equations according to the models discussed above. Thus, I estimated a separate model for each type of collaborative activity and its efficacy at each level, as well as a separate model for transnational and supranational versus national collaborative activity. As in previous chapters, a regional control variable is included to guard against omitted variable bias and add regional fixed effects to the models.

The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in tables by groupings of independent variables. Thus, there is a separate table for the effects of interconnectedness, the POS, identity, and resources on collaborative activity. In all cases where a regression was performed on the data, all predictor variables were included together in the full model (regardless of how the results are presented). In other words, each regression controls for all predictor

[27] The dependent variable is constructed in this manner due to low responses in some of the categories.

variables even though they are presented separately. The subsequent sections discuss the results of the analyses.

RESULTS

Descriptive Patterns

Table 7.1 indicates that the vast majority of groups engage in some type of collaborative activity. At the national level, an overwhelming 98% of all PMR organizations frequently (often + sometimes) share information with other SMOs. Moreover, 93% frequently share advice or expertise, 47% share personnel and other resources, and 91% coordinate common projects or other activities. In terms of collaboration at the transnational level, a full 80% share information with groups based in another country, while 70% exchange advice/expertise. Further, 30% share resources or personnel, and 60% coordinate common activities/projects. Finally, 63% of groups exchange information with groups at the EU level, 45% share advice/expertise, 20% share resources or personnel, and 39% undertake common projects or activities. Overall, collaborative activity is very common among PMR organizations, as the overwhelming majority engages in various modes. Moreover, it is quite common across all levels of governance.

Interestingly, although most groups act in concert with others, the majority do not view most of these activities as very effective. Although over half (52%) report that sharing information with other SMOs at the national level is very effective, only 33% report this to be the case when it comes to exchanging advice/expertise, only 7% view sharing resources and personnel as very effective, and 36% find this to be true for coordinating common activities and projects. Moreover, the reported effectiveness of these activities tends to decrease as groups collaborate at increasingly higher levels. Overall, this pattern suggests that groups prefer to act together with other SMOs in their own country, calling into question the claim that a global civil society comprised of transnational advocacy coalitions is on the rise (Lipschutz 1996; Risse-Kappen 1995; Rosenau 1998).

The data show that there are slight variations in activity by group identity. For example, Figure 7.1 illustrates that in the domestic arena services/care groups, which espouse the least challenging ideology, participate more in information sharing and common projects with others compared to political/legal or asylum groups. They are also the most likely to report that sharing information as well as advice and expertise are very effective strategies. In contrast, asylum organizations are slightly more prone to sharing advice and expertise, and together with political/legal groups they are most likely to share resources.

At the transnational level, Figure 7.2 shows that services/care organizations are the most likely to act across each activity type, with the exception of resource-sharing, which is dominated slightly by political/legal groups. Overall, asylum groups participate the least in activities at this level. Although each group type is about equally likely to view coordinated activities at this level as very effective (only 17% across group types), about the same proportion of services/care and political/legal groups view the sharing of information as well as advice and expertise as very effective. Finally, of the three, asylum organizations tend to report the highest efficacy when it comes to sharing resources and personnel with groups based in another country.

At the EU level, Figure 7.3 confirms that asylum groups participate at higher levels in two of the four collaborative activity types: sharing information, and sharing resources. Moreover, they are about as likely as services/care organizations to share advice or expertise with EU-level groups. In contrast, both services/care and political/legal groups are about equally likely to coordinate activities or projects with EU groups. In terms of efficacy, generally services/care, or services/care together with political/legal, groups are the most likely to report collaborative activities at the EU level as very effective. The one exception is sharing resources, which asylum organizations are about twice as likely to view as very effective.

I have argued that differences in the frequency of participation in collaborative activities across levels, and the effectiveness of those activities, is likely strongly related to groups' interconnectedness. In addition, I have suggested that other factors, including the broad and issue-

specific POS, group identity, and resources also likely play a role. In order to assess the impact of these factors on collaborative activity, I proceeded in two steps. First, I examined bivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables. These are presented Tables 7.2 – 7.7.[28] Following this, I estimated a series of multivariate equations in order to arrive at explanatory models.

The following sections expound on the latter processes of testing the hypotheses and the results of the analyses. Although each set of predictors were included together in the multivariate equations, for organizational purposes the following sections separately treat each set of factors' effects on activity and effectiveness. For each set of predictors below, I first discuss the results of the models that estimate collaboration in the domestic, transnational, and supranational arenas. Secondly, I add a relational component to the discussion by illustrating how each set of factors influences *transnational versus domestic* collaboration, and *supranational versus domestic* collaboration. The analyses lend support to the claim that interconnectedness is indeed among the most important determinants that shape the likelihood of both domestic and non-domestic collaboration by PMR groups.

Main Findings: Interconnectedness and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness

Tables 7.8 – 7.12 illustrate how interconnectedness impacts collaboration at various levels. Recall that domestic ties are expected to increase national activity, whereas non-domestic ties should increase activity beyond the state. Table 7.8 shows that the relationship is actually more complex. Whereas the prediction holds across most of the activities, a caveat must be added. As expected, stronger connections with national business and labor (i.e., the social partners) significantly increase all domestic activities, and those with the social partners from other countries decrease most of the activities. However, strong ties with NGOs in other countries also work to *increase* participation in *domestic* collaborative activities. For example, they facilitate information sharing

[28] The bivariate relationships are shown for informational purposes and were used to inform the construction of the multivariate models. However, due to space limitations the following discussion will only focus on the results of the multivariate models.

(1.93, p<.10), resource sharing (1.64, p<.05), and common projects (2.19, p<.01). In terms of efficacy, the prediction holds for two of the four activity types. Connections with national NGOs strongly increase the efficacy of resource sharing (4.28, p<.01), and together with the national social partners, strongly increase the effectiveness of common projects (5.01, p<.01; and 3.21, p<.01 respectively). Yet when it comes to increasing the effectiveness of sharing information, links with NGOs abroad play a strong role (1.71, p<.05). Moreover, in terms of advice sharing, interconnectedness with all types of organizations (national, non-national, and EU level) increases efficacy. Thus, there is mixed support for the hypothesis that collaborative activity in the national arena should be more likely to occur when groups have increasingly strong connections with other domestic actors. For some domestic collaborative activities what matters is the *level* of the connection (i.e., domestic, transnational, EU), while for others the *type* of connection matters more (i.e., NGO, business, labor).

The same pattern holds broadly when we examine transnational collaboration. Table 7.9 shows that for two of the four activity types, the level of the connection impacts participation. For example, links with actors outside the country level, including EU groups and the social partners in other countries, increase the sharing of information among PMR groups across countries (3.07, p<.01; and 6.95, p<.01 respectively), as well as the sharing of resources (1.70, p<.10; and 2.66, p<.01 respectively). However, the type of connection matters more for the remaining two activities. Specifically, stronger ties with other organizations appear to facilitate advice sharing. For instance, those with national NGOs increase this activity by a factor of 2.20 (p<.05), and those with EU groups increase it by a factor of 3.00 (p<.01). Finally, when it comes to collaborating on common projects the odds ratios suggest that the type and level of connection matters. In this case, ties with the national social partners increase activity by a factor of 1.92 (p<.05), with the social partners in other countries by a factor of 2.31 (p<.10), and with EU groups by a factor of 1.76 (p<.01). In terms of effectiveness, the level of the connection is

important for sharing resources and common projects, whereas both appear to impact the efficacy of the remaining activities.

Table 7.10 illustrates that when it comes to collaborative activity at the EU level, the level of the connection broadly predominates. This lends general support to the hypothesis that increasingly strong ties with actors from beyond the national level should make groups more likely to engage in supranational collaborative activity. For example, groups with stronger versus weaker ties with NGOs in other countries are over twice as likely to exchange advice, resources, and embark on common projects with EU groups (2.87, $p<.01$; 2.87, $p<.01$; and 2.44, $p<.01$ respectively). Moreover, stronger links with the social partners in other countries increase advice sharing by a factor of 2.25 ($p<.05$), resource sharing by a factor of 1.49 ($p<.10$), and common projects by a factor of 1.70 ($p<.10$). In contrast, connections with the national social partners increase information sharing with EU groups by a factor of 2.05 ($p<.01$). In terms of the efficacy of these activities, each is strongly improved by connections with actors beyond the nation-state.

Turning to the relational models, Table 7.11 demonstrates how interconnectedness impacts the shifting of all cooperative activities from the domestic to the transnational arena. Here, strong connections with EU groups robustly influence the choice to turn away from cooperation with national actors toward NGOs in other countries. In fact, PMR groups with strong ties to EU organizations are over three times as likely to do so compared to PMR groups with weaker ties to EU organizations ($p<.01$). Disaggregating activity by type and turning to the supranational level, Table 7.12 shows how group ties influence the choice to cooperate at the EU versus the national level. In this case, groups with stronger ties with NGOs in other countries are over twice as likely to share information with EU versus national groups (2.76, $p<.01$), and over three times as likely to share advice (3.70, $p<.01$), resources (3.54, $p<.01$), and common projects (3.70, $p<.01$) with EU versus national groups. In sum, the results of the relational models lend the strongest support to the hypothesis that strong connections with actors from beyond the national level should mobilize supranational collaborative activity. When we examine why groups choose

to move beyond national-level collaborations, strong ties with others beyond the state explain a great deal. I will return to this theme in the conclusion of this chapter.

Other Findings: The National POS and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness

The impact of the national POS on collaboration is shown in Tables 7.13 – 7.17. Table 7.13 shows that only two aspects of the *broad* POS influence domestic collaboration. First, competitiveness of participation works in two different ways. Groups in countries where competitiveness of participation is more open are 55% less likely to share advice with other domestic groups ($p<.10$), and are 66% less likely to report this activity as very effective ($p<.05$). Yet at the same time they are 79% more likely to engage in common projects ($p<.10$). In addition, groups based in countries with a greater number of political parties are 78% more likely to share resources with other domestic groups than organizations in countries with fewer parties ($p<.01$). In terms of efficacy, groups in countries with a Left-leaning government are 64% more effective in sharing advice compared to Rightist governments ($p<.10$), and are more than twice as likely to report that common projects are very effective (2.17, $p<.05$). In addition, groups based in a federal system are also over twice as likely as those in centralized systems to report that common projects are very effective (2.80, $p<.01$). At the same time, however, groups in countries with more political parties are 54% less likely to hold the same view ($p<.10$).

When it comes to the *issue-specific* POS, it has inconsistent effects on domestic collaborations. For example, a more favorable national policy context specific to migrants and refugees increases advice sharing among domestic groups by a factor of 2.29 ($p<.05$). Yet at the same time, groups that perceive the national policy environment specific to migrants as increasingly favorable are 43% less likely to view sharing resources with domestic groups as effective ($p<.01$).

Table 7.14 displays the results of the POS on transnational collaboration. The number of political parties in the country has a consistent effect on depressing transnational activity. For instance, PMR organizations based in countries with more political parties are 97% less likely to

share information with NGOs in other countries (p<.10), 68% less likely to share advice (p<.01), and 58% less likely to collaborate in common projects (p<.05). In this case, an open national POS does decrease the need to collaborate transnationally. However, the broad POS has a much stronger effect on shaping effectiveness. For example, being based in a federal versus centralized system increases the reported efficacy of sharing information (2.08, p<.05), resources (2.48, p<.05), and common projects (1.87, p<.05). Moreover, a Left-leaning government increases the efficacy of sharing information (2.54, p<.10), advice (2.23, p<.10), and resources (4.37, p<.05). Further, although being based in a country with more political parties appears to depress activity, it increases the effectiveness of sharing advice (3.27, p<.01) and resources (2.75, p<.01). Finally, groups in countries with greater competitiveness of participation tend to view each transnational collaborative activity as not very effective.

Turning to the issue-specific POS, a more open national policy context increases the reported efficacy of sharing advice with groups based in other countries (1.00, p<.10). Yet, it also decreases both resource sharing activities with these groups (.07, p<.05) and its efficacy (.04, p<.05). Moreover, more favorable policy perceptions decrease the reported efficacy of sharing advice with groups in other countries by 50% (p<.01).

When it comes to collaborations with EU groups, Table 7.15 shows that none of the broad aspects of the POS mobilizes activity. Rather, a Left-leaning government decreases the odds that a group will share advice with an EU organization by 39% (p<.10), and being located in a country with more political parties decreases it by 51% (p<.05). Again, an open national POS decreases the need to collaborate outside the country level. However, again, it generally has the opposite impact on effectiveness. A federal system and a Left-leaning government increase the reported efficacy of sharing information with EU groups by a factor of 3.01 (p<.01) and 3.37 (p<.05) respectively, and of collaborating in common projects with EU groups by a factor of 1.60 (p<.05) and 2.60 (p<.05) respectively. Moreover, groups in countries with more versus fewer parties are over three times as likely to view sharing information as effective (3.89, p<.05).

However, at the same time, greater competitiveness of participation depresses the efficacy of sharing advice with EU groups by 57% ($p<.01$) and common projects by 67% ($p<.05$).

In terms of the issue-specific POS, a more favorable national policy context generally mobilizes collaboration at the EU level. For example, it increases information sharing with EU groups by a factor of 9.24 ($p<.05$) (but it also decreases its efficacy by 93%, $p<.05$), advice sharing by a factor of 3.93 ($p<.01$), and common projects by a factor of 8.37 ($p<.10$). However, more favorable policy perceptions appear to have the opposite effect in that they depress EU-level collaborations but increase their reported effectiveness. For instance, whereas groups with more favorable policy perceptions are 37% less likely to share resources with EU groups ($p<.10$), they are 75% more likely to view sharing information with these groups as effective ($p<.10$).

Finally, the relational models show that the broad POS has mixed effects on mobilizing activity beyond versus within the nation-state. Table 7.16 illustrates that groups in countries with more political parties are 73% less likely to collaborate transnationally versus domestically ($p<.10$). Moreover, a Leftist government decreases this tendency by 80% ($p<.05$), and of sharing resources at the EU versus the national level by 56% ($p<.05$) (Table 7.17). Yet, Table 7.17 also shows that groups in a federal system are 78% more likely to share information at the supranational versus the national level ($p<.05$), 56% more likely to share advice ($p<.10$), and 80% more likely to collaborate in common projects with supranational versus national groups ($p<.05$).

The issue-specific POS again has mixed effects. On one hand, more favorable national policy perceptions increase the odds of transnational versus domestic collaborative activity by a factor of 1.63 ($p<.10$). However, they also decrease the odds of sharing advice at the EU versus the national level by 39% ($p<.05$). Overall, the results do not fully support the hypothesis that when the national POS (in both broad and issue-specific forms) is more open to SMO demands, groups become less likely to engage in collaborative activity. Rather, in general an open national POS encourages domestic collaboration while discouraging it beyond the state level. However, there are several caveats to this pattern which I will discuss further in the conclusion.

Group Identity and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness

Tables 7.18 – 7.22 illustrate the effects of group identity on collaborations. At the national level, Table 7.18 shows that services/care organizations (whose goals tend to be less challenging) are more likely to collaborate with other domestic NGOs and to report these activities as effective than both political/legal and asylum groups. For example, services/care groups are 76% more likely to share information ($p<.10$), 74% more likely to share advice ($p<.05$), and 45% more likely to engage in common projects with other domestic NGOs. They are also over twice as likely to report that sharing advice is very effective (2.12, $p<.01$), and 64% more likely to view common projects as very effective in achieving their policy goals (1.64, $p<.10$). In contrast, being a political/legal group decreases the odds of sharing information with other domestic NGOs by 61% ($p<.01$), of sharing advice by 46% ($p<.05$), and of reporting advice sharing very effective by 41% ($p<.10$). Similarly, being an asylum organization decreases the odds of collaborating in common projects by 36% ($p<.10$), and of their efficacy by 43% ($p<.10$). In short, domestic collaborative activity is structured in favor of groups with more moderate goals.

However, Table 7.19 demonstrates that this pattern changes outside the nation-state. For example, when it comes to collaborating on common projects with NGOs based in other countries, political/legal groups are over twice as likely as services/care organizations to do so (2.16, $p<.05$). In fact, being a services/care group actually decreases the odds of this type of collaboration by 37% ($p<.10$).

The findings at the supranational level are very similar. Political/legal groups are over twice as likely as services/care organizations to undertake common projects with EU organizations (2.21, $p<.05$). Moreover, they are 94% more likely than services/care groups to report these projects as effective in achieving their policy goals ($p<.01$). In sum, perhaps because their goals pose a greater challenge to the national political status quo, asylum and political/legal groups tend to collaborate with others beyond the domestic arena.

Finally, the relational models are displayed in Tables 7.21 and 7.22. Although identity is not a significant mobilizing force when it comes to transnational versus national collaboration (Table 7.21), it does affect supranational versus national collaborative activity (Table 7.22). Here, services/care groups are 61% more likely than political/legal groups to share information with organizations at the EU versus the national level ($p<.10$). Yet, they are also 46% less likely to share resources with EU versus national groups. Consistent with the prior results, being a political/legal organization increases the odds of undertaking common projects with EU versus national groups by 72% ($p<.10$). In broad terms, the results support the hypothesis that political/legal and asylum groups are more likely to band together with other like-minded groups to act in concert, as they face fewer opportunities to have their demands met by government. However, this only tends to be the case outside of the nation-state. In contrast, services/care groups are more likely to cooperate at the domestic level.

Resources and Collaborative Activity/Effectiveness

Tables 7.23 – 7.27 display the effects of organizational resources on collaborations. Although resources have little impact in the domestic arena, Table 7.23 shows that groups with more versus fewer volunteers are 41% more likely to participate in common projects with other national NGOs ($p<.10$), yet these same groups are 50% less likely to report these activities as effective in achieving their policy goals ($p<.01$). At the same time, however, they are 56% more likely to view sharing information as effective ($p<.05$). Moreover, having a higher versus lower annual income increases the reported efficacy of common projects by 79% ($p<.05$).

At the transnational level, Table 7.24 illustrates that a grant from the EU mobilizes surprisingly little activity when other factors are controlled. For example, such groups are only more likely to share information with NGOs in other countries by a factor of 1.95 ($p<.05$). Groups with an EU grant are also 69% more likely to report that their common projects with NGOs in other countries are effective in influencing policy ($p<.05$), yet they are no more likely than others to undertake these projects in the first place. Since “transnationality” is a criterion for

receiving EU funding, it is surprising that this does not mobilize more transnational activity. Overall, however, the results support the hypothesis that EU funding mobilizes some level of transnational collaboration.

In addition, older PMR organizations are over twice as likely as younger groups to engage in projects with NGOs abroad (2.21, $p<.01$). Moreover, they are over two-and-a-half times as likely to consider sharing information effective (2.53, $p<.01$), and are 97% more likely to view sharing advice ($p<.05$) with NGOs abroad effective. In contrast, more paid staff decreases collaborations with NGOs in other countries. For example, groups with more full time employees are 54% less likely to consider sharing information an effective means of policy influence ($p<.10$). In addition, having more part time staff decreases the odds of sharing resources by 54% ($p<.01$) and of reporting this activity effective by 41% ($p<.10$). Moreover, more volunteers decreases the likelihood of sharing advice with groups abroad by 43% ($p<.05$) (though it increases its reported effectiveness by a factor of 1.88, $p<.05$), and of collaborative projects by 44% ($p<.05$). Finally, an increase in income over the past year increases the odds of sharing information with groups in other countries by 70% ($p<.05$), and of sharing advice by a factor of 2.29 ($p<.01$).

Table 7.25 shows the effects of resources on collaborations at the supranational level. Here, PMR groups that have received an EU grant are more likely to share advice and engage in projects with EU groups by 49% ($p<.10$) versus groups without such funding. Yet, an EU grant decreases the odds that an organization will share resources with an EU organization by 38% ($p<.10$). In addition, older organizations are over twice as likely as younger groups to share information with EU groups (2.72, $p<.01$), and are over twice as likely to report that sharing advice with EU organizations is an effective means of policy influence (2.10, $p<.05$). Further, the effect of volunteers is similar to that at the transnational level. For instance, although groups with more versus fewer volunteers are 68% more likely to report that sharing information with EU groups is effective ($p<.05$), they are 50% less likely to undertake common projects.

Tables 7.26 and 7.27 illustrate the effects of resources on transnational versus national collaborative activity, and on supranational versus national collaborative activity, respectively. Overall, resources do not structure transnational versus domestic collaborations (Table 7.26). However, Table 7.27 shows that income is the most consistent resource predictor of EU versus national collaborations. For example, PMR groups with higher versus lower annual budgets are 86% more likely to share resources with EU versus domestic groups ($p<.10$), and are 71% more likely to collaborate in projects with EU versus national groups ($p<.10$). In addition, having more full time employees increases the odds of sharing information with EU versus national groups by 55% ($p<.10$). Finally, groups that have received a grant from the EU are 51% less likely to exchange resources with EU versus national groups ($p<.05$), suggesting that EU funding ultimately helps to mobilize resources among domestic NGOs. In general, the results support the hypotheses that *certain* resources (i.e., those that are monetary in nature) increase overall collaborative activity.

CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF COLLABORATION

This chapter found that group ties fare quite well in explaining collaborative activity that takes place out of view of visible politics. Compared to the competing explanations, group ties are the strongest and most consistent predictors of domestic collaboration, are among the strongest predictors of transnational and supranational collaboration, and are the strongest predictors of collaborative activities that occur outside versus within the nation-state. In addition, the data broadly support this chapter's interconnectedness hypotheses, with several caveats. First, interconnectedness is a strong and significant influence on collaborative activity across levels. However, the prediction that stronger connections at each level will increase collaborative activity at that level only holds for collaborative activity with EU groups, and for transnational and supranational versus national activity. More specifically, increasingly strong ties with NGOs and the social partners in other countries significantly increase three types of supranational collaborative activity. Moreover, they increase the reported efficacy of all activity types. In

addition, in examining the determinants of EU *versus* national level collaboration as well as transnational *versus* national collaboration, connections with actors beyond the nation-state strongly and significantly increase the odds that groups will chose to cooperate outside of the country setting.

In contrast, it is not simply domestic ties that increase or decrease domestic collaboration, but rather the type of connection also matters for certain activity types. For example, although increasingly strong ties with the national social partners significantly increase all types of domestic collaborative activity, those with NGOs in other countries also increase three of the four types. Thus, although domestic connections matter, so do those with other NGOs abroad. Moreover, group ties at all levels work to increase the efficacy of domestic cooperation. Thus, groups with stronger connections to NGOs in general are more likely to collaborate with domestic groups and are more likely to view these acts as an effective means of policy influence.

A similar phenomenon exists at the transnational level. Although ties with actors beyond the state increase each type of transnational collaborative activity, there is more to the picture. For instance, increasingly strong connections with both national and EU groups increase the odds of sharing advice with NGOs in other countries. Again, this suggests a kind of "solidarity effect" in which connections among PMR organizations across levels serves to increase collaborative activity at each level. At the same time, a diversity of group ties matters when it comes to collaborating in common projects with NGOs abroad. In this case, increasingly strong connections with both the national social partners and those in other countries, as well as with EU groups, increase the odds that groups will act in concert across borders.

Turning to the other factors that were controlled, the national POS generally creates an environment that encourages national-level collaboration. A more open broad and issue-specific POS tends to increase collaborations with domestic groups. At the transnational level, both aspects of the open POS tend to depress activity. At the supranational level, an open broad POS tends to decrease collaborative activity whereas a more open issue-specific policy context

encourages it. The effects of the POS on transnational and supranational versus national activity are more mixed. A consistent finding is that the presence of political allies at home (in the form of a Left-leaning government) tends to decrease activity beyond versus within the nation-state. Moreover, the presence of more political parties in the country appears to increase domestic collaboration while depressing it beyond the national level, suggesting that when political allies exist at home, groups have less of a need to act in concert beyond the state.

Overall, the broad aspects of the POS in particular exert the most consistent effects not on activity, but on efficacy. For example, a federal system increases efficacy across each level, as does a Leftist government. The presence of more political parties, while decreasing effectiveness at the national level, increases it beyond. Thus, whereas the issue-specific POS has very inconsistent effects both on activity and efficacy, several elements of the broad POS are indicative of a national environment in which groups perceive their activities to have greater efficacy when it comes to influencing policy.

Identity exhibits interesting effects on collaborative activity across levels. In general, services/care groups are more likely than political/legal or asylum groups to cooperate at the domestic level. In contrast, the results indicate that political/legal and asylum groups are more likely to band together with other like-minded groups to act in concert outside of the nation-state, as they face fewer opportunities to have their demands met by national government. This pattern broadly holds across each level, suggesting that domestic collaboration is structured in favor of more moderate groups. In turn, the more challenging PMR groups opt to turn beyond the state and seek collaborative arrangements elsewhere, implying that their patterns of collaboration are shaped by an "isolation effect" in the domestic arena. This pattern suggests that if a global civil society is emerging within the migrant inclusion movement, it is likely comprised of slightly more radical actors that espouse more challenging goals.

Finally, the data indicate that those resources that are monetary in nature tend to increase collaborative activity across each level. Moreover, older PMR groups are more likely to

act collaboratively beyond the country level and to regard those actions as effective. In addition, whereas more volunteers tend to increase domestic collaborative activity, they have the opposite effect on activity with others beyond the nation-state. Most interestingly, however, is the effect of EU funding on collaborative activity. EU financing does mobilize transnational activity, but very little of it. This is surprising given that one aim of EU funding is to encourage transnational collaboration among NGOs. Moreover, Table 7.27 shows that groups with an EU grant are more likely to exchange resources with other *domestic* NGOs. Overall, these findings call into question the real value added of EU grants in encouraging transnational collaboration.

In sum, the findings in this chapter begin to address the research questions put forth at the beginning. Collaboration with other actors is quite common among PMR groups, and occurs across each level of governance. Interconnectedness shapes collaborative activity at each level. In addition, the national POS, group identity, and resources also play a role in structuring collaborative activity. The following chapter will place these findings, together with those from the previous chapters, into a broader context of movement activity and will offer some conclusions about the political behavior of the migrant inclusion movement in Europe.

Chapter Seven: Tables and Figures

Figure 7.1
National Collaborative Activity by Group Identity



Figure 7.2
Transnational Collaborative Activity by Group Identity



Figure 7.3
Supranational Collaborative Activity by Group Identity



Table 7.1

Collaborative Activities by Level and Type

Level/Activity	% often	% sometimes	% very effective
National			
Share information	84	14	52
Share advice/expertise	72	21	33
Share resources/personnel	16	31	7
Coordinate activities/projects	53	38	36
Transnational			
Share information	50	30	34
Share advice/expertise	37	33	18
Share resources/personnel	12	18	9
Coordinate activities/projects	27	33	17
Supranational			
Share information	25	38	28
Share advice/expertise	19	26	14
Share resources/personnel	7	13	6
Coordinate activities/projects	17	22	11

N=114

Note: Figures are percentages of groups that reported frequently utilizing the given collaborative activity to address their primary issues of concern over the past two to three years ("often" or "sometimes"), and that reported the activity to be "very effective."

Table 7.2
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Domestic Collaborative Activity

Variable	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Network Structures				
national business	.16*	.31**	.21**	.28**
national labor	.16*	.28**	.28**	.26**
EU groups	-.12	.02	.19**	.02
non-national NGOs	.08	.11	.30**	.22**
non-national business	-.23**	-.15	.08	-.16*
non-national labor	-.23**	-.14	.13	-.07
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	-.05	.02	-.12	.10
federal system	-.17*	-.15	-.17*	-.07
Left chief executive	.04	.07	-.12	.07
Left government	.05	.06	-.14	.06
number of parties	-.13	.05	.11	.05
Issue-Specific POS				
labor market policy	-.03	.10	-.12	.08
long-term residence policy	-.02	.10	-.14	.08
family reunification policy	-.01	.08	-.12	.11
naturalization policy	-.02	.08	-.07	.13
anti-discrimination policy	-.04	.11	-.09	.14
immigration policy perception	-.03	-.09	.03	.05
citizenship policy perception	.15	.05	-.04	.07
asylum policy perception	-.14	-.16*	-.11	-.01
employment policy perception	.00	-.05	.04	.00
Identity				
services/care	.12	.17*	.14	.19**
political/legal	-.21**	-.11	.04	-.02
asylum	-.13	-.04	.08	-.16*
Resources				
EU grant	-.10	.04	.11	-.03
group age	.15	-.18*	.02	.12
full-time staff	-.10	-.01	-.08	-.14
part-time staff	.07	.12	-.03	.00
volunteers	.07	.10	-.01	.09
budget	.04	.05	-.14	-.08
income trend	.09	.02	.15	.11
members	.06	.09	.05	-.09

Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with national NGOs are not included in the analyses of domestic collaborative activity with those NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of domestic collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10.

Table 7.3
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of Domestic Collaborative Activity

Variable	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Network Structures				
national NGOs	.29**	.35**	.36**	.36**
national business	.21**	.32**	.19**	.18*
national labor	.11	.23**	.21**	.23**
EU groups	.02	.09	.16*	.14
non-national NGOs	.19**	.09	.13	.19**
non-national business	-.03	.04	.09	-.01
non-national labor	-.05	-.02	.06	.10
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	.09	.15	-.08	-.05
federal system	.11	-.02	-.10	.10
Left chief executive	.05	.06	.02	.04
Left government	.06	.04	-.01	.02
number of parties	-.02	.11	.08	-.12
Issue-Specific POS				
labor market policy	.10	.20**	-.06	-.03
long-term residence policy	.08	.18*	-.06	-.02
family reunification policy	.09	.20**	-.08	-.03
naturalization policy	.09	.20**	-.04	-.03
anti-discrimination policy	.11	.19**	-.08	-.00
immigration policy perception	-.03	.02	-.07	.02
citizenship policy perception	-.00	.02	-.05	.04
asylum policy perception	-.10	-.03	-.09	-.08
employment policy perception	-.14	-.06	-.01	-.07
Identity				
services/care	.04	.05	.00	.04
political/legal	-.15	-.16*	.02	-.05
asylum	-.15	-.07	.00	-.05
Resources				
EU grant	-.05	.04	.00	.05
group age	.14	.11	.08	.14
full-time staff	-.11	-.01	.06	-.01
part-time staff	.12	-.03	.08	-.02
volunteers	.03	.03	.01	-.08
budget	.03	.12	.06	.02
income trend	.08	.07	-.01	.00
members	-.03	-.01	.05	-.07

Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with national NGOs are not included in the analyses of domestic collaborative activity with those NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of domestic collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10.

Table 7.4
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Transnational Collaborative Activity

Variable	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Network Structures				
national NGOs	.24**	.31**	.17*	.17*
national business	.16*	.23**	.12	.17*
national labor	.23**	.31**	.29**	.26**
EU groups	.40**	.43**	.40**	.44**
non-national business	.18*	.15	.36**	.23**
non-national labor	.26**	.27**	.46**	.39**
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	-.17*	-.09	-.10	-.12
federal system	.18*	.17*	.01	.07
Left chief executive	-.24**	-.18*	-.16*	-.16*
Left government	-.20**	-.16*	-.16*	-.14
number of parties	-.07	-.05	.00	-.09
Issue-Specific POS				
labor market policy	-.14	-.07	-.21**	-.19**
long-term residence policy	-.15	-.08	-.23**	-.21**
family reunification policy	-.12	-.07	-.21**	-.16*
naturalization policy	-.16*	-.10	-.14	-.15
anti-discrimination policy	-.11	-.04	-.18*	-.13
immigration policy perception	.12	.00	.01	.14
citizenship policy perception	.13	.00	-.14	.05
asylum policy perception	.17*	.05	.07	.23**
employment policy perception	.00	-.07	.03	.00
Identity				
services/care	-.07	-.06	-.02	-.05
political/legal	-.04	-.05	-.00	.09
asylum	-.11	-.08	.01	-.03
Resources				
EU grant	.21**	.25**	.24**	.20**
group age	.10	.15	.05	.13
full-time staff	.04	.05	.02	-.06
part-time staff	-.02	-.08	-.18*	-.10
volunteers	-.13	-.20**	-.17*	-.17*
budget	.02	.03	-.07	-.11
income trend	.23**	.25**	.18*	.11
members	.08	.12	.01	.00

Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with non-national NGOs are not included in the analyses of transnational collaborative activity with those NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of transnational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10.

Table 7.5
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of Transnational Collaborative Activity

Variable	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Network Structures				
national NGOs	.23**	.13	.00	.03
national business	.18*	.35**	.09	.15
national labor	.25**	.36**	.06	.18*
EU groups	.41**	.33**	.20**	.37**
non-national NGOs	.66**	.54**	.30**	.52**
non-national business	.19**	.23**	.22**	.24**
non-national labor	.24**	.31**	.13	.24**
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	-.22**	-.28**	-.19**	-.26**
federal system	.05	.02	.02	.12
Left chief executive	-.21**	-.15	-.13	-.19**
Left government	-.19**	-.26**	-.17*	-.22**
number of parties	.03	.13	.19**	.05
Issue-Specific POS				
labor market policy	-.18*	-.14	-.20**	-.21**
long-term residence policy	-.19**	-.17*	-.21**	-.25**
family reunification policy	-.17*	-.17*	-.24**	-.25**
naturalization policy	-.17*	-.14	-.19**	-.24**
anti-discrimination policy	-.16*	-.12	-.19**	-.19**
immigration policy perception	.06	.00	.05	.13
citizenship policy perception	-.03	-.16*	-.20**	-.12
asylum policy perception	.06	.11	.15	.21**
employment policy perception	.06	.03	.06	.05
Identity				
services/care	-.00	.03	.06	-.01
political/legal	.09	.03	.00	.07
asylum	.03	.02	.04	.04
Resources				
EU grant	.21**	.30**	.12	.37**
group age	.09	.09	-.05	.01
full-time staff	-.03	.08	.13	.13
part-time staff	-.04	.02	-.07	.01
volunteers	-.09	-.03	.00	-.07
budget	-.01	.02	.04	.00
income trend	.06	.11	.00	.08
members	.02	.06	.02	-.10

Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with non-national NGOs are not included in the analyses of transnational collaborative activity with those NGOs. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of transnational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10.

Table 7.6
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Supranational Collaborative Activity

Variable	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Network Structures				
national NGOs	.02	.12	.05	.05
national business	.20**	.25**	.18**	.23**
national labor	.22**	.31**	.30**	.28**
non-national NGOs	.37**	.50**	.43**	.45**
non-national business	.20**	.26**	.31**	.26**
non-national labor	.22**	.30**	.40**	.32**
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	-.13	-.10	-.01	-.00
federal system	.14	.17*	.03	.17*
Left chief executive	-.26**	-.27**	-.14	-.17*
Left government	-.25**	-.24**	-.17*	-.17*
number of parties	.04	-.04	.08	.04
Issue-Specific POS				
labor market policy	-.06	-.09	-.05	-.02
long-term residence policy	-.08	-.11	-.09	-.04
family reunification policy	-.06	-.09	-.06	-.01
naturalization policy	-.07	-.11	-.00	-.00
anti-discrimination policy	-.06	-.06	-.02	.02
immigration policy perception	.05	-.02	-.10	-.03
citizenship policy perception	.16	.06	-.10	-.00
asylum policy perception	.09	.05	-.01	-.01
employment policy perception	.09	.01	-.01	.00
Identity				
services/care	.02	.07	.02	.04
political/legal	.16*	.14	.16*	.26**
asylum	.13	.12	.12	.19**
Resources				
EU grant	.22**	.30**	.26**	.32**
group age	.04	.11	.05	.11
full-time staff	.08	.15	.18*	.09
part-time staff	-.15*	-.09	-.10	-.09
volunteers	-.09	-.14	-.09	-.22**
budget	.03	.12	.09	.09
income trend	.12	.15	.07	.07
members	-.14	-.08	.01	-.06

Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with EU groups are not included in the analyses of supranational collaborative activity with those groups. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of supranational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10.

Table 7.7
Bivariate Associations between Independent Variables and Effectiveness of Supranational Collaborative Activity

Variable	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Network Structures				
national NGOs	.02	.11	.07	.02
national business	.16*	.31**	.07	.12
national labor	.25**	.31**	.10	.18*
EU groups	.36**	.39**	.16*	.25**
non-national NGOs	.36**	.46**	.21**	.28**
non-national business	.26**	.26**	.15	.19**
non-national labor	.34**	.30**	.16*	.23**
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	.08	-.12	-.01	.01
federal system	.18*	.15	.04	.20**
Left chief executive	-.11	-.16*	-.00	.10
Left government	-.09	-.22**	-.04	.04
number of parties	.10	.07	.09	-.04
Issue-Specific POS				
labor market policy	.05	-.09	-.01	.03
long-term residence policy	.04	-.11	-.04	.03
family reunification policy	.06	-.12	-.06	.01
naturalization policy	.05	-.10	-.04	.01
anti-discrimination policy	.06	-.06	.03	.05
immigration policy perception	.13	.04	-.06	-.09
citizenship policy perception	.04	-.09	-.12	-.05
asylum policy perception	.20**	.16*	.05	.07
employment policy perception	.10	.05	-.01	-.05
Identity				
services/care	.06	.06	.07	.13
political/legal	.16*	.03	-.07	.11
asylum	.05	-.08	-.04	.04
Resources				
EU grant	.22**	.22**	.05	.09
group age	.18*	.14	.01	.01
full-time staff	-.06	.10	.04	.01
part-time staff	-.05	-.10	-.15	-.12
volunteers	-.06	-.07	.04	-.05
budget	-.03	.04	.04	-.06
income trend	-.04	.16*	-.10	.06
members	.03	.13	-.04	-.13

Note: Due to multicollinearity and issues of variable construction, network structures with EU groups are not included in the analyses of supranational collaborative activity with those groups. However, they are able to be included in analyses of the effectiveness of supranational collaborative activity. **<.05, *<.10.

Table 7.8
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Domestic Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Network Structures								
national NGOs	---	1.21	---	2.28***	---	4.28***	---	5.01***
		(.34)		(.89)		(1.55)		(2.23)
national social partners	2.91***	1.25	2.76***	1.45	1.45*	1.23	1.97**	3.21***
	(1.48)	(.32)	(.93)	(.47)	(.40)	(.50)	(.66)	(1.52)
EU groups	.64	1.18	.96	1.85**	1.15	1.46	.78	.81
	(.37)	(.32)	(.33)	(.56)	(.32)	(.48)	(.21)	(.34)
non-national NGOs	1.93*	1.71**	1.32	1.63**	1.64**	1.02	2.19***	1.20
	(.96)	(.52)	(.44)	(.45)	(.49)	(.37)	(.75)	(.47)
non-national social partners	.33***	.79	.52**	.72	1.04	1.10	.55**	.64
	(.15)	(.20)	(.20)	(.24)	(.26)	(.43)	(.17)	(.44)
N=	108	108	108	102	108	108	109	109

Note: Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.9
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Transnational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Network Structures								
national NGOs	1.61	1.74*	2.20**	.47**	1.48	1.45	1.36	.75
	(.63)	(.61)	(.81)	(.18)	(.51)	(.55)	(.44)	(.27)
national social partners	.76	1.32	1.40	3.85***	1.12	.62	1.92**	.82
	(.32)	(.51)	(.56)	(1.88)	(.54)	(.29)	(.66)	(.31)
EU groups	3.07***	5.36***	3.00***	1.47	1.70*	1.29	1.76**	1.95**
	(1.23)	(2.28)	(.82)	(.61)	(.57)	(.43)	(.56)	(.66)
non-national NGOs	---	---	---	7.93***	---	3.48***	---	5.49***
				(3.79)		(1.86)		(2.52)
non-national social partners	6.95***	2.53*	1.74	1.35	2.66***	2.04**	2.31*	.85
	(5.46)	(1.63)	(.77)	(.92)	(1.22)	(.78)	(1.24)	(.29)
N=	109	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.10
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Supranational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Network Structures								
national NGOs	1.18	.56*	.88	.81	.80	.97	1.35	.91
	(.39)	(.20)	(.27)	(.26)	(.34)	(.44)	(.61)	(.31)
national social partners	2.05***	.77	1.20	1.27	1.27	.73	1.09	.77
	(.59)	(.33)	(.36)	(.56)	(.46)	(.30)	(.29)	(.27)
EU groups	---	5.78***	---	3.61***	---	2.16***	---	2.08***
		(2.80)		(1.43)		(.61)		(.65)
non-national NGOs	1.41	2.28***	2.87***	2.00**	2.87***	3.08***	2.39***	2.44***
	(.44)	(.72)	(.87)	(.70)	(1.18)	(1.16)	(.92)	(.87)
non-national social partners	1.17	3.63***	2.25**	2.37	1.49*	1.88**	1.70*	1.65*
	(.34)	(4.54)	(.86)	(1.80)	(.45)	(.72)	(.65)	(.63)
N=	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.11
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Transnational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity

Predictor	Odds
Network Structures	
national NGOs	---
national social partners	1.72
	(.81)
EU groups	3.26***
	(1.29)
non-national NGOs	---
non-national social partners	2.04
	('1.70)
N=	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.12
Multivariate Results for Network Structures and Supranational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity

Predictor	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Network Structures				
national NGOs	---	---	---	---
national social partners	1.06	1.22	1.35	1.15
	(.40)	(.42)	(.44)	(.42)
EU groups	---	---	---	---
non-national NGOs	2.76***	3.70***	3.54***	3.54***
	(.88)	(1.36)	(1.63)	(1.30)
non-national social partners	.94	.79	1.08	1.07
	(.26)	(.23)	(.27)	(.44)
N=	111	111	108	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.13
Multivariate Results for POS and Domestic Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E
Broad POS								
competitiveness of participation	.81	.92	.45*	.34**	.71	.42	1.79*	.51
	(.52)	(.40)	(.26)	(.17)	(.37)	(.30)	(.77)	(.43)
federal system	.76	1.41	.85	.95	.78	1.16	.96	2.80***
	(.27)	(.40)	(.21)	(.33)	(.23)	(.48)	(.25)	(1.24)
Left government	1.24	1.19	1.75	1.64*	.99	1.95	.76	2.17**
	(.86)	(.39)	(.86)	(.61)	(.39)	(1.07)	(.32)	(.98)
number of parties	.99	1.26	1.28	1.08	1.78***	.90	1.33	.46*
	(.43)	(.40)	(.44)	(.51)	(.47)	(.26)	(.47)	(.22)
Issue-Specific POS								
policy context index	1.99	1.22	2.29**	2.07	.44	.21	.84	1.75
	(4.58)	(1.37)	(3.35)	(3.22)	(.47)	(.29)	(1.11)	(2.68)
policy perceptions index	1.30	.91	.75	.90	.99	.57***	1.15	.91
	(.43)	(.23)	(.18)	(.30)	(.23)	(.15)	(.27)	(.27)
N=	108	108	108	102	108	108	109	109

Note: A=Activity, E=Efficacy. Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.14
Multivariate Results for POS and Transnational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E
Broad POS								
competitiveness of participation	---	.25**	1.41	.18***	1.32	.33*	.46	.43**
		(.18)	(.79)	(.11)	(.74)	(.26)	(.30)	(.22)
federal system	1.36	2.08**	1.15	1.66	1.30	2.48**	1.60	1.87**
	(.55)	(.90)	(.46)	(.85)	(.45)	(1.04)	(.65)	(.55)
Left government	.61	2.54*	.65	2.23*	1.35	4.37**	1.29	1.68
	(.33)	(1.52)	(.27)	(1.20)	(.67)	(3.15)	(.56)	(.75)
number of parties	.63*	1.31	.32***	3.27***	1.12	2.75***	.42**	.169
	(.22)	(.69)	(.16)	(1.64)	(.44)	(1.22)	(.17)	(.76)
Issue-Specific POS								
policy context index	2.37	.30	2.10	1.00*	.07**	.04**	.50	.38
	(3.71)	(.50)	(3.44)	(.14)	(.10)	(.06)	(.78)	(.53)
policy perceptions index	1.32	.78	.91	.50***	.91	.85	1.26	.89
	(.46)	(.27)	(.24)	(.14)	(.27)	(.23)	(.43)	(.27)
N=	109	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: A=Activity, E=Efficacy. Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.15
Multivariate Results for POS and Supranational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E
Broad POS								
competitiveness of participation	.75	.44	1.15	.43*	1.17	.67	1.25	.33**
	(.38)	(.31)	(.63)	(.28)	(.67)	(.35)	(.60)	(.20)
federal system	1.23	3.01**	.95	1.29	.81	(.85)	1.11	1.60**
	(.38)	(1.72)	(.31)	(.69)	(.25)	(.24)	(.43)	(.43)
Left government	.74	3.37**	.61*	.88	.60	1.32	.81	2.60**
	(.29)	(2.43)	(.22)	(.41)	(.27)	(.63)	(.30)	(1.17)
number of parties	.80	3.89**	.49**	1.24	1.30	1.39	.89	1.27
	(.29)	(2.41)	(.17)	(.59)	(.51)	(.43)	(.30)	(.54)
Issue-Specific POS								
policy context index	9.24**	.07**	3.93***	.62	1.20	.88	8.37*	.53
	(1.49)	(.11)	(6.05)	(1.11)	(1.71)	(1.19)	(1.36)	(.67)
policy perceptions index	1.20	1.75*	1.08	.96	.63*	.74	.74	1.14
	(.32)	(.69)	(.31)	(.29)	(.20)	(.25)	(.23)	(.32)
N=	106	106	016	106	106	106	106	106

Note: A=Activities, E=Efficacy. Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.16
Multivariate Results for POS and Transnational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity

Predictor	Odds
Broad POS	
competitiveness of participation	---
federal system	.64
	(.32)
Left government	.20**
	(.18)
number of parties	.27*
	(.23)
Issue-Specific POS	
policy context index	9.74
	(2.32)
policy perceptions index	1.63*
	(.48)
N=	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.17
Multivariate Results for POS and Supranational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity

Predictor	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Broad POS				
competitiveness of participation	---	---	1.32	---
			(.79)	
federal system	1.78**	1.56*	1.08	1.80**
	(.54)	(.45)	(.27)	(.52)
Left government	1.28	.84	.44**	.82
	(.45)	(.34)	(.20)	(.32)
number of parties	.62	.88	1.51	1.11
	(.24)	(.33)	(.51)	(.35)
Issue-Specific POS				
policy context index	.63	1.76	.47	1.57
	(1.05)	(2.55)	(.59)	(2.35)
policy perceptions index	1.01	.61**	.77	1.07
	(.26)	(.17)	(.22)	(.39)
N=	111	111	108	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.18
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Domestic Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Identity								
services/care	1.76*	1.02	1.74**	2.12***	1.32	1.14	1.45*	1.64*
	(.64)	(.26)	(.59)	(.58)	(.36)	(.31)	(.42)	(.55)
political/legal	.39***	.82	.54**	.59*	.77	1.08	---	---
	(.16)	(.21)	(.19)	(.19)	(.21)	(.30)		
asylum	---	---	---	---	---	---	.64*	.57*
							(.18)	(.23)
N=	108	108	108	102	108	108	109	109

Note: Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.19
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Transnational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Identity								
services/care	.76	.89	.95	1.55	.88	1.45	.63*	.87
	(.37)	(.30)	(.39)	(.58)	(.28)	(.63)	(.19)	(.27)
political/legal	1.25	1.24	1.04	.97	1.08	1.19	2.16**	1.43
	(.65)	(.50)	(.37)	(.40)	(.37)	(.39)	(.78)	(.47)
asylum	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
N=	109	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.20
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Supranational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Identity								
services/care	.70	1.30	1.41	1.37	.87	.99	1.01	1.19
	.22	(.51)	(.54)	(.45)	(.30)	(.35)	(.43)	(.33)
political/legal	1.35	1.68	1.27	.82	1.14	1.20	2.21**	1.94***
	(.28)	(.76)	(.34)	(.28)	(.36)	(.34)	(.80)	(.58)
asylum	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
N=	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.21
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Transnational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity

Predictor	Odds
Identity	
services/care	.92
	(.36)
political/legal	1.17
	(.48)
asylum	---
N=	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.22
Multivariate Results for Group Identity and Supranational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity

Predictor	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Identity				
services/care	1.61*	1.13	.54*	.84
	(.59)	(.40)	(.22)	(.31)
political/legal	1.04	1.21	1.16	1.72*
	(.37)	(.46)	(.40)	(.59)
asylum	---	---	---	---
N=	111	111	108	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.23
Multivariate Results for Resources and Domestic Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Resources								
EU grant	1.05	.97	.99	1.14	.79	.70	1.10	1.17
	(.43)	(.26)	(.29)	(.35)	(.21)	(.22)	(.31)	(.44)
group age	.93	1.02	1.20	.84	1.00	.90	1.04	1.08
	(.42)	(.25)	(.38)	(.27)	(.25)	(.26)	(.29)	(.35)
full-time staff	.81	.96	.89	.95	1.09	.76	.77	.72
	(.37)	(.24)	(.27)	(.31)	(.27)	(.23)	(.21)	(.22)
volunteers	.90	1.56**	---	---	1.06	.74	1.41*	.50***
	(.37)	(.38)			(.23)	(.20)	(.36)	(.14)
budget	1.13	1.04	1.22	1.01	.84	1.19	1.12	1.79**
	(.34)	(.25)	(.32)	(.36)	(.24)	(.31)	(.32)	(.61)
members	---	---	---	---	1.19	---	.86	1.03
					(.21)		(.18)	(.30)
N=	108	108	108	102	108	108	109	109

Note: Table entries for Information-sharing, Advice-sharing, and Project-sharing Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=less than often, 1=often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "often" versus "less than often" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Table entries for Resource-sharing Activities are from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Information and Advice Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=less than very effective, 1=very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "very effective" versus "less than very effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Resource and Project Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity is "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.24
Multivariate Results for Resources and Transnational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Resources								
EU grant	1.95**	1.20	1.32	.79	1.11	1.53	1.07	1.69**
	(.72)	(.35)	(.46)	(.31)	(.38)	(.54)	(.32)	(.48)
group age	1.41	2.53***	1.44	1.97**	1.06	.72	2.21***	.90
	(.54)	(1.01)	(.50)	(.71)	(.35)	(.26)	(.75)	(.28)
full-time staff	.84	.54*	1.42	1.33	---	---	---	---
	(.33)	(.22)	(.72)	(.52)				
part-time staff	---	---	---	---	.46***	.59*	1.31	.98
					(.15)	(.23)	(.45)	(.31)
volunteers	.78	1.01	.57**	1.88**	.79	.67	.56**	1.39
	(.25)	(.30)	(.19)	(.70)	(.22)	(.33)	(.17)	(.38)
income trend	1.70**	.84	2.29***	1.05	1.36	.84	1.24	.72
	(.54)	(.25)	(.68)	(.40)	(.42)	(.26)	(.36)	(.21)
members	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
N=	109	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.25
Multivariate Results for Resources and Supranational Collaborative Activity and Effectiveness

	Information		Advice		Resources		Projects	
Predictor	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy	Activity	Efficacy
Resources								
EU grant	1.30	1.55	1.49*	1.05	.62*	.87	1.49*	1.02
	(.35)	(.64)	(.45)	(.35)	(.21)	(.34)	(.42)	(.29)
group age	.77	2.72***	.89	2.10**	.90	.94	1.07	1.23
	(.21)	(.96)	(.24)	(.71)	(.33)	(.32)	(.34)	(.35)
full-time staff	---	---	---	---	1.29	.97	1.13	.87
					(.44)	(.32)	(.28)	(.25)
part-time staff	.74	1.63	.93	1.32	---	---	---	---
	(.19)	(.69)	(.25)	(.42)				
volunteers	.81	1.68**	.69	1.24	.94	1.32	.50**	1.02
	(.22)	(.51)	(.24)	(.43)	(.32)	(.45)	(.20)	(.24)
income trend	.89	.77	1.29	1.47	1.04	.62*	1.18	.91
	(.23)	(.27)	(.41)	(.53)	(.40)	(.20)	(.31)	(.24)
members	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
N=	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: Table entries for Activities are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=rarely/never, 1=sometimes/often. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Entries for Efficacy are from binary logistic regression, where 0=not very/not at all effective, 1=somewhat/very effective. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of the activity as "generally effective" versus "generally not effective" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.26
Multivariate Results for Resources and Transnational versus Domestic Activity

Predictor	Odds
Resources	
EU grant	1.38
	(.49)
group age	1.15
	(.50)
full-time staff	.81
	(.25)
part-time staff	---
volunteers	.68
	(.29)
income	1.07
	(.32)
N=	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively (in all activities combined) at the transnational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

Table 7.27
Multivariate Results for Resources and Supranational versus Domestic Collaborative Activity

Predictor	Information	Advice	Resources	Projects
Resources				
EU grant	.90	.66	.49**	.95
	(.29)	(.24)	(.20)	(.33)
group age	1.05	1.18	.60	.69
	(.33)	(.43)	(.28)	(.26)
full-time staff	1.55*	1.45	1.29	1.39
	(.52)	(.49)	(.35)	(.41)
volunteers	.84	---	---	1.06
	(.26)			(.45)
income	1.16	1.21	1.86*	1.71*
	(.40)	(.43)	(.75)	(.56)
N=	111	111	108	111

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from multinomial logistic regression. These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of acting collaboratively in the given activity at the supranational versus national level increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "--" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion: The Politics of Migrant Inclusion in Europe

"…a progressive movement towards a multi-leveled and multi-spatial participation and representation of migrants does appear to be already underway," Gaia Danese, 1998, p. 730.

This study treats pro-migrant and refugee (PMR) advocacy groups as central to the study of the larger migrant inclusion movement. PMR organizations are the main policy channels of the movement, and represent citizens concerned about migrant inclusion as well as broader human rights, anti-discrimination, and social tolerance issues. Across the European Union (EU), these groups are becoming visible actors in the policy process. They hold meetings with European Parliamentarians, provide policy advice to the European Commission, meet with government ministers, organize public demonstrations, and pressure political parties on immigration matters. Through their activities, these organizations help define the meaning of migrant inclusion. Thus, the study of PMR interest group behavior helps us to understand the nature of the migrant inclusion movement in Europe; their behavior is a symptom of the broader political changes taking place in advanced democracies.

In the 1980s immigration issues surfaced in the public debate in many European countries, and in the 1990s these issues emerged onto the political stage throughout the EU, where they remain today. In this study I have documented that a popular base for migrant inclusion exists in most European countries (Chapter 4) in response to many aspects of societal intolerance toward migrants. Although the church sit-ins and hunger strikes that received much media attention in the 1990s portrayed migrant inclusion issues as being of interest mainly to the fringe of society, organized interests now lobby various levels of government at different stages of the policy process to ensure as much as possible that migrant inclusion issues are factored into policy decisions. Moreover, they use the media to raise public awareness of these issues among individuals in European societies. Overall, PMR organizations are making some progress toward

fashioning a more inclusive Europe, although meaningful change is inevitably slow and incremental. The purpose of this concluding chapter is thus to discuss the main themes of this study and summarize its key findings in relation to this progress.

There is no doubt that migrant inclusion remains an uphill battle and much work remains to be done. For example, organizations must continue to work to integrate these issues into the regular policy process of all EU democracies. Moreover, they must play a larger and more direct role in policy negotiations at the European level (Tyson 2001). Yet at the same time, over the past decade there has been important legislation at both the national and European levels dealing with migrant and refugee problems (CEC 1985, 1995a, 1995b). At the national level, specialized national bodies have been established in every EU country to monitor anti-discrimination. However, the struggle has become more difficult recently with the rise of many center-right governments throughout Europe, which tend to be less sympathetic to migrant inclusion issues. Yet many organizations are nonetheless attempting to influence policy by targeting sympathetic members of parliament and taking advantage of opportunities in member states that want to be seen as intolerant of racism and discrimination.

At the European level, expanding networks and strategic access points in the decision-making structure are resulting in increasing attention being paid to migrant inclusion issues as well as concrete policy outcomes. For example, the Commission unit DGV sponsored the proposal to designate 1997 the European Year Against Racism, with a budget of ECU 4.76 million to go to a range of activities at the local, national, and European levels (CEC 1995a). Out of this initiative rose one important umbrella organization (the ENAR) representing a network of pro-migrant NGOs across Europe. Moreover, the Starting Line Group, founded in 1992 by a group of independent experts from six member states, lobbied for the inclusion of the anti-discrimination provision known as Article 13 to the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 13 brought about an “unprecedented requirement” under EU law requiring national governments to establish a designated body to monitor anti-discrimination. In a personal interview, one European

Commission official remarked that “an anti-discrimination industry” was born out of the inclusion of Article 13. Since 1997, the EU has probably introduced more migrant inclusion legislation than in any other time period. This is indicated by Commission proposals on temporary protection for refugees, the rights of third country nationals, the action plan on free movement, immigration and asylum, and discussion of extended anti-discrimination competencies (CEC 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998a).

In addition to these indications of the growing importance of migrant inclusion issues, this study has documented the institutional and political development of the migrant inclusion movement. Starting with a fairly small organizational base in the 1970s and 80s, the movement has grown in scale and complexity since the mid-1980s (Chapter 4). Moreover, diverse elements of PMR organizations exist, as was shown throughout this study. For instance, services/care-giving groups mobilize public support for social concerns such as anti-discrimination, intolerance, education, and housing. Political/legal groups have expanded the scope of the movement to include the emerging political and legal problems associated with immigration; they critique the legal, social, and political structures that contribute to these problems. Finally, asylum groups continue to mobilize support for improving the conditions of asylum detainees and for the human rights principles that serve as the foundation for admitting asylum-seekers into Europe.

INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

In addition to documenting the range of political activities that PMR groups engage in, this study used two broad questions to guide its analyses: What factors influence the choice of activity among PMR groups? Why do they choose certain activities or levels of governance over others? The results of this research show that interconnectedness significantly and robustly influences participation in certain strategies, the choice of one strategy over another, as well as the arena where activity is targeted. In other words, groups with similar grievances working toward similar goals and located in similar countries undertake different political activities based in part on the nature and strength of the ties they maintain. When the nature of a group’s connections changes –

in terms of who it includes among its strongest ties – its activity patterns will also change. This suggests that PMR organizations, like other social movement groups, have many activities to choose from in their action repertoires, and this choice (at each level of governance) is significantly influenced by the nature of their group ties. When those ties change, the likelihood of participation in a given activity also changes. This study thus contributes to filling a gap in the literature in that it offers an explanation of how groups move from simply having grievances to choosing political activities to address those grievances. In explaining why similar groups based in similar countries working toward similar goals choose to engage in different activity patterns, a focus on an organization's interconnectedness goes a long way.

Group ties, however, are not the full story. The advantage of employing an integrative model of behavior is that it allows one to isolate the effects of a specific factor while controlling for competing explanations. In this study, those competing explanations include the political opportunity structure (POS), group identity, and group resources. While these factors served a function as controls, I was also interested in how they contribute to an integrative or multi-faceted explanation of movement behavior in and of themselves.

In the following paragraphs, I will draw conclusions from the previous chapters and explain the ways in which this study has added to broader knowledge in the fields of comparative politics and interest group/social movement studies. This study's novelty and its implications beyond migrant inclusion politics is in part defined by its focus on group ties. In addition, its methodological design which allows an assessment of the choice of one activity type or arena of activity versus another contributes to its uniqueness. By asking how interconnectedness shapes the choice of one activity *over another*, and activity at one level of governance *versus another*, I incorporated a relational and explicitly comparative element into the analyses that is often absent in social movement research. By examining groups across as many EU countries as possible, including the new member states, I am able to generalize beyond one or two countries and obtain a more complete picture of how the migrant inclusion movement writ large behaves.

In Chapter 1 of this study, I put forth a set of guiding research questions that informed the analyses which followed. First, I asked what political activities PMR groups engage in at different levels of governance. At each level, lobbying activities reflect the majority of groups' visible political efforts, while confrontational tactics are always secondary. Moreover, a major finding of this study is that much of the activity that PMR organizations undertake is less visible, "behind the scenes" activity. The data in Chapter 7 show that actions that groups take collaboratively with one another away from the visible political spotlight comprise the largest proportion of all activities. The implication is that in moving toward a more complete understanding of organizations' activity patterns, research needs to focus not only on the visible displays, such as lobbying and protest, but also on less visible action that occurs among groups, such as sharing information and exchanging resources. While some studies do focus on these types of activities (Dalton et al. 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002), it is far from common practice. Yet, the implication of excluding these activities from analyses of movement political behavior is that we are left with only a partial and incomplete understanding of the actions organizations take to achieve their policy goals.

Chapter 2 put this study in context by situating it in the migrant inclusion literature. It showed that this study's focus on organized migrant inclusion interests developed from a long history of research on immigration and asylum issues. It also illustrated that over time, migrant inclusion research has become more systematic and comparative. This research adds to this body of work both in its scope and comparative nature. First, this study spans 20 of the 25 current EU member states, which allows a more complete picture of the migrant inclusion movement across Europe as a whole, rather than within a specific country or region of Europe. Although the movement is relatively less developed in the new member states, I nonetheless include them in this study in order to construct an image of how the movement as a whole functions. Moreover, rather than the standard approach of comparing across countries as is common practice in comparative research, this study offers a unique contribution in that it explicitly compares

movement activity across levels of governance. It also compares the choice of tactics themselves. The implications are relevant to both comparative politics and EU studies; the findings presented here add to our understanding of the interplay between the national, supranational and transnational spheres, and how organized interests use these different levels to their advantage. In addition, comparing the use of different tactics adds to our understanding of social movement politics by assessing the conditions under which groups will select one type of tactic over another.

The other guiding research questions posited in the introductory chapter ask: What factors influence participation in different activities? Why do groups choose certain political activities or levels of governance over others? Chapter 3 set the stage for answering these questions by elaborating an integrative model of movement behavior with a focus on interconnectedness. The model it advanced proposed a unique set of expectations regarding the ways in which group ties shape political strategies at each level. Although both social movement and migrant inclusion research treat strong relationships with alliances as important factors in political behavior, there have been no attempts at compiling the existing work into a model that can be used to explain movement activity. That was the primary goal of Chapter 3.

In order to assess the performance of group ties as predictors of activity, however, one must also control for other factors that have been shown to be relevant. Thus, the integrative model also includes POS, group identity, and resource variables. Rather than treating these competing factors strictly as controls, however, I hypothesized that they also structured activity in important ways. To that end, Chapter 3 also builds on and contributes to more traditional social movement theories. To the POS it adds an "issue-specific" focus; to identity research it adds dimensions of organizational identity; and to resource mobilization it adds a supranational element by focusing on the EU as a source of funding. The ensuing theoretical model was used as the basis for answering the research questions.

Before those questions could be answered, however, Chapter 4 provided more information on the sample of organizations included in this study. It showed that the sample is relatively

representative of the overall population of PMR groups in Europe. That is, the proportion of younger versus older organizations as well as the relative size of organizations in the sample roughly mirrors that of the overall population. However, it was also shown that political/legal groups are slightly over-represented in the sample compared to their presence in the population. Because political/legal groups are relatively more challenging, the implications for this study were that to some degree it was predisposed to finding evidence in favor of more confrontational activities. However, I did not find that the data collected through the surveys were skewed toward any one activity, and I did not find systematic over-reporting of contentious activity based on a group's political/legal identity. The fact that challenging activities were found to comprise a relatively minor part of groups' political repertoires across levels despite the over-representation of political/legal groups lends confidence to the claim that groups prefer to work inside established channels whenever possible. This chapter has implications for future movement research by explicitly assessing the representativeness of the sample against the broader population rather than taking the characteristics of the sample at face value as has been done in past research. After assessing these sample characteristics, the chapters proceeded to test several hypotheses related to the political behavior of PMR groups across each level of governance.

Although it would be incorrect to claim on the basis of this study that interconnectedness influences organizational political behavior across all cases in all countries, this research constitutes a step toward formally incorporating a model of group ties into explanations of organizations' political activities and generating testable hypotheses based on that model. The research presented in Chapter 5 through Chapter 7 produces some initial level of theory generation and empirical evidence related to the connection between PMR political behavior and group ties (as well as the POS, identity, and resources).

In Chapter 5, I examined the impact of connections with other national NGOs as well as with national business associations and labor unions on political activity. The findings highlight unique patterns of behavior among PMR groups that have broader implications for movement

research. I found that interconnectedness has a marked impact on the national-level activities of the groups included in this study. In general, I found that simply maintaining a strong tie with any actor at the national level produced a moderation of tactics. In contrast, more isolated groups were more likely to act confrontationally against their governments. This implies that simply being better connected to other relevant actors within the home country not only increases the likelihood of activity, but also has a moderating effect in that it renders that activity less confrontational. I also found that when groups maintain strong ties with actors beyond the nation-state, the likelihood that they will act at all in the domestic arena decreases. The importance of domestic connections to social group action may extend beyond PMR organizations to other movement groups, and is something that should be tested in future research. Overall, strong group ties with domestic actors, regardless of the type, mobilize domestic activity while those with non-domestic actors depress it. Moreover, interconnectedness in general tends to increase policy effectiveness.

Chapter 6 continued to explore the impact of interconnectedness on political behavior by examining how it shapes activity directed toward the European Union as opposed to the nation-state. This chapter moved beyond previous studies which ask how groups act at the level of the EU by asking what factors shape activity at this level. It examined both activities directed at specific EU institutions, as well as at the EU versus the national government. Overall, the evidence showed strong support for the theoretical model put forth in Chapter 3. In general, I found that PMR groups with strong ties to domestic actors are less likely to act at the level of the EU. Rather, both EU lobbying as well as challenges mounted against the EU are strongly mobilized by connections that exist outside of the state, including with EU organizations, NGOs in other countries, and business and labor in other countries. In addition, these types of ties increase the likelihood that PMR groups will act beyond versus strictly within their nation-states. Interestingly, the one exception to this rule is connections with national NGOs, which increase the odds of protest directed against the EU. Together with the findings from Chapter 5, this

suggests that when pro-migrant groups are part of a strong network with other NGOs in their home country, they attempt to penalize the *EU* rather than their *national governments* for their dissatisfaction with the status quo. Unlike at the national level where isolation produced protest, the more "connected" groups endure the added costs of mounting challenges against the EU. This pattern may apply to other social groups as well and should be tested in future research. In addition, these findings highlight that future work on European movements cannot plausibly be confined to the national level; the EU is a major arena of action that also must be considered.

Turning beyond lobbying and protest, Chapter 7 examined acts of collaboration among groups across various levels. At the national level, the data showed that strong links with national business and labor increase collaboration among groups. Moreover, I found evidence of a "solidarity effect" whereby NGO connections across levels increase the odds of collaborative activity at home, suggesting that groups with stronger connections to NGOs in general are more likely to act in concert with domestic groups. In addition, this chapter found that, consistent with the model, ties with actors beyond the nation-state increase the likelihood that groups will cooperate outside of the country setting. More specifically, these types of links lead to EU as well as transnational collaboration versus that at the national level. When it comes to engaging in "behind the scenes" activity with others, such as sharing information and advice, I again found evidence of a solidarity effect produced by connections to other organizations. In other words, there is something special about maintaining ties to other NGOs at different levels. Where these connections exist, the likelihood of transnational collaboration in less visible activities increases. In addition, simply being connected to other relevant stakeholders across levels increases the odds of undertaking common projects transnationally. The results related to the solidarity effect and interconnectedness in general add to the fields of comparative politics and social movement studies by providing new theories to test in future research.

OTHER FINDINGS

Although the most unique aspect of this research is its treatment of interconnectedness, other factors were also found to influence the political behavior of PMR groups. The following paragraphs discuss the other interesting findings that emerged from this study.

The National POS

First, the data show that at the national level, it is actually the *issue-specific* rather than the broad POS that mobilizes activity. In other words, where the issue-specific policy context surrounding migrant and refugee issues is relatively open, groups are more likely to interact with national policymakers. In contrast, where the broad POS is relatively open, groups are less likely to act at all. This finding has implications for other social movement research as well, in that groups tend to be less active when the broad institutional arrangements present in the country are open to the movement's goals. In other words, it is not enough to have a federal system or political allies in a position of power when it comes to mobilizing activity. Rather, groups become mobilized to act in the context of more open institutions that directly pertain to their specific policy goals. This suggests that groups are more active within their country if that country has relatively liberal labor market, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination policies. It is also interesting that a more open rather than restrictive POS increases the odds of activity, implying that groups do not tend to mobilize in response to being shut out from the political process, but rather when there is some level of public or political support for their policy goals. These findings underscore the need for future work to consider both aspects of the POS.

At the EU level, however, the situation changes insofar as the *broad* POS has the most pronounced effects on political behavior. An open POS in its broad form mobilizes a range of supranational activity. Moreover, it also makes groups more likely to target the EU versus act exclusively at the national level. Again, this suggests that mobilization proceeds not from being relatively excluded from political processes, but rather by a sense of being able to affect them.

A similar pattern emerges in examining collaborations among groups across levels. At the national level, groups are more likely to collaborate when they face a more open POS in both

broad and issue-specific forms. However, this changes as we move beyond the state setting. Groups are less likely to act in concert transnationally when the national POS in both forms is relatively open. Moreover, when it comes to collaborating with EU groups, PMR organizations are more likely to do so when the issue-specific POS is relatively open. Overall, these patterns suggest that when it comes to lobbying policymakers, an open POS mobilizes activity. At the national level it is the issue-specific POS that does so, whereas at the EU level the broad POS tends to produce these effects. When it comes to collaborating with others at home, an open POS similarly mobilizes activity, but has more mixed effects when we move beyond the national level.

Group Identity

This study has shown that groups' activities are significantly shaped by their organizational identity in very clear and interesting patterns. At the national level, I found that services/care groups (more moderate) are the most likely to utilize a broad range of tactics, whereas political/legal and asylum groups (more challenging) are more likely to challenge the government rather than lobby.

The picture becomes a bit more complex, however, as we move beyond the state setting. At the EU level, the more challenging groups are not shut out from the policy process as one might expect based on the structure of EU institutions. At the same time, however, they do not tend to lobby the major institutions, such as the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament. Rather, the findings show that they devise "back door" strategies aimed at influencing the EU policy process whereby these groups tend to interact with the less visible bodies such as the Economic and Social Committee and Coreper. The cleverest of these strategies reflects that although the more challenging groups are not likely to interact with the Council of Ministers directly, they are likely to target Coreper, the body that prepares items to appear on the agenda of Council meetings. This suggests that rather than lobbying the high level national ministers of the Council (which they do not tend to do at the national level anyway), they attempt to wield influence indirectly through the relatively lower-level civil servants in Coreper. Future social

movement research should devise similar tests based on organizational identity, as the back door model may apply to other social groups as well.

When it comes to group collaborations, I found evidence of an "isolation effect" in the domestic arena that has implications for collaborative activity across levels. Services/care organizations are the most likely to act in concert with others at the national level. In contrast, political/legal and asylum organizations tend to collaborate outside of the national setting. This finding suggests that domestic collaboration is structured in favor of more moderate groups. In turn, the more challenging groups must look beyond the state for similar opportunities, implying that their patterns of collaboration are shaped by their isolation at the national level. This finding holds interesting implications for the claim that a transnational civil society is emerging. If other movement studies find a similar isolation effect, then these transnational actors are likely to be slightly more radical and push for policy reforms considered by national governments to be more challenging.

Organizational Resources

This study found that older groups are more likely to challenge their national governments than younger organizations. This contradicts theoretical arguments that with time groups become more moderate as they learn to develop strategic political relationships and to work within established channels of participation. I suggested that groups established before 1990 may experience some degree of path dependency in terms of their political strategies. In the migrant inclusion movement, it was not until the 1990s that migrant and refugee issues assumed a prominent place in the public debate in most West European countries. Before that time, PMR organizations may have relied mainly on challenging tactics because they faced few options for influence via institutional means. As policy debates evolved over time, groups became more likely to find political allies within government. However, older groups may simply be more apt to include protest in their political repertoires because it was an essential tactic at one point in time, and served to draw public attention to their causes.

One aim of this study was to assess how the supranational source of group resources shapes political behavior across levels. Interestingly, I found that groups that receive EU funding are far more likely to act confrontationally against their national governments rather than lobby them. In addition, this study has shown that EU financing does mobilize transnational activity, but very little of it. Because a stated aim of Commission grants to civil society organizations is to increase transnationalism, it is unexpected that they do not significantly increase the likelihood of collaborative activities and projects among groups in different countries when controlling for other factors. In contrast, I found that groups with an EU grant are more likely to exchange resources with other *domestic* NGOs. Overall, these findings call into question the real value added of EU grants in encouraging transnational collaboration.

In sum, in comparing activity across levels rather than across countries, I found that PMR groups are active at each level and only in isolated circumstances do groups use one level as an alternative to another. Rather, this study has shown that activity occurs in each arena because they all serve an important function in working toward the goals of the movement. Moreover, although interconnectedness is often the strongest predictor of activity across levels, each set of factors exhibits some influence in shaping the behavior of PMR groups.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Several broad elements of this study warrant further attention in future research. First, the number of included organizations should be expanded so that research can continue to develop and refine theories about the different activity patterns of social movements. Such theories should go beyond the simple distinction between conventional and challenging action to capture increasingly distinct modes of activity. Adding more cases to the analyses would increase the reliability of the findings and the conclusions drawn from them. That being said, however, the number of cases in this study is sufficient to perform complex statistical analyses and subsequently draw inferences.

Taken together, the results presented here show that the best possible contextual situation occurs when pro-migrant organizations are well-connected across levels of governance, operate in

an open issue-specific national policy context, pursue more moderate as opposed to radical policy goals, and have high or increasing levels of resources at their disposal in order to undertake a broad range of activity. Given this ideal, a promising avenue for future studies would be to explicitly model the interaction effects among these sets of variables. Such conditional effects represent an under-explored topic in social movement studies yet are important for theory building. For example, do resources mediate the effects of group ties in predicting participation in various activity modes at different levels of governance? Does the POS interact with the group characteristics variables to structure interconnectedness? Do different types of group ties mediate the effect of group ideology on activity patterns? In exploring the interactions between group ties and more common social movement variables, research can begin to extend and refine the network model developed in this study.

In addition, the social movement literature is lacking in terms of comparative studies of movements. Thus, an interesting avenue for future research would be to compare the activities of the migrant inclusion movement with other social movements, such as environmentalism or the women's movement. For example, it would be informative to investigate how organizational identity structures the activity patterns of environmental groups compared to migrant inclusion actors. Do environmental groups experience a similar "isolation effect" at the domestic level based on their ideology? Do certain types of groups devise comparable "back door" strategies when it comes to influencing the EU? Does EU funding shape the activities of women's lobbies in ways similar to the migrant inclusion movement? Moreover, the findings of this study as they pertain to the interconnectedness variables would be strengthened if research showed that group ties shape the activities of other movements in similar ways.

This study could be improved in three main ways. First, this research project would greatly benefit by collecting survey data over time. Rather than providing a snapshot of group activity, longitudinal data would enable an investigation of *changes* in activity patterns at various levels, and the factors that influence them. In general, very little of the social movement literature

examines action repertoires over time. Thus, future waves of the survey should be planned and executed. The data for this study was collected from 2004-2006. It would be logical for the next wave of the survey to span 2007-2008.

A second wave of the survey would also be useful in addressing issues of causal ordering that this study, by nature of its design and limited scope, cannot speak to. While this study conceptualizes interconnections among groups as independent variables that affect political behavior, group ties may also be important outcomes of social movements in and of themselves. Another wave of survey data would allow analysis of the over time reciprocal effects of group ties by, for example, identifying the leading organizations in this policy area and charting their interconnections and political tactics over time. As this study relies on cross-sectional data, it cannot determine if a reciprocal relationship exists. Thus, while this research establishes a relationship between interconnectedness and activity, longitudinal survey data is needed to further test the causal ordering of this relationship.

Secondly, the findings presented here would be even more robust if more organizations had been included in the study. Although I targeted approximately 600 groups, only a fraction of them chose to participate. Future rounds of the survey should devise a means of increasing the response rate so that a larger sample can be assessed. One way to accomplish this would be to increase the number of groups that are initially targeted, perhaps from 600 to 1600. A second avenue would be to expand the number of countries included, a point which I address below.

Finally, it would be useful to increase the number of countries in the study to include all 25 current member states, and perhaps even expand the project beyond the EU. In addition to representing a viable strategy for increasing the sample size, this would also allow for the analysis of specific country or regional effects. The analyses of this study relied on pooled models, which aggregated responses from each country into a sample of PMR group actors.[29] Although this

[29] However, the analyses in this study do include a regional control variable. The inclusion of individual country control variables was not possible due to the significant loss of degrees of freedom.

strategy was appropriate given the aims of this study and considering that it was limited to the EU member states, it may not be the best method for future analyses that extend beyond the EU. For example, disaggregating by country (or at least including country control variables) would shed light on country-specific effects that could impact group activity. More importantly, it would allow us to discern whether patterns exist in specific countries or regions. This could be an important step in building theory about how specific national or regional environments impact group activity. In order to accomplish this, I would have to greatly increase the number of groups surveyed within many of the countries included here. This also represents a task for future research.

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY: MIGRANT INCLUSION INTERESTS AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN EUROPE

Finally, the findings of this study have implications not only for PMR interest groups, but also for politics in advanced democracies. This research has identified the migrant inclusion movement as an important and growing development for the EU and its member states. Yet, the significance of the movement goes further. Pro-migrant lobbies are more than just relatively new actors on the political stage; migrant inclusion and other new social movements illustrate the broader political changes that are causing a transformation of the political process in advanced democracies. Taken together, migrant inclusion and other new social movement politics may be an indicator of political developments to come.

As others have argued (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Dalton 1994), new social movements represent a distinct, albeit not revolutionary, challenge to the political establishment of advanced democracies. Pro-migrant lobbies do not seek to destroy the existing legal system that restricts migrant entry, free movement, and access to citizenship; nor do they want to topple the democratic political process that provides an outlet for sometimes negative public opinion. Although the media tends to focus on the more radical elements of the movement, such groups do not represent the norm. Rather, the migrant inclusion movement, like other social movements,

mainly promotes a reformist challenge to contemporary politics in advanced democracies. Groups press for political reform in a range of venues, and often request simply that European leaders and societies cast migrant inclusion in a more balanced light in the public debate.

Perhaps most significantly, the migrant inclusion movement typifies the expansion of the political agenda to include non-economic issues as primary political concerns. European citizens must increasingly concern themselves with better integrating the migrants living in their societies in order to prevent social unrest. National and European policymakers are beginning to incorporate migrant inclusion considerations into their legislation; this need will only increase with time as problems of migrant integration become more visible and pressing. Furthermore, migrant inclusion issues are part of broader quality-of-life concerns, such as environmentalism, life-style choices, and women's rights. Rather than superseding the traditional economic interests of advanced democracies, these new issue interests add a new political dimension (Inglehart 1990). Others have argued that this new dimension "competes with and potentially contradicts established lines of political division," (Dalton 1994: 256; see also Dalton et al. 1984).

Migrant inclusion, like other social movements, also illustrates a broader change in the character of European interest group politics. Across Europe, most business organizations, labor unions, and other economic interests abide by the neocorporatist model whereby different interests are united under an umbrella organization. However, migrant inclusion interests, like other social groups, are characterized by organizational diversity, which encourages groups to compete for membership, finances, and political influence. Even the umbrella groups within the movement act more as coordinating and networking bodies rather than authorities claiming to speak for the movement.

The political style of the migrant inclusion movement is also somewhat distinct from the routine patterns of conventional interest group lobbying. Many pro-migrant lobbies have established close ties with government agencies across levels of governance. At the same time, however, challenging behavior remains a key component of the political repertoire of some PMR

groups (although it is not as common as the media suggest). Thus, the migrant inclusion movement combines practical activities with protest politics. Moreover, this study finds that, in contrast to other movements, pro-migrant groups do *not* tend to moderate their tactics with time; thus, it is unlikely that the movement will completely forego the use of unconventional methods. The co-existence of protest and more conventional groups highlights that, unlike neocorporatist systems, there is no monopoly of representation in the movement. The challenging identity of the movement, together with the need to mobilize support and communicate with the mass base, gives rise to the use of direct action tactics. In general, this mixture of political strategies highlights another identifying characteristic of new social movement politics.

The fact that there is no single notion of migrant inclusion, and that groups pursue social change through a variety of methods, suggests that policymakers are dealing with a competitive and flexible form of interest representation. This implies that the arenas for decision-making are likely to remain broad, from local governments to national parliaments and courts to European institutions to international bodies. It also suggests that, together with other social movements, the migrant inclusion movement may be helping to reshape the character of democratic political processes across Europe.

There is evidence that the movement is impacting policy reform in incremental ways and is at least setting the terms for reform of the policy process. For example, MRAX and European Coordination for a Foreigner's Right to Family Life campaigned to include specific statements about anti-racism in the (now stalled) draft constitution of the EU, which ended up being adopted. Moreover, many migrant inclusion networks, along with the European Parliament (EP), campaigned for the President of the EP to request a withdrawal of the unpopular Family Reunification Directive. Ultimately, the ECJ ruled to withdraw it. Finally, on November 19th, 2004 the Council produced the Common Basic Principles on Integration, which was approved by all member states. Importantly, this gives the EU the tools to continue taking measures at the EU

level and to establish a firmer foundation in this policy area.[30] In terms of reforming the policy process, most groups would like to see migration and asylum issues included in the open method of coordination[31] within the EU; the Commission even issued a communication on this matter. At present, however, groups have been unable to realize this goal.

In general, the migrant inclusion movement is working to become an instrument for social change. In order to make progress, groups consider what is feasible to accomplish in addition to what may be ideal. Organizing seminars on migration, arranging workshops on best practice, and creating steering committees may not transform the political landscape, but may constitute a small step toward influencing reform, particularly insofar as these activities promote interconnectedness and network-building. One group representative summarized this logic in stating that "it's difficult, but little by little, things are taking shape." This statement implies that, although the ultimate goals of reform legislation and reform of the policy process may not be easy to attain, groups can work in much smaller ways to shape the public debate, bring stakeholders together in common venues, and influence policymakers. The future is likely to see a continuation of this pattern of incremental progress interspersed with occasional setbacks.

At the same time, however, social unrest among those most affected by exclusionary or stringent migrant integration policies is also likely to continue, and may even worsen. The sustained suburban rioting in France in November 2005, for example, typifies a sense of frustration, hopelessness, and separation from mainstream society among young migrant and ethnic minority populations. Because of the divisive effects on society, governments are

[30] However, many groups saw this as a defeat, since civil society was not involved in the drafting of this document.

[31] The open method of coordination is a term for a specific type of policy influence. If there is an area in which the EU lacks competence, it can exert influence not through laws but through other measures. The Commission proposes guidelines for the member states in a given area. These are then adopted by the Council. The member states must report bi-annually on their progress towards achieving those guidelines as well as outline plans for their future attainment (these are called National Action Plans). The Commission reads these National Action Plans and issues an opinion on how each member state is performing. It gives individual recommendations to each member state, and rank orders them in terms of their performance. It then creates a synthesis report containing this information, which is then adopted by the Council. The idea behind this strategy is peer pressure and embarrassment of those member states that lag behind others. The European Employment Strategy, for example, uses this method.

increasingly forced to examine remedies to discrimination and methods of reducing barriers to integration. This situation, together with the developments that migrant inclusion lobbies have already achieved, underlies a genuine potential for substantive policy change in the near future.

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VITAE

MELISSA SCHNYDER

Permanent address: 2300 41st Street, NW, #105, Washington, DC 20007
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EDUCATION

- **Ph.D.** Political Science, October 2006, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, USA
  Sub-field areas of specialization: Comparative Politics and International Relations with focus on quantitative/survey research
  GPA: 3.9/4.0, Total cumulative GPA credits: 77
  Thesis: *"Interest Group Politics in the European Union: Migrant Inclusion Organizations and Political Behavior across Levels of Governance"*

  Sample of Graduate Coursework in Research Design/Quantitative Methodology: Introduction to the Study of Politics (research design), Political Data Analysis I (data analysis), Computer Applications in Political Science (data analysis), Math Tools for Political Scientists (data analysis), Political Data Analysis II (data analysis), Comparative Political Behavior (survey research), and Time Series Analysis (data analysis)

- **B.A.** May 1999, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, USA
  Double Major: International Studies and French
  Minor: Economics
  Summa cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa with Honors
  GPA: 3.876/4.0, Total cumulative GPA credits: 137

- **French Language Certificate**. May 1998, University of Paris La Sorbonne, Paris, France
  16 semester hours

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Current Position: Quantitative Consultant, Corporate Executive Board
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 6000, Washington, DC 20006

Key Duties: *Responsible for leading all quantitative research initiatives. Plan quantitative aspects of research projects. Collect and analyze data from Fortune 500 companies. Communicate key insights and write findings for executive audience.*

Key Accomplishments:

- Collect survey data from frontline staff of Fortune 500 companies
- Analyze data to produce custom reports for Fortune 500 executives
- Perform full range of statistical analyses for annual meeting series

Visiting Fulbright Researcher, Institute for European Studies
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University), Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium

Key Duties: *Received Fulbright research grant to carry out large-scale survey research project on pro-migrant and refugee interest groups in the European Union. Wrote and administered original survey to interest groups and political actors across Europe. Compiled and evaluated*

survey and interview data, statistically analyzed data, wrote reports, and presented research findings. Performed full range of administration, implementation, and data analysis duties.

Key Accomplishments:

- Conceptualized, wrote and administered five-part survey questionnaire targeting over 1,000 migrant and refugee organizations throughout 20 countries of the European Union
- Organized and conducted in-person, semi-structured interviews with over 35 representatives of migrant and refugee organizations in Belgium, and with over 20 representatives of the European Commission and European Parliamentarians
- Created/managed large statistical database, developed coding criteria, and coded survey responses
- Analyzed data using full range of statistical techniques including: factor analysis, multiple regression, analysis of variance, and tests of significance
- Wrote reports of findings and presented research to management, board of directors, and colleagues

Project Assistant, The Views of European Parliamentarians on European Integration Project
The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Transatlantic Center, Residence Palace Bloc C, Rue de la Loi 155, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium

Key Duties: *Responsible for all aspects of data collection and project management involving an original statistical survey research project of European Parliamentarians' attitudes toward European integration.*

Key Accomplishments:

- Planned and designed applied research to probe elite opinion on European Union integration
- Assisted in conceptualization and drafting of 11-page survey questionnaire and codebook
- Organized and conducted structured elite interviews with over 70 European Parliamentarians from eight countries
- Created and managed large statistical database of survey responses
- Applied descriptive and inferential statistical techniques to survey data using STATA statistical software program

Research Assistant, Professor Robert Rohrschneider
Indiana University, 1100 E. 7th St., Bloomington, IN 47405, USA

Key Duties: *Assisted in organizing conference on Public Opinion about the European Union in Post Communist Europe, and edited book manuscript based on conference for Indiana University and Oxford University professors. Served as literature consultant for project on Survey of Minority Rights and Political Tolerance to be submitted for publication.*

Key Accomplishments:

- Helped manage event planning and assisted conference sponsors as needed for Public Opinion about the EU in Post-Communist Eastern Europe Conference, Indiana University, April 2-3, 2004, Bloomington, IN.
- Read and evaluated 14 chapters of edited volume of public opinion studies based on above conference to be published by Berghahn Books
- Implemented appropriate stylistic, methodological and grammatical editing changes to text

- Assessed current debates and themes in ethnic minorities and political tolerance literatures
- Drafted 10-page literature review to Principal Investigators for use in public opinion project on Minority Rights and Political Tolerance, based on European Social Survey data
- Achieved place as third author for Minority Rights and Political Tolerance research paper to be submitted to peer-reviewed academic journal in 2006

Instructor, Social Movements and Protest in Democracies
Indiana University, Political Science Department, 210 Woodburn Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA

Key Duties: *Conceptualized, designed, and taught new undergraduate course on social movements. Supervised one teaching assistant and oversaw course administration.*

Key Accomplishments:

- Researched, wrote and delivered bi-weekly lectures on social movement theory and 7 case studies
- Delegated and oversaw administrative duties of teaching assistant
- Evaluated students' written assignments and managed large database of over 80 students
- Served as Associate Instructor for 7 additional courses in collaboration with full professors

PUBLICATIONS

"Getting By With a Little Help From Their Friends: NGO Cooperation and Participation in Multi-level Policy Processes," (2006, forthcoming). Institute for European Studies Working Paper Series.

"Creating Networks from Diversity in the Pro-Migrant and Refugee Movement," (2005). One Europe Magazine. Special issue on Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations.

RESEARCH/CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

- Guest lecture, Vesalius College, Free University of Brussels, Belgium, March 11, 2006. *"Migrant Inclusion Interest Representation in the European Union."*
- Best Practices Symposium on Immigration and Ethnic Relations in European and North American Cities, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, January 26-28, 2006. *"Pro-Migrant Networks and a Multi-level Strategy for Migrant Inclusion."*
- American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 2005. *"Penetrating the Fortress? The Role and Impact of Pro-Migrant NGO Coalitions on the Anti-Discrimination Policy Agenda in the European Union."*
- Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, April 7-10, 2005. *"Networking among Pro-Migrant NGOs: Coalitions and their Influence on Policy Effectiveness."*
- Southern Political Science Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, January 8-10, 2004. Panel Chair: *"Immigration, Attitude Formation, and Problems of Collective Action."*
- Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, April 3-6, 2003. *"East-West Migration: Perceptions of Economic Reform, Political Reform, and Support for the EU."*

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Political Science Association
International Leadership Association
Phi Beta Kappa National Honor Society
Golden Key National Honor Society
Midwest Political Science Association
European Consortium for Political Research
Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society
Pi Delta Phi French National Honor Society

HONORS AND AWARDS

- Fulbright Grant Recipient to the European Union, International Institute of Education, the IIE-Fulbright Program, 9/2005-6/2006.
- Nominated for American Political Science Association 2006 prize for best paper on European Politics and Society
- Academic biography published by select invitation in *The Chancellor's List, 2005-2006*.
- Nomination for the Instructor of the Year Award, Indiana University (IU) Political Science Department, 4/2005.
- Certificate of Appreciation for Distinguished Service to the Graduate Studies Program in the Department of Political Science, 4/2005.
- First IU Foundation Scholarship, 5/24/2004.
- Graduate Fellowship for Dissertation Writing, IU Political Science Department, 4/23/2004.
- Best International Relations Research Paper (won two consecutive years), IU Political Science Department Annual Graduate Student Conference, 4/9/2004 and 3/7/2003.
- FLAS (Foreign Language and Area Studies) Fellowship, Hungarian, IU, 6-8/2003.
- FLAS Fellowship, Romanian, IU, 6-8/2002.
- FLAS Fellowship, Arabic, IU Center for the Study of Global Change, 8/2001-5/2002.
- Associate Instructorship and Academic Scholarship, IU Political Science, 9/2000-5/2004.

COMPUTER, RESEARCH, AND METHODS SKILLS

- Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Excel, PowerPoint
- Statistical software applications including STATA and SPSS
- Informational databases including: Internet, Lexis-Nexis, ABI Inform, EBSCO, and standard hard copy sources
- Research design, quantitative/qualitative research methods, and statistical techniques including:

  bivariate and multiple regression, time series, event count techniques, categorical data analysis, binary logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression, survey data analysis, factor analysis, sampling, sampling error, analysis of variance, significance tests, content analysis, structured and semi-structured interviews

LANGUAGE SKILLS

- French (extensive reading, writing, and speaking proficiency)
- Hungarian (basic reading and speaking proficiency)
- Romanian (basic reading and speaking proficiency)
- Arabic (basic reading, writing, and speaking proficiency